Superior Court Overturns Med Mal Defense Verdict Based on Erroneous Evidentiary Rulings by Trial Court

In the case of Hagelauer v. Mainline Emergency Medicine Associates, LLC, No. 2064 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. June 2, 2025 Panella, P.J.E., Beck, J., and Ford Elliot, P.J.E.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed various issues raised following the entry of a defense verdict in a medical malpractice case.

According to the Opinion, the allegations pertained to the treatment, or lack thereof, relative to a deceased Plaintiff who suffered cardiac arrest.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court overruled the defense verdict based upon a finding, in part, that the trial court had improperly barred the Plaintiffs from cross-examining the Defendants’ expert about an article that the expert had authored which conflicted with his trial testimony.

The Superior Court noted that an expert's authoring of an article and including a reference to the article in his CV constituted an adoption of the information contained in the article by that expert. The appellate court found that it was not credible that an expert would author an article that she or he did not adopt and support.

As such, the preclusion by the trial court of the cross-examination of the Defendant's expert on that article was found to be reversible error as the Superior Court ruled that the jury missed out on important information that might have colored its evaluation of that expert’s credibility.

The Superior otherwise addressed a separate issue of hearsay within hearsay that arose during the course of the trial.

The appellate court noted that it was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court to have excluded a note written by the Plaintiff as inadmissible double hearsay.

The note at issue included a compound statement referred not only to the Plaintiff's state of mind, but also referenced medical instructions.

While the portion of the statement that referenced the Plaintiff's state of mind may have been admissible under Pa.R.E. 803(3)'s hearsay exception related to a declarant's statement of their then-existing state of mind or condition, here, the court noted that compound statements such as the one at issue were not admissible.

Rather, the court noted that, given the existence of hearsay within hearsay, the trial court properly excluded the evidence.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Bad Evidentiary Ruling In Med Mal Trial Spurs Pa. Appeals Court To Toss Hospital’s Defense Verdict,” By Aleeza Furman of The Legal Intelligencer (June 4, 2025).

Soure of image: Photo by Katrin Bolovtsova on www.pexels.com.

Federal Court Addresses Request to Amend Complaint in a UIM Bad Faith Claim

In the case of Binotto v. Geico, No. 3:22-CV-210 (W.D. Pa. May 30, 2025 Haines, J.), the court denied a Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint in order to allege bad faith against the carrier.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs had previously filed a Second Amended Complaint which included allegations of bad faith against Geico. However, the Plaintiffs opted to withdraw that Second Amended Complaint under an indication that they thought that the case would settle with the resolution of the summary judgment proceedings. 

When the case did not settle after the court’s resolution of the summary judgment motions, the Plaintiffs then presented this Motion for Leave of Court to File a Third Amended Complaint in order to put the bad faith claim back into play.

The court reviewed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), which sets out the standard for granting leave to amend a Complaint when a responsive pleading has already been served. Under that rule, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or with leave of court. The rule additionally states that the court should freely give leave of court when justice so requires.

However, the court in this matter noted that the policy favoring liberal amendments is not without bounds. The decision on whether to grant or deny a Motion for Leave to Amend still rests within the sound discretion of the district court.

The court noted that a federal district court may deny leave to amend a Complaint where it is apparent from the record that (1) the moving party has demonstrated undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motives, (2) the amendment would be futile, or (3) the amendment would prejudice the other party.

In this case, the court found that there is no prejudice to the Defendant by the proposed Third Amended Complaint. The court additionally found that, while the Motion for Leave was filed late in the litigation, the court did not find that the Plaintiff acted with any undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motives. The court also noted that the trial date was still several months away.

Accordingly, the court addressed the element of whether the allowance of an amendment would be futile under the case presented. In this regard, the Plaintiffs asserted that the Defendant carrier never had any intention of fairly and in good faith attempting to negotiate a settlement.

Under the facts presented in this case, the court found that the Defendant carrier’s delay in offering its settlement amount until the summary judgment proceedings were resolved and the Defendant carrier’s subsequent low settlement offer did not amount to clear and convincing evidence of bad faith in any event.

The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the Defendant acted in bad faith by failing to investigate, allegedly misrepresenting policy provisions, failing to make a reasonable offer in failing to explain the offer. The court found that there were no facts presented in the proposed Third Amended Complaint to support those inferences drawn by the Plaintiff.

Accordingly, the court denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph A. Hudock, Jr. of the Pittsburgh office of the law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Superior Rejects Prothonotary's Rejection of a Writ of Summons That Had an Electric Signature

In the case of Scheibe v. Woodloch Resort, No. 1478 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. May 20, 2025 Stabile, J., McLaughlin, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by Lane, J.), the appellate court vacated a Pike County trial court’s Order granting a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in favor of the Defendant.  In the lower court proceedings, the trial court had dismissed the action with prejudice based upon the filing of a Praecipe for the Writ of Summons beyond the statute of limitations.

In this case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the Complaint was timely filed where the Prothonotary’s office acknowledged receipt of the Complaint on the last day of the limitations period.  The appellate court also noted that the Prothonotary lacked the authority to refuse to docket that Complaint based upon a non-compliance with local rules of court where the Complaint otherwise met the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

This case involved allegations that the Plaintiff was injured while attempting to use an inflatable water slide erected for guests use at the Woodloch Resort.

Six (6) days before the expiration of the applicable two year statute of limitations, the Plaintiff’s attorney mailed an electronically signed copy of a Praecipe For Writ of Summons through one day delivery by the Postal Service to the Prothonotary’s office. The USPS tracking information indicated the Praecipe was delivered the following day. However, the Prothonotary’s office did not docket the Praecipe for the rest of the week.

Rather, a clerk from the Prothonotary’s office contacted the Plaintiff’s counsel on the last date of the limitations period to advise that the Praecipe would not be docketed because it had an electronic signature in violation of the local rules that required original signatures.

Plaintiff’s counsel then prepared a hand-signed Praecipe that was delivered overnight and docketed the day after the statute of limitations had expired.

The Defendants’ moved for judgment on the pleadings under an allegations that the suit was not filed within the statute of limitations. 

The trial court granted the motion based upon a strict application of the statute of limitations. The trial court noted that it did not hold any oversight over the policies and procedures of the Prothonotary’s office.  The trial court found that the properly filed Praecipe was not docketed until after the statute of limitations had expired.

The Superior Court reversed.  The appellate court first confirmed that there was no requirement in the Rules of Civil Procedure for a Praecipe to be hand-signed by a party or their attorney, as the rules contemplated that a “signature” could include a computer-generated signature.

The Superior Court additionally held that, under the rules, documents mailed to the Prothonotary’s office were deemed to be filed when received by that office as a litigant would have no control over when that office would stamp and process the filing.

The Superior Court additionally confirmed that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure expressly prohibited the rejection of a filing that complied with those Rules of Civil Procedure where that filing did not meet the requirements of a local rule.

The Superior Court also found that the Prothonotary has no discretion to reject documents due to defects, as such authority lays with the trial court.

Accordingly, the Superior Court agreed that the Complaint was timely filed. The rationale of the Superior Court was that the Prothonotary had acknowledged that it had received the filing prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.  The Court reierated that the Prothonotary had no discretion to refuse to docket the Praecipe as it complied with the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert” on www.Law.com (June 3, 2025).

Claims of Recklessness and Punitive Damages Allowed To Proceed in Premises Liability Case

In the case of K.H. v. Mill Run Campground, No. 2197 of 2023, G.D. (C.P. Fay. Co., March 10, 2025 Vernon, J.), the court denied Preliminary Objections filed by a Defendant on claims of recklessness and for punitive damages in a premises liability case. According to the Opinion, the case involved a young child who fell off a set of bleachers.

The court overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and held that, where a Plaintiff stated a cognizable negligence claim and generally averred that the Defendant acted with the state of mind necessary for an award of punitive damages, the Defendant’s challenge to these types of claims was premature such that the Preliminary Objections would be denied. The Defendant was advised that the issues could be revisited in a Motion for Summary Judgment after the close of discovery.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (May 14, 2025).

Issues of Fact Defeat Summary Judgment Relative To Fall Allegedly Caused by Floor Mat

In the case of Montanez-Fontanez v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, No. 2023-CV-0880 (C.P. Leh. Co. Dec. 17, 2024 Reichley, J.), the court denied summary judgment in a case involving a Plaintiff who was allegedly injured when the wheel was of a walker she was using caught on a worn floor mat and caused her to fall at the entrance to the Defendants’ building where she was visiting for physical therapy. The court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the existence of genuine issues of material fact that required resolution by a jury.

The court found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the Defendants had notice of the alleged dangerous condition asserted by the Plaintiff.

The court also found that a genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the alleged condition of the floor mat amounted to an unreasonable risk of harm for visitors to the facility.

Based upon these issues of fact, the court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (May 8, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by RDNE Project on www.pexels.com.

Federal Western District Court Puts the Brakes on Evidence of Certain Insurance Matters in a Post-Koken Case

In the Post-Koken federal court case of Binotto v. Geico, No. 3:22-CV-210 (W.D. Pa. May 30, 2025 Haines, J.), the court granted the Defendant UIM carrier’s Motion In Limine to preclude evidence of the UIM limits or premium paid at the trial of a post-Koken matter. 

The court addressed the argument of whether such evidence is relevant in a post-Koken trial. Included in that assessment was whether or not the probative value of such evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusing of the issues presented. In this regard, the court cited to Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403.

The court in this Binotto matter stated that its research revealed that the courts in Pennsylvania are split on this issue. This court noted that it was choosing to follow the case of Lucca v. Geico Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3632717 (E.D. Pa. July, 2016) and its progeny. 

Relying upon that case law, the Binotto court held that the “limits and premiums of Geico’s insurance policy offered no benefit to fact finder’s determinations of the value of Plaintiffs’ injuries.”

As such, the court ruled that evidence of the carrier’s policy limits and premiums paid were irrelevant. 

The court additionally held that, even if such evidence was somehow found to be relevant to the injury and damages assessments, any probative value of such evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the Defendant carrier.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph A. Hudock, Jr. of the Pittsburgh office of the law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Instawalli on www.pexels.com.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Expands Ability of Claimants to Secure Recoveries in Work-Related Fatal Accident Matters

In the case of Steets v. Celebration Fireworks, Inc., (WCAB), No. 3 MAP 2024 (Pa. May 30, 2025) (Op. by Donohue, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned decades of precedent in order to allow a new available of worker’s compensation claims to go forward. 

In this decision, the Supreme Court created new law and cleared the way for the estates of those individuals who died from work-related injuries to collect benefits related to claims for disfigurement and injury.

Justice Christine Donohue authored the Opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Deborah Todd and Justices Kevin Dougherty, Sallie Updyke Mundy and Daniel McCaffery. Justices David Wecht and Kevin Brobson dissented in separate Opinions.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority Opinion for this decision may click this LINK.

Justice Wecht's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Justice Brobson's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “Pa. High Court Rejects Years of Precedent Barring Recovery of Benefits For Workers Who Died From Work-Related Injuries,” By Riley Brennan The Legal Intelligencer (May 30, 2025).