Court Addresses Whether Topic of Expert Opinion Is Outside Scope of Understanding of Lay Jurors

In the case of Dragann v. Florey Lumber Co., No. 2020-CV-4118 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 18, 2025 Nealon, J.), the court addressed a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by an Additional Defendant relative to a Joinder Complaint. 

According to the Opinion, this case arises out of issues related to the construction of a residential home. More specifically, after the Plaintiffs moved into the home, issues allegedly arose with regard to the white limestone that had been utilized as part of the construction of the exterior of the home. The Plaintiffs alleged that the limestone had deteriorated, which allowed for water infiltration.

One of the original Defendants asserted a claim against an Additional Defendant and asserted that, due to the original Defendant’s lack of prior experience in using limestone on exterior surfaces on homes in Northeastern Pennsylvania, that original Defendant allegedly relied upon the Additional Defendant and its expertise with limestone to determine whether and how the limestone could be installed safely in the climate of Northeastern Pennsylvania.

The claim in the original Defendant’s Joinder Complaint sounded in negligent misrepresentation against the Additional Defendant.

Judge Nealon provided a current overview of the status of the law pertaining to negligent misrepresentation claims.

One of the essential questions in this case was whether expert testimony is required to sustain a negligent misrepresentation claim. The court noted that the litigants did not produce any precedent in this regard and that the court’s own research revealed that such expert evidence is generally unnecessary.

The court noted that, the subject matter at issue was not so related to a particular science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ordinary knowledge or information customarily possessed by the average layperson or juror. Accordingly, the court ruled that no expert report was required in order to establish a case of negligence on the part of the Additional Defendant.

Rather, the court found that jurors would be capable of determining whether the Additional Defendant’s representative made the alleged representations regarding the suitability of exterior limestone in the local climate, that the Additional Defendant failed to conduct a reasonable investigation as to the truthfulness of those representations, that the original Defendant justifiably relied upon the misrepresentations and that the original Defendant’s justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentations ultimately caused the harm alleged by the homeowners.

Accordingly, based on the above law and findings, the court denied the Additional Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Third Circuit Addresses Issues As To When Expert Testimony Is Required in Gun Discharge Case

In the case of Slatowski v. Sig Sauer, Inc., No. 24-1639 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2025 Krause, J., Bibas, J., and Montgomery-Reeves, J.) (Op. by Bibas, J.), the court affirmed the district court exclusion of the Plaintiff’s expert witnesses on the issue of causation but reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in a case involving a federal immigration agent who was injured when he went to grab a gun from his holster and the gun fired a bullet into his hip and thigh.

The appellate court ruled that the trial court had properly excluded the Plaintiff’s expert testimony about what caused the gun to fire accidentally.

However, the court overruled the district court’s entry of summary judgment which was based on the district court’s finding that the Plaintiff could not proceed to a jury without expert testimony.

The appellate court noted that, given the other admissible evidence in the case, a jury would be able to determine what caused the gun to fire. As such, the entry of summary judgment was overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Lack of Causation Experts Does Not Knock Out Plaintiff’s Defective Gun Design Claims, 3rd Circuit Rules,” By Aleeza Furman The Legal Intelligencer (August 1, 2025).

City Ruled Protected by the Immunity Afforded Under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act

In the case of Cruz v. City of Scranton, No 2024-CV-7644 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 28, 2025 Moyle, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in a case in which the Plaintiff sued the City of Scranton relative to the police department’s handling of the Plaintiff’s stolen motorcycle.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff reported that her motorcycle was stolen. The Scranton Police Department was later informed by the Reading Police Department that the motorcycle was located at an auto facility in Reading, PA.

According to the Opinion, the Scranton Police Department allegedly never notified the Plaintiff of the location of her motorcycle. The motorcycle was thereafter declared to be abandoned and accumulated impound fees. Thereafter, the Plaintiff received a bill from the auto company indicating that she owed over $15,000.00 for impound and storage fees.

In response to recieving this bill, the Plaintiff sued the City of Scranton for negligence.

The Defendant asserted immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act found at 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542.

While the court agreed that the City of Scranton Police Department was required by law to notify the Plaintiff regarding the recovery of the Plaintiff’s motorcycle by the Reading Police Department, the court ruled that the City of Scranton was granted immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s attempt to assert that the case fell under the exception to immunity relative to the care, custody, or control of personal property exception. The court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the receipt of information regarding the status of the Plaintiff’s motorcycle constituted control over the Plaintiff’s personal property.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Paul Walker of the Clarks Summit, PA law firm of Walker Law LLC, for bringing this decision to my attention.

Court Addresses Liability of Store To Customer Attacked By Assailant After Leaving the Store

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Borth v. Alpha Century Security, Inc., No. 2044 EDA 2022 (Pa. Super. Aug. 1, 2025 Lazarus, P.J., Beck, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Mem. Op. by Lazarus, P.J.) (non-precedential), the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Rite Aid and certain security companies in a lawsuit arising out of an incident during which the Plaintiff was assaulted by an individual at a location over 700 feet from the Rite Aid store.

According to the ruling, the assailant had been seen following the Plaintiff in the store and then left the store shortly after the Plaintiff left.  The record indicated that the security guards allegedly noticed this activity.

The appellate court ultimately ruled that the Defendants owed the Plaintiffs the duty owed to any business invitee, which was to take reasonable precautions against harmful third party conduct that might be reasonably anticipated.

The Superior Court additionally noted that, while it agreed with the trial court’s determination that Rite Aid’s duty to protect its invitees “does not extend to an area beyond its parking lot, city blocks from its location,” the Superior Court disagreed that it necessarily followed, under the facts in this case, that the subject attack was unforeseeable as a matter of law or that the criminal act of the assailant was a superseding event. See Op. at 8-9. 

The court noted that, although the Plaintiff was no longer on Rite Aid property when she was attacked by the assailant, it was not entirely clear whether Rite Aid’s precautions, or the security company Defendants’ actions, were reasonable and/or sufficient under the circumstances.

In this regard, the court noted that the Rite Aid store was in possession of reports putting the store on notice of crimes in the area. Moreover, there is evidence in this case that the representatives of the security company in the store was suspicious of the assailant in terms of his following the Plaintiff in the store and also leaving the store without buying anything shortly after the Plaintiff left the store.

In the end, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

Anyone wishing to review this non-precedential decision of the Superior Court may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Rayner Simpson on www.unsplash.com.

I send thanks to Attorney Thomas G. Wilkinson, Jr. of the Philadelphia office of Cozen & O'Connor for bringing this case to my attention.

Allegations of Recklessness Allowed To Proceed in Motor Vehicle Accident Case

In the case of Marcinkevich v. Stevens, No. 24-CV-1826 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 31, 2025 Gibbons, J.), the court overruled a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections filed against allegations of recklessness and for punitive damages in a standard motor vehicle accident case not involving any outrageous facts.

The court ruled that, because recklessness is a condition of the mind that, under this court’s reading of Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b) can be alleged generally where an underlying claim of negligence is pled, the court allowed these allegations to proceed into the discovery phase of the case.

The Court also allowed the claims for punitive damages to proceed as well.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Superior Court Rules that Default Judgment Against Defendant Should Have Been Opened

In the case of Lines v. Timothy Britton Const. Servs., Inc., No. 948 W.D.A. 2024 (Pa. Super. July 1, 2025 Bowes, J., Olson, J., and Bender, P.J.E.) (Op. by Bowes, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the proper procedure relative to a Petition to Strike and/or Open a Default Judgment. In the end, the court reversed a trial court’s Order dismissing a Defendant’s Petition to Strike and/or Open a Default Judgment.

This matter arose out of a lawsuit brought by a homeowner against the Defendant for breach of contract and violation of consumer protection law claims.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff’s Complaint did not contain a required Notice to Defend. When the Defendant made no response, the Plaintiffs ultimately obtained a default judgment. The Defendant then petitioned to strike and/or open the judgment based upon the deficiencies with the Plaintiff’s Complaint.

With the parties’ consent, the trial court struck the initial default judgment and granted the Defendant leave to file a responsive pleading. Thereafter, the Defendant failed to file a pleading and the Plaintiffs again secured a default judgment. The Defendant then petitioned to strike and/or open the second default judgment due to the Plaintiff’s failure to provide the notice required under Pa. R.C.P. 237.1.

The Plaintiffs argued that, given that they had previously provided their Rule 237.1 notice before the entry of the first default judgment, no new notice was required. 

 The trial court dismissed the Defendant’s Petition to Strike and/or Open and the Defendant then appealed.

The Superior Court held that the trial court erred in entering a second default judgment against the Defendant where notice pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 237.1 was missing. The appellate court ruled that the initial Rule 237.1 notice was not still in place by the time the second default judgment was entered. 

The appellate court also noted that the trial court’s extension of time to answer, which was issued after the entry of the initial default judgment, also did not comport with the requirements set forth under Pa. R.C.P. 237.6.

The appellate court otherwise also noted that the trial court’s agreed extension Order did not state that a failure to timely respond could result in another default judgment. As such, the appellate court ruled that, absent compliance with Rule 237.6, a default judgment could not be entered absent a new 10-Day Notice as required under Rule 237.1.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 16, 2025).

Superior Court Rules that Forum Selection Clause in Informed Consent Form is Enforceable in Medical Malpractice Cases

In the medical malpractice case of Somerlot v. Jung, No. 2578-EDA-2024 (Pa. Super. July 30, 2025 Lazarus, P.J., Kunselman, J., and King, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the validity of forum selection clauses in informed consent forms.

According to the Opinion, in this personal injury action, the Plaintiff had undergone treatment with certain medical providers and, under the contract entered into with those medical providers, the Plaintiff agreed that any litigation would be pursued solely in Bucks County.

Yet, the Plaintiff brought this personal injury lawsuit in Philadelphia County.  The medical Defendant filed Preliminary Objections asserting improper venue.

The Superior Court affirmed the decision of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas transferring the case to Bucks County based upon the forum selection clause.

The Superior Court upheld the general principle of contract law that the parties are free to pre-select among all possible proper venues as to which venue would be utilized to decide any legal disputes that might arise between them. Accordingly, the Superior Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Etactics Inc. on www.unsplash.com.