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Superior Court Rules That 3 Hour Delay Between End of Snowstorm and Beginning of Cleanup Was Not Unreasonable (Non-Precedential)

It appears that it is reasonable in Pennsylvania to have a cup of coffee or tea and enjoy the sight of a freshly fallen snow before having to go out and shovel.

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Melvin v. Sellani, No. 1234 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Dec. 31, 2025 Bowes, J., Stabile, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Mem. Op. by Stabile, J.), the court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant landowners and property manager in a slip and fall matter involving ice and/or snow.

The trial court decision entering summary judgment in favor of the Defendants had been entered by Judge Richard M. Hughes, III of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas.

Relative to the hills and ridges argument, the court noted that the Plaintiff failed to present evidence to establish when photographs of the scene of the incident were taken. There were conflicting statements as to whether the photos were taken the day of the incident or shortly thereafter. As such, the court noted that the photographs relied upon by the Plaintiff were not sufficient to create any material issues of fact as to whether the Defendants were under a duty to remedy any alleged hills and/or ridges of snow at the time of the incident.

The Superior Court otherwise observed that the Plaintiff failed to establish that an unreasonable of time had passed between the snowstorm and the alleged dangerous accumulation of snow or ice.

By the Plaintiff’s own testimony, it was snowing when she arrived at work at 6:30 in the morning on the day of the fall. The Plaintiff also confirmed that the snow had stopped by 3:00 p.m. when she left work. Three (3) to five (5) inches of snow had accumulated.

It was additionally indicated that the Defendant property manager indicated that he had begun to remove snow at 9:30 a.m. at the Plaintiff’s residence. The Plaintiff confirmed that the property manager was still working at snow removal when the Plaintiff arrived at home.

The court noted that, even if the snow had stopped immediately when the Plaintiff arrived at work earlier that morning, the Plaintiff provided no case law to support an argument “that a 3-hour delay between the cessation of the snow and the beginning of the clean up effort constitute[d] an unreasonable delay.” See Op. at 7.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Jill Wellington on www.pexels.com.

Civil Trial Stayed Pending Resolution of Companion Criminal Case

In the case of Estate of Dugan v. Hotton, No. 2023-CV-4957 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 6, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion to Stay a civil jury trial in a wrongful death action arising out of a motor vehicle accident pending the resolution of the Defendant’s companion criminal court proceedings under charges of driving under the influence.

In so ruling, the court reviewed the applicable six-factor balancing test adopted by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the case of Kessee v. Dougherty, 230 A.3d 1128 (Pa. Super. 2020). After reviewing those 6-factors, the court deemed it appropriate to enter the stay.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, who decided this issue, handed down a very detailed Opinion outlining the current status of the law in this regard.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Defense counsel in this case is Daniel E. Cummins, Esq.

Source of image: Photo by Cottonbro Studios on www.pexels.com.

Court Allows Claim To Proceed Against UIM Carrier Where UIM Claims Rep Allegedly Interfered With Settlement Negotiations In Third Party Case

In the case of Winner v. Progressive Advanced Ins., No. 2230 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Sept. 24, 2025 Panella, P.J.E., Nichols, J., and Ford Elliott, P.J.E.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court overruled the dismissal of an Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) claims that was based on alleged actions of an insurance adjuster who allegedly intentionally interfered with the policyholder’s settlement negotiations in a lawsuit with a third party Defendant.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a car accident.  During the course of the matter, after completing productive settlement negotiations in the third party matter, Plaintiff's counsel contacted the UIM carrier to request that a UIM claim be opened.

Thereafter, the UIM claims representative, without the consent of the carrier's insured or the insured's attorney, contacted the third party defense attorney and informed that defense attorney of a subsequent accident that the Plaintiff had been involved in.  As is turned out, the subsequent accident only involved property damages and no injuries to the insured.

Plaintiff's counsel in this matter alleged that the UIM carrier had allegedly contacted the third party defense attorney in order to persuade that attorney to reduce his settlement offer in the third party case in an attempt to shield the UIM carrier from the UIM claim.  In other words, the Plaintiff asserted that the UIM carrier purposely interfered in the third party matter in an effort to prevent the Plaintiff from recieving UIM benefits.

Based on these facts, the Superior Court overruled the trial court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's UTPCPL claims.

The Superior Court additionally held that the forum selection clause in the policy that applies to any action brought against the insurance company requiring that such action must be brought in a county in which a person seeking benefits resides also applies to bad faith and unfair trade practices claims based on the conduct alleged in this matter.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Court Summaries” By Timothy L. Clawges, Pennsylvania Bar News (Oct. 20, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Sean Musil on www.unsplash.com.

Not So Fast: Superior Court Quashes Appeal After Finding That Trial Court Order Was Not a Final Order

In the case of Henry v. Colangelo, 2025 Pa. Super. 265 (Pa. Super. Nov. 26, 2025 Kunselman, J., McLaughlin, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed an appeal after finding that the Order that the appellant had appealed from was not a final Order.

More specifically, although the trial court had certified an Order granting summary judgment against some but not all of the Defendants in a negligence and wrongful death suit as a final Order and immediately appealable, the Superior Court quashed the appeal after finding that the Order was not final and that an appeal would not facilitate resolution of the entire case.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Court Summaries” By Timothy L. Clawges, Pennsylvania Bar News (Dec. 22, 2025).

Court Refers To Required Liberal Construction of Rules in Relieving Pro Se Plaintiff From a Judgment Non Pros

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Morrison v. Pennsylvania State Police, No. 182 C.D. 2024 (Pa. Cmwlth. Dec. 9, 2025 Covey, J., Fizzano Cannon, J., and Wallis, J.) (Op. by Covey, J.) (Op. not reported), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court ruled that a trial court’s failure to send a Notice of Judgment Non Pros to Plaintiff’s correct address warranted a liberal application of the Rules of Procedure to allow the Plaintiff to amend his Motion to Strike the Judgment of Non Pros in order to allow the Plaintiff to comply with the rules’ requirements.

Based upon this ruling, the appellate court vacated the trial court’s Order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This matter involved a pro se prisoner Plaintiff.

In so ruling, the appellate court also referred to the liberal construction of the Rules of Civil Procedure that is required by Pa.R.C.P. 126.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Dec. 23, 2025).

Judge Munley of Federal Middle District Court Addresses Scope of State Created Danger Claims

In the case of T.M. v. East Stroudsburg Area School District, No. 3:24-CV-1465 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2025 Munley, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss a personal injury action arising out of allegations that the minor Plaintiff, who was a 6 year old boy with special education needs, allegedly sustained permanent injuries after being allegedly violently beaten by another student on a school bus.

According to the Opinion, the case involved, at a minimum, constitutional claims against the school district and certain school officials, as well as state law claims under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). Included in the claims were state created danger federal claims.

As part of her decision, Judge Julia K. Munley rejected the defense argument that the Plaintiffs were required to allege “affirmative acts” on the part of the state actors to meet the legal standards required to proceed on a claim of a state created danger.

Judge Julia K. Munley
M.D. Pa.

Rather, Judge Munley agreed with the Plaintiff’s argument that an awareness of a risk, coupled with acts of omission or failures to act, could render the Plaintiff more vulnerable to harm. The court therefore held that such circumstances could constitute “affirmative misuse of state authority” sufficient to establish a state created danger claim, assuming the other elements of that cause of action are also met. In so ruling, the court rejected the Defendants’ argument that affirmative action is required to support a claim of a state created danger.

The court also addressed the vehicle exception to governmental immunity under the PSTCA. The court rejected the Defendants’ argument that the Plaintiff’s injury must stem from the actual operation of a vehicle in motion. To the contrary, the court ruled that the exception applies even where a state actor is in actual physical control of the vehicle when the harm occurs, such as even when a parked vehicle is involved. Accordingly, the court ruled that the exception could apply regardless of whether the vehicle was in motion.

Judge Munley additionally rejected the defense argument that pain and suffering damages were not available to the 6 year old minor Plaintiff under the PSTCA. The Defendants argued that the minor’s injuries did not amount to a permanent loss of bodily function or disfigurement. In this case, the Plaintiff sustained a concussion, facial contusions and lacerations, and severe PTSD.

Judge Munley found that such injuries did in fact support a request for pain and suffering damages under the PSTCA.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE


I send thanks to Attorney Robert T. Moran of the Moran Law Group, LLC in Scranton, PA for bringing this case to my attention.