City Ruled Protected by the Immunity Afforded Under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act

In the case of Cruz v. City of Scranton, No 2024-CV-7644 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 28, 2025 Moyle, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in a case in which the Plaintiff sued the City of Scranton relative to the police department’s handling of the Plaintiff’s stolen motorcycle.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff reported that her motorcycle was stolen. The Scranton Police Department was later informed by the Reading Police Department that the motorcycle was located at an auto facility in Reading, PA.

According to the Opinion, the Scranton Police Department allegedly never notified the Plaintiff of the location of her motorcycle. The motorcycle was thereafter declared to be abandoned and accumulated impound fees. Thereafter, the Plaintiff received a bill from the auto company indicating that she owed over $15,000.00 for impound and storage fees.

In response to recieving this bill, the Plaintiff sued the City of Scranton for negligence.

The Defendant asserted immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act found at 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542.

While the court agreed that the City of Scranton Police Department was required by law to notify the Plaintiff regarding the recovery of the Plaintiff’s motorcycle by the Reading Police Department, the court ruled that the City of Scranton was granted immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s attempt to assert that the case fell under the exception to immunity relative to the care, custody, or control of personal property exception. The court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the receipt of information regarding the status of the Plaintiff’s motorcycle constituted control over the Plaintiff’s personal property.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Paul Walker of the Clarks Summit, PA law firm of Walker Law LLC, for bringing this decision to my attention.

Court Addresses Liability of Store To Customer Attacked By Assailant After Leaving the Store

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Borth v. Alpha Century Security, Inc., No. 2044 EDA 2022 (Pa. Super. Aug. 1, 2025 Lazarus, P.J., Beck, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Mem. Op. by Lazarus, P.J.) (non-precedential), the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Rite Aid and certain security companies in a lawsuit arising out of an incident during which the Plaintiff was assaulted by an individual at a location over 700 feet from the Rite Aid store.

According to the ruling, the assailant had been seen following the Plaintiff in the store and then left the store shortly after the Plaintiff left.  The record indicated that the security guards allegedly noticed this activity.

The appellate court ultimately ruled that the Defendants owed the Plaintiffs the duty owed to any business invitee, which was to take reasonable precautions against harmful third party conduct that might be reasonably anticipated.

The Superior Court additionally noted that, while it agreed with the trial court’s determination that Rite Aid’s duty to protect its invitees “does not extend to an area beyond its parking lot, city blocks from its location,” the Superior Court disagreed that it necessarily followed, under the facts in this case, that the subject attack was unforeseeable as a matter of law or that the criminal act of the assailant was a superseding event. See Op. at 8-9. 

The court noted that, although the Plaintiff was no longer on Rite Aid property when she was attacked by the assailant, it was not entirely clear whether Rite Aid’s precautions, or the security company Defendants’ actions, were reasonable and/or sufficient under the circumstances.

In this regard, the court noted that the Rite Aid store was in possession of reports putting the store on notice of crimes in the area. Moreover, there is evidence in this case that the representatives of the security company in the store was suspicious of the assailant in terms of his following the Plaintiff in the store and also leaving the store without buying anything shortly after the Plaintiff left the store.

In the end, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

Anyone wishing to review this non-precedential decision of the Superior Court may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Rayner Simpson on www.unsplash.com.

I send thanks to Attorney Thomas G. Wilkinson, Jr. of the Philadelphia office of Cozen & O'Connor for bringing this case to my attention.

Allegations of Recklessness Allowed To Proceed in Motor Vehicle Accident Case

In the case of Marcinkevich v. Stevens, No. 24-CV-1826 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 31, 2025 Gibbons, J.), the court overruled a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections filed against allegations of recklessness and for punitive damages in a standard motor vehicle accident case not involving any outrageous facts.

The court ruled that, because recklessness is a condition of the mind that, under this court’s reading of Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b) can be alleged generally where an underlying claim of negligence is pled, the court allowed these allegations to proceed into the discovery phase of the case.

The Court also allowed the claims for punitive damages to proceed as well.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Superior Court Rules that Default Judgment Against Defendant Should Have Been Opened

In the case of Lines v. Timothy Britton Const. Servs., Inc., No. 948 W.D.A. 2024 (Pa. Super. July 1, 2025 Bowes, J., Olson, J., and Bender, P.J.E.) (Op. by Bowes, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the proper procedure relative to a Petition to Strike and/or Open a Default Judgment. In the end, the court reversed a trial court’s Order dismissing a Defendant’s Petition to Strike and/or Open a Default Judgment.

This matter arose out of a lawsuit brought by a homeowner against the Defendant for breach of contract and violation of consumer protection law claims.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff’s Complaint did not contain a required Notice to Defend. When the Defendant made no response, the Plaintiffs ultimately obtained a default judgment. The Defendant then petitioned to strike and/or open the judgment based upon the deficiencies with the Plaintiff’s Complaint.

With the parties’ consent, the trial court struck the initial default judgment and granted the Defendant leave to file a responsive pleading. Thereafter, the Defendant failed to file a pleading and the Plaintiffs again secured a default judgment. The Defendant then petitioned to strike and/or open the second default judgment due to the Plaintiff’s failure to provide the notice required under Pa. R.C.P. 237.1.

The Plaintiffs argued that, given that they had previously provided their Rule 237.1 notice before the entry of the first default judgment, no new notice was required. 

 The trial court dismissed the Defendant’s Petition to Strike and/or Open and the Defendant then appealed.

The Superior Court held that the trial court erred in entering a second default judgment against the Defendant where notice pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 237.1 was missing. The appellate court ruled that the initial Rule 237.1 notice was not still in place by the time the second default judgment was entered. 

The appellate court also noted that the trial court’s extension of time to answer, which was issued after the entry of the initial default judgment, also did not comport with the requirements set forth under Pa. R.C.P. 237.6.

The appellate court otherwise also noted that the trial court’s agreed extension Order did not state that a failure to timely respond could result in another default judgment. As such, the appellate court ruled that, absent compliance with Rule 237.6, a default judgment could not be entered absent a new 10-Day Notice as required under Rule 237.1.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 16, 2025).

Superior Court Rules that Forum Selection Clause in Informed Consent Form is Enforceable in Medical Malpractice Cases

In the medical malpractice case of Somerlot v. Jung, No. 2578-EDA-2024 (Pa. Super. July 30, 2025 Lazarus, P.J., Kunselman, J., and King, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the validity of forum selection clauses in informed consent forms.

According to the Opinion, in this personal injury action, the Plaintiff had undergone treatment with certain medical providers and, under the contract entered into with those medical providers, the Plaintiff agreed that any litigation would be pursued solely in Bucks County.

Yet, the Plaintiff brought this personal injury lawsuit in Philadelphia County.  The medical Defendant filed Preliminary Objections asserting improper venue.

The Superior Court affirmed the decision of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas transferring the case to Bucks County based upon the forum selection clause.

The Superior Court upheld the general principle of contract law that the parties are free to pre-select among all possible proper venues as to which venue would be utilized to decide any legal disputes that might arise between them. Accordingly, the Superior Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Etactics Inc. on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Addresses Discoverability of Documents Under Patient Safety and Healthcare Quality Improvement Act in a Med Mal Case

In the case of Boyle v. Mainline Health, Inc., No. 2454 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. July 17, 2025 Lazarus, P.J., King, J., and Lane, J.) (Lane, J., Concurring and dissenting)(Maj. Op. by King, J.), the Superior Court ruled that reports created for the hospital’s patient safety organization constituted “deliberation or analysis of” the patient safety evaluation system. As such, the court ruled that these reports were privileged under the Patient Safety and Healthcare Quality Improvement Act. 

This case arose out of a medical malpractice lawsuit by the Plaintiffs seeking compensation for birth injuries sustained by their child.

During the course of discovery, the Defendants produced a privilege log regarding certain documents. The Plaintiff followed a discovery motion in response. The trial court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion.

On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. As part of the ruling, the Superior Court noted that the Defendants had a patient safety plan, which established a patient safety committee under MCARE.

The court found other documents that were not privileged given that those documents did not arise from a matter reviewed by the patient safety committee.

However, noted above, the court did find that certain other documents fell within the scope of the statutory privilege provided under the Patient Safety and Healthcare Quality Improvement Act.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. The concurring and dissenting Opinion issued by Judge Lane can be viewed HERE.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Aug. 6, 2025).

Judge Powell of Lackawanna County Rules on Medical Practice Pleading Isssues

In the case of Menon v. Geisinger Wyoming Valley Medical Center, No. 2024-CV-7436 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 23, 2025, Powell, J.), Judge Mark Powell of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas overruled various Preliminary Objections filed by the different medical Defendants to the Plaintiff’s medical malpractice Complaint.

This medical malpractice action arose from the death of a full-term newborn baby.

Relative to the Plaintiff’s claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress related to alleged negligent care during the late pregnancy stage and the delivery, the Defendants filed a demurrer. The Defendants asserted that the Plaintiffs failed to allege a contemporaneous sensory perception of the harm-producing event as required under Sinn v. Burd and Bloom v. Regional Medical Center.

The court disagreed and ruled that the Plaintiffs sufficiently pled a continuous traumatic sequence of events that included direct observation of the newborn’s distress and death. The court cited to the case of Neff v. Lasso, for the proposition that concept of sensory perception in this context under Pennsylvania law is not limited to visual observation but also includes awareness through experience and presence.

Judge Powell also overruled the Defendants’ objections regarding the lack of specificity with respect to the allegations of negligence and agency claims contained in the Complaint. The court held that, under Pennsylvania’s fact-pleading standard, Plaintiffs are not required to identify every employee and are not required to site specific hospital policies at issue at the pleadings stage.

Rather, the court found that, in this case, the Plaintiffs’ detailed allegations provided the Defendants with adequate notice of the claims presented. The court noted that the identity of unnamed agents could be ascertained through discovery efforts.

In this regard, the court emphasized that, in medical malpractice cases, Defendants typically control the relevant records and personnel information.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: Lackawanna Jurist, Vol. 126, No. 27 (July 4, 2025).