Tuesday, January 13, 2026

Not So Fast: Superior Court Quashes Appeal After Finding That Trial Court Order Was Not a Final Order


In the case of Henry v. Colangelo, 2025 Pa. Super. 265 (Pa. Super. Nov. 26, 2025 Kunselman, J., McLaughlin, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed an appeal after finding that the Order that the appellant had appealed from was not a final Order.

More specifically, although the trial court had certified an Order granting summary judgment against some but not all of the Defendants in a negligence and wrongful death suit as a final Order and immediately appealable, the Superior Court quashed the appeal after finding that the Order was not final and that an appeal would not facilitate resolution of the entire case.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Court Summaries” By Timothy L. Clawges, Pennsylvania Bar News (Dec. 22, 2025).

Monday, January 12, 2026

Court Refers To Required Liberal Construction of Rules in Relieving Pro Se Plaintiff From a Judgment Non Pros


In its non-precedential decision in the case of Morrison v. Pennsylvania State Police, No. 182 C.D. 2024 (Pa. Cmwlth. Dec. 9, 2025 Covey, J., Fizzano Cannon, J., and Wallis, J.) (Op. by Covey, J.) (Op. not reported), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court ruled that a trial court’s failure to send a Notice of Judgment Non Pros to Plaintiff’s correct address warranted a liberal application of the Rules of Procedure to allow the Plaintiff to amend his Motion to Strike the Judgment of Non Pros in order to allow the Plaintiff to comply with the rules’ requirements.

Based upon this ruling, the appellate court vacated the trial court’s Order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This matter involved a pro se prisoner Plaintiff.

In so ruling, the appellate court also referred to the liberal construction of the Rules of Civil Procedure that is required by Pa.R.C.P. 126.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Dec. 23, 2025).

Friday, January 9, 2026

Judge Munley of Federal Middle District Court Addresses Scope of State Created Danger Claims


In the case of T.M. v. East Stroudsburg Area School District, No. 3:24-CV-1465 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2025 Munley, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss a personal injury action arising out of allegations that the minor Plaintiff, who was a 6 year old boy with special education needs, allegedly sustained permanent injuries after being allegedly violently beaten by another student on a school bus.

According to the Opinion, the case involved, at a minimum, constitutional claims against the school district and certain school officials, as well as state law claims under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). Included in the claims were state created danger federal claims.

As part of her decision, Judge Julia K. Munley rejected the defense argument that the Plaintiffs were required to allege “affirmative acts” on the part of the state actors to meet the legal standards required to proceed on a claim of a state created danger.

Judge Julia K. Munley
M.D. Pa.

Rather, Judge Munley agreed with the Plaintiff’s argument that an awareness of a risk, coupled with acts of omission or failures to act, could render the Plaintiff more vulnerable to harm. The court therefore held that such circumstances could constitute “affirmative misuse of state authority” sufficient to establish a state created danger claim, assuming the other elements of that cause of action are also met. In so ruling, the court rejected the Defendants’ argument that affirmative action is required to support a claim of a state created danger.

The court also addressed the vehicle exception to governmental immunity under the PSTCA. The court rejected the Defendants’ argument that the Plaintiff’s injury must stem from the actual operation of a vehicle in motion. To the contrary, the court ruled that the exception applies even where a state actor is in actual physical control of the vehicle when the harm occurs, such as even when a parked vehicle is involved. Accordingly, the court ruled that the exception could apply regardless of whether the vehicle was in motion.

Judge Munley additionally rejected the defense argument that pain and suffering damages were not available to the 6 year old minor Plaintiff under the PSTCA. The Defendants argued that the minor’s injuries did not amount to a permanent loss of bodily function or disfigurement. In this case, the Plaintiff sustained a concussion, facial contusions and lacerations, and severe PTSD.

Judge Munley found that such injuries did in fact support a request for pain and suffering damages under the PSTCA.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE


I send thanks to Attorney Robert T. Moran of the Moran Law Group, LLC in Scranton, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

Thursday, January 8, 2026

Another Appellate Brief Containing AI Hallucinations Found in Pennsylvania


In the case of Assoc. Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Bucks County Community College, No. 1172 C.D. 2025 (Pa. Cmwlth. Nov. 24, 2025 Cohn Jubelirer, P.J.) (Opinion not reported), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court refused to allow an attorney to file an Amended Appellate Brief after it was determined that the original Brief filed by that attorney was created using generative artificial intelligence (AI) and was riddled with numerous factual and legal errors.

This matter arose out of an emergency application for a stay in the nature of a preliminary injunction pending appeal. There was an expedited consideration of the appeal by the court. There was also a condensed briefing scheduled issued.

The attorney for the appellee filed an initial Brief. The appellant filed a Reply Brief in which it contended that AI may have been used by the appellee to prepare the initial Brief given that the appellee’s Brief was apparently filled with fake citations, quotes to cases that do not exist and to information in the record that did not exist, and material misrepresentations with respect the record, all of which were described as AI-created hallucinations.

A week later and just two (2) days before the appeal was scheduled to be argued before the court, another attorney for the appellee filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Brief. The proposed Amended Brief was noted to be significantly different from the initial Brief of the appellee in both form and substance.

The appellant filed an opposition to the request for permission by the appellee to file an Amended Brief.

The Commonwealth Court confirmed that the appellee’s initial Brief was replete with both factual and legal errors. The court held that granting leave of court for the appellee to file an Amended Brief was “not an option.” The court noted that it would be prejudicial to the appellant to allow the appellee to file what is essentially an entirely new appellate Brief just two (2) days before the argument was scheduled before the en banc appellate court.

The Commonwealth Court also agreed with the argument by the appellant that granting leave under these circumstances would set a poor precedent. As such, the Commonwealth Court denied the application and struck the “AI-ridden” initial Brief. The Commonwealth Court noted that “cannot condone the filing of any legal document that admittedly contained numerous factual legal errors.”

In so ruling, the court noted that the creation of a legal document by way of generative artificial intelligence, in and of itself, is not problematic. However, the court noted that what is problematic is when the document is filed with numerous factual and legal errors and obviously not reviewed and corrected prior to the filing of the document.

In its Opinion, the court referenced a Pennsylvania Federal Court decision addressing similar issues regarding AI hallucinations being found in an filed brief. The court also reviewed the Joint Formal Opinion 2024-200 issued by the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility and the Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee which provided guidance on the use of AI for the creation of legal documents.

In its Opinion, the Commonwealth Court noted that it did not “determine or pass judgment on whether any ethical rules were violated” in this case. See Op. at 8. However, with its decision, the court wished “to bring attention to the gravity of the implications of the use of generative AI by attorneys.” See Op. at 8.

In the end, the court denied the application by the appellee to file an Amended Brief.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Tuesday, January 6, 2026

Court Issues Sanctions When Defense Discloses 600 Pages of Documents on the Eve of Trial


In the case of McCready v. Re/Max Achievers, No. 2:24-CV-02226-JFM (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025 Murphy, J.), the court addressed a Motion for discovery sanctions against a defense counsel due to the defense counsel’s failure to produce discoverable documentation during the discovery phase of the case. Defense counsel produced 600 pages of the previously undisclosed documentation at issue days before the trial date.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff sued the Defendants after he was allegedly placed at an allegedly unlicensed sober home, which allegedly improperly administered his medication, allegedly leading the Plaintiff to suffer a near fatal state of low blood pressure. The Plaintiff also claimed that he was wrongfully evicted from the facility. He sued various Defendants before settling with Re/Max, which was a property manager for the home.

While the Plaintiff asserted that the Defendant at issue should be sanctioned with a default judgment for its late disclosure of relevant evidence, after reviewing the standards applicable to discovery sanctions, the court concluded that an alternative sanction would suffice.

The court awarded attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with the discovery issues. The court also prohibited the Defendant from asserting that any negligence found was attributable to parties who had already settled out of the case. The court additionally permitted the Plaintiff to utilize the late-produced documents at trial, but prohibited the culpable Defendant from doing so.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article: “Marshall Dennehey, Re/Max Sanctioned For Delayed Discovery Disclosures Ahead of Trial,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Dec. 10, 2025).

Court Rejects Allegations of Fraud Relative to Opposing Counsel Allegedly Meeting Ex Parte With Arbitrator During Lunch Break

In the case of Shannon v. Weis Markets, Inc., No. 1604 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Sept. 16, 2025 Panella, P.J.E., Lane, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Lane, J.), the Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s Order denying a Plaintiff’s Petition to vacate or set aside an Arbitration Award in favor of the Defendant under 42 Pa. C.S. A §7341.

According to the Opinion, this negligence action arose out of a slip and fall in a supermarket. 

After the completion of discovery, the parties agreed to submit the matter to binding Arbitration pursuant to a binding high/low Arbitration pursuant to a written agreement. 

After the Arbitration was completed, the arbitrator determined that the store was not negligent. Consistent with the high/low agreement, the arbitrator entered an award in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $75,000.00, which was the low parameter of the high/low agreement. 

Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a Petition to Vacate or Set Aside the Arbitration Award. The Plaintiff asserted that the arbitrator, Weis’s counsel and a Weis’s corporate representative met privately during a lunch break without the Plaintiff or her counsel present, thereby creating an appearance of “fraud, misconduct, corruption, or other irregularity” resulting in an outcome that was “unjust, inequitable, or unconscionable.”

The trial court denied the Petition and, with this decision, the Superior Court affirmed the denial.

In its Opinion, the Superior Court reaffirmed high burden set by the scope of review relative to an arbitration award.   

In addition to confirming that the Plaintiff never made an inquiry about the alleged meeting and never produced facts to suggest that the arbitrator’s award was influenced by the alleged meeting, the Superior Court held that the mere appearance of impropriety arising from an alleged ex parte contact between an arbitrator and one party’s counsel’s representative, without clear, precise, and indubitable evidence of misconduct or resulting prejudice, is insufficient to support the vacation of a common law Arbitration Award under §7341.

The court additionally noted that the award itself was not inequitable since the Plaintiff received $75,000.00 under the high/low agreement even though the arbitrator found that the store was not negligent.

The Superior Court otherwise found that the Plaintiff had waived the argument that the trial court had abused its discretion by not developing a factual record before entering its decision denying the Petition to Vacate. The appellate court noted that the trial court’s local rules allowed the trial court the discretion to determine whether to issue a Rule to Show Cause based upon the sufficiency of the allegations. The appellate court noted that, since the Plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient, the record did not need further development for a proper decision.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (Sept. 30, 2025).


Source of image:  Photo by Rebrand Cities on www.pexels.com.

Monday, January 5, 2026

Effort To Dismiss Case Due To Service of Process Issues Fails Procedurally and Substantively


In the case of Howey v. O’Leary, No. 2024-CV-5227 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Dec. 15, 2025 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas denied a Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings based upon service of process issues. According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident.

In the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant resided at a certain address. The Sheriff’s Department served the Complaint on the Defendant’s father at the address pled in the Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Thereafter, the Defendant did not file any Preliminary Objections asserting improper service of a Complaint. Nor did the Defendant file a responsive pleading raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense under Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a).

Rather, before the pleadings were closed, the Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on the pleadings in which she asserted that she did not reside at the address pled in the Complaint when the Complaint was served.

In response, the Plaintiff asserted that the Defendant’s address was identified on the Defendant’s driver’s license, vehicle registration, and insurance paperwork as being the correct address. 

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas


In addresssing the matter before him, Judge Nealon initially noted that Pennsylvania law requires that any alleged defects in service of process must be raised by way of Preliminary Objections. The court additionally noted that a party who fails to object to service of process by way of Preliminary Objections waives the issue. As such, the court found that the Defendant waived the issues regarding service of process by proceeding with a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Judge Nealon went on to note that, even if the Defendant’s claim of a failure to complete proper service of process was considered, the defense's request for relief would be denied in any event.

First of all, the court noted that the pleadings were not closed and, as such, the filing of a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was improper. 

The court additionally noted that the Defendant failed to satisfy the standard of review of showing that there were no disputed issues of fact and that the Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Here, there was as dispute between the parties as to where the Defendant resided.

For all of these reasons, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and directed that the Defendant file a responsive pleading to the Complaint.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.