Court Rules that Defendant's Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims Also Eradicates Cross-claims by Co-Defendant

In the case Robinson v. Phila. Intern. Airport, 263 C.D. 2002 (Pa. Cmwlth. June 9, 2025 Fizzano Cannon, J., McCullough, J., and Hannah Levitt, J.) (Op. by Fizzano Cannon, J.), the court granted the interlocutory appeal and addressed Motions In Limine in a municipal liability personal injury case.

This matter arose out of a slip and fall incident at the Philadelphia International Airport.  The Plaintiff apparently took a trip prior to her flight.

In this appeal, the court noted that, where summary judgment had been granted against the Plaintiffs’ claims against the municipal Defendant, that Defendant could not be held liable for purposes of contribution or indemnity relative to the Co-Defendants.

The court more specifically noted that, where the municipal Defendant had secured summary judgment on the common law ground that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the condition on the land that the Plaintiff claimed was responsible for her injury, that Defendant likewise could not be held liable for indemnity on the cross-claims asserted by the Co-Defendants.

The Commonwealth Court additionally noted that, because the non-municipal Defendant did not oppose the municipal Defendant’s summary judgment motion against the Plaintiff’s claims, which claims were also the basis of the non-municipal Defendant’s crossclaims, that non-municipal Defendant was found to have waived any right to contest the granting of summary judgment.

That waiver and the entry of summary judgment precluded the non-municipal Defendant from later moving to have the municipal Defendant added to the verdict sheet under the Fair Share Act. This was so because the municipal Defendant, by virtue of summary judgment decision, had already been adjudicated as not being a joint tortfeasor with the Co-Defendant relative to the claims of the Plaintiff.

The Court ruled that a subsequent trial judge’s Order granting the non-municipal Defendant’s Motion In Limine to allow evidence against the municipal Defendant and to place it on the verdict sheet therefore violated the coordinate jurisdiction doctrine. As such, the court on appeal ruled that the non-municipal Defendant could certainly assert that it was not liable on the Plaintiff’s claims at trial, but that Defendant could not argue that the municipal Defendant was liable.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Alex P on www.pexels.com.

Appellate Court Addresses Applicability if an Absolute Auto Exclusion in a Business General Liability Policy

In the case of Chris Eldredge Containers v. Crumb & Foster Specialty Ins., 2025 Pa. Super. 92 (Pa. Super. April 24, 2025 Lazarus, P.J., King, J., Lane, J.) (Op by. Lazarus, P.J.), the court addressed a coverage issue in this declaratory judgment action involving various coverage issues, including the applicability of an automobile exclusion in a business policy in a case involving an accident that involved a service truck driven by an employee of the carriers' insured.

The appellate court noted that it was proceeding under a de novo standard of appeal, meaning that it was not limited by the trial court's rationale and could affirm or reverse the trial court decision on any basis.   

The Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that the absolute auto exclusion, which excluded coverage for bodily injury under the policy for any incident arising out of the use of an auto, was found to be ambiguous in the context of this policy and was, therefore, found to be not enforceable.

The Superior Court additionally ruled that the ownership clause in the absolute auto exclusion was found to be ambiguous when it failed to specify whose ownership, maintenance, use, or entrustment served to trigger that exclusion.

In the end, the appellate court reversed the trial court decisions and found that the carriers did owe a duty to defend and indemnify its insured under the facts presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Court Summaries” in the Pennsylvania Bar News By Timothy L. Clawges (June 9, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Vlad Deep from www.unsplash.com.

Trial Court Grants UIM Carrier's Motion to Sever and Stay a Companion Bad Faith Claim in a Post-Koken Case

In the case of Bixler v. Erie Insurance Exchange, AD No. 2024-CV-11155 (C.P. Butler Co. June 5, 2025 Streib, J.), the court issued an Order in a post-Koken case granting the UIM carrier’s Motion to Sever and Stay the bad faith claim from the UIM claim. The court did not issue any Opinion with this Order.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Order may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Court Applies Forum Selection Clause Contained in Pre-Surgery Consent Form To Transfer Medical Malpractice Case Out of Philadelphia Venue to Bucks County

In the case of Somerlot v. Jung, Sept. Term 2023, No. 3138 (C.P. Phila. Co. Nov. 25, 2024 Bright, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Pennsylvania Superior Court to uphold the Philadelphia County trial court’s decision to transfer a medical malpractice case from Philadelphia County to Bucks County.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of an alleged medical malpractice claim related to a surgery that was rendered in Bucks County to a Bucks County resident Plaintiff by a Bucks County physician/medical practice.

The court based its decision on transferring the case from Philadelphia County to Bucks County on a valid forum selection clause that was contained in a pre-surgery consent form executed by the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff pointed to the fact that one of the Defendants, a medical device manufacturer, had previously stipulated with the Plaintiffs that venue was proper in Philadelphia as to that Defendant. However, the trial court noted that the propriety of venue in Philadelphia was not dispositive based on the fact that a Defendant had previously stipulated to venue in Philadelphia. 

Here, the court noted that the injured Plaintiff had contracted to litigate in a different, but also proper venue when the Plaintiff executed the consent form. The trial court held that it was giving preference to the Plaintiffs’ original choice of forum, as reflected in the executed consent form. 

The court additionally noted that litigating the entire case in Bucks County would void splitting the case just as effectively as reversing the transfer of moving the matter back to Philadelphia as was requested by the Plaintiffs. 

The trial court additionally stated that there were no exceptional circumstances present in this case that would warrant straying from the general principle that a valid forum selection clause is to be honored by the courts.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 27, 2025).

Superior Court Overturns Med Mal Defense Verdict Based on Erroneous Evidentiary Rulings by Trial Court

In the case of Hagelauer v. Mainline Emergency Medicine Associates, LLC, No. 2064 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. June 2, 2025 Panella, P.J.E., Beck, J., and Ford Elliot, P.J.E.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed various issues raised following the entry of a defense verdict in a medical malpractice case.

According to the Opinion, the allegations pertained to the treatment, or lack thereof, relative to a deceased Plaintiff who suffered cardiac arrest.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court overruled the defense verdict based upon a finding, in part, that the trial court had improperly barred the Plaintiffs from cross-examining the Defendants’ expert about an article that the expert had authored which conflicted with his trial testimony.

The Superior Court noted that an expert's authoring of an article and including a reference to the article in his CV constituted an adoption of the information contained in the article by that expert. The appellate court found that it was not credible that an expert would author an article that she or he did not adopt and support.

As such, the preclusion by the trial court of the cross-examination of the Defendant's expert on that article was found to be reversible error as the Superior Court ruled that the jury missed out on important information that might have colored its evaluation of that expert’s credibility.

The Superior otherwise addressed a separate issue of hearsay within hearsay that arose during the course of the trial.

The appellate court noted that it was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court to have excluded a note written by the Plaintiff as inadmissible double hearsay.

The note at issue included a compound statement referred not only to the Plaintiff's state of mind, but also referenced medical instructions.

While the portion of the statement that referenced the Plaintiff's state of mind may have been admissible under Pa.R.E. 803(3)'s hearsay exception related to a declarant's statement of their then-existing state of mind or condition, here, the court noted that compound statements such as the one at issue were not admissible.

Rather, the court noted that, given the existence of hearsay within hearsay, the trial court properly excluded the evidence.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Bad Evidentiary Ruling In Med Mal Trial Spurs Pa. Appeals Court To Toss Hospital’s Defense Verdict,” By Aleeza Furman of The Legal Intelligencer (June 4, 2025).

Soure of image: Photo by Katrin Bolovtsova on www.pexels.com.

Federal Court Addresses Request to Amend Complaint in a UIM Bad Faith Claim

In the case of Binotto v. Geico, No. 3:22-CV-210 (W.D. Pa. May 30, 2025 Haines, J.), the court denied a Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint in order to allege bad faith against the carrier.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs had previously filed a Second Amended Complaint which included allegations of bad faith against Geico. However, the Plaintiffs opted to withdraw that Second Amended Complaint under an indication that they thought that the case would settle with the resolution of the summary judgment proceedings. 

When the case did not settle after the court’s resolution of the summary judgment motions, the Plaintiffs then presented this Motion for Leave of Court to File a Third Amended Complaint in order to put the bad faith claim back into play.

The court reviewed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), which sets out the standard for granting leave to amend a Complaint when a responsive pleading has already been served. Under that rule, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or with leave of court. The rule additionally states that the court should freely give leave of court when justice so requires.

However, the court in this matter noted that the policy favoring liberal amendments is not without bounds. The decision on whether to grant or deny a Motion for Leave to Amend still rests within the sound discretion of the district court.

The court noted that a federal district court may deny leave to amend a Complaint where it is apparent from the record that (1) the moving party has demonstrated undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motives, (2) the amendment would be futile, or (3) the amendment would prejudice the other party.

In this case, the court found that there is no prejudice to the Defendant by the proposed Third Amended Complaint. The court additionally found that, while the Motion for Leave was filed late in the litigation, the court did not find that the Plaintiff acted with any undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motives. The court also noted that the trial date was still several months away.

Accordingly, the court addressed the element of whether the allowance of an amendment would be futile under the case presented. In this regard, the Plaintiffs asserted that the Defendant carrier never had any intention of fairly and in good faith attempting to negotiate a settlement.

Under the facts presented in this case, the court found that the Defendant carrier’s delay in offering its settlement amount until the summary judgment proceedings were resolved and the Defendant carrier’s subsequent low settlement offer did not amount to clear and convincing evidence of bad faith in any event.

The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the Defendant acted in bad faith by failing to investigate, allegedly misrepresenting policy provisions, failing to make a reasonable offer in failing to explain the offer. The court found that there were no facts presented in the proposed Third Amended Complaint to support those inferences drawn by the Plaintiff.

Accordingly, the court denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph A. Hudock, Jr. of the Pittsburgh office of the law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Superior Rejects Prothonotary's Rejection of a Writ of Summons That Had an Electric Signature

In the case of Scheibe v. Woodloch Resort, No. 1478 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. May 20, 2025 Stabile, J., McLaughlin, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by Lane, J.), the appellate court vacated a Pike County trial court’s Order granting a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in favor of the Defendant.  In the lower court proceedings, the trial court had dismissed the action with prejudice based upon the filing of a Praecipe for the Writ of Summons beyond the statute of limitations.

In this case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the Complaint was timely filed where the Prothonotary’s office acknowledged receipt of the Complaint on the last day of the limitations period.  The appellate court also noted that the Prothonotary lacked the authority to refuse to docket that Complaint based upon a non-compliance with local rules of court where the Complaint otherwise met the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

This case involved allegations that the Plaintiff was injured while attempting to use an inflatable water slide erected for guests use at the Woodloch Resort.

Six (6) days before the expiration of the applicable two year statute of limitations, the Plaintiff’s attorney mailed an electronically signed copy of a Praecipe For Writ of Summons through one day delivery by the Postal Service to the Prothonotary’s office. The USPS tracking information indicated the Praecipe was delivered the following day. However, the Prothonotary’s office did not docket the Praecipe for the rest of the week.

Rather, a clerk from the Prothonotary’s office contacted the Plaintiff’s counsel on the last date of the limitations period to advise that the Praecipe would not be docketed because it had an electronic signature in violation of the local rules that required original signatures.

Plaintiff’s counsel then prepared a hand-signed Praecipe that was delivered overnight and docketed the day after the statute of limitations had expired.

The Defendants’ moved for judgment on the pleadings under an allegations that the suit was not filed within the statute of limitations. 

The trial court granted the motion based upon a strict application of the statute of limitations. The trial court noted that it did not hold any oversight over the policies and procedures of the Prothonotary’s office.  The trial court found that the properly filed Praecipe was not docketed until after the statute of limitations had expired.

The Superior Court reversed.  The appellate court first confirmed that there was no requirement in the Rules of Civil Procedure for a Praecipe to be hand-signed by a party or their attorney, as the rules contemplated that a “signature” could include a computer-generated signature.

The Superior Court additionally held that, under the rules, documents mailed to the Prothonotary’s office were deemed to be filed when received by that office as a litigant would have no control over when that office would stamp and process the filing.

The Superior Court additionally confirmed that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure expressly prohibited the rejection of a filing that complied with those Rules of Civil Procedure where that filing did not meet the requirements of a local rule.

The Superior Court also found that the Prothonotary has no discretion to reject documents due to defects, as such authority lays with the trial court.

Accordingly, the Superior Court agreed that the Complaint was timely filed. The rationale of the Superior Court was that the Prothonotary had acknowledged that it had received the filing prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.  The Court reierated that the Prothonotary had no discretion to refuse to docket the Praecipe as it complied with the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert” on www.Law.com (June 3, 2025).