Summary Judgment Denied in Case Involving Trip and Fall on Jogging Trail

In the case of Sember v. Lackawanna Heritage Valley Auth., No. 2024-CV-3255 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Oct. 22, 2025 Powell, J.), the court addressed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by the Defendants claiming immunity under the Recreational Use of Land and Water Act relative to a trip and fall incident that occurred while the Plaintiff was jogging on the Lackawanna Heritage Trail.

The City of Scranton, which was a Co-Defendant, additionally asserted that it was entitled to immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

Both Defendants asserted that they were entitled to immunity under the Recreational Use of Land and Water Act given that the trail was on recreational land that was open to the public without charge. 

The Defendants asserted that the Act provided that owners owe no duty to recreational uses to maintain safety or to warn of dangers, including with respect to paved and unpaved trails. The Defendants claimed that the Lackawanna Heritage Valley Authority and the City of Scranton both constituted owners under the Act. 

Here, however, the Plaintiff alleged a man-made hazard, that is, a raised concrete base, and also asserted that the Defendants knew of that condition but failed to repair it or warn the persons entering the land about the condition. 

Judge Mark Powell
Lackawanna County

As such, Judge Mark Powell of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas held that there were issues of fact and that it could not determine from the pleadings alone whether the RULWA applied at this early stage of the litigation.  The court more specifically found that factual development was required to assess whether the condition at issue was part of the trial’s recreational use or an artificial structure beyond the protection of the Act.

Relative to The City’s claim of governmental immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, the City asserted that it was immune because the trail was maintained by the Lackawanna Heritage Valley Authority and was not under The City’s “care, custody, or control.” The City of Scranton also argued that the Plaintiff’s claim did not fall under any of the exceptions to the grant of immunity.

The court found that the record was insufficient to determine the extent of each Defendant's control or whether the defect constituted a dangerous condition of real property that might trigger an exception to immunity. In light of these questions of fact, the court denied the Motion for these additional reasons.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Lackawanna Jurist (Oct. 31, 2025).

CORRECTION OF TITLE OF YESTERDAY'S POST

 

The title of yesterday's post indicated that the court in the premises liability case had "denied" the summary judgment motion.  That was incorrect.  As confirmed in the synopsis of the case provided, the court had actually denied the motion for summary judgment.

I think I must have just wanted to see what a title like that would have looked like.

Sorry for any confusion caused.

You may say I'm a Dreamer.....

Imagine by John Lennon

Summary Judgment Denied in Parking Lot Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Shea v. Kalahari Resorts & Conventions – Poconos, No. 3:23-CV-814 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2025, Mariani, J.), the court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall matter involving ice and snow on sidewalks.

In this matter Judge Mariani initially overrulled the Defendant's Motion in Limine to preclude the Plaintiff's engineering expert from testifying at trial.

The court also noted that it could not state, from the information in the record, that the winter conditions in the parking lot of the Defendant's premises amounted to an open and obvious condition.   

The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether or not the hills and ridges doctrine applied. In this regard, the court noted that the storm at issue had ended eleven (11) hours prior to the accident.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Court Denies Motion For Summary Judgment in Store Trip and Fall Case

 In the case of Vargas v. Wal-Mart Supercenter, No. 3:22-CV-01642 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2025 Latella, Mag. J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a premises liability case. 

The Defendant was attempting to rely upon surveillance videotape evidence that showed the Plaintiff's actions at the time of the incident.  The Defendant also asserted that the video confirmed that the conditin that the Plaintiff encountered was open and obvious.

Federal Mag. Judge Leo Latella

Federal Middle District Court Magistrate Judge Leo Latella ruled that the Defendant’s surveillance videotape evidence did not reach the level of an irrefutable physical fact that could support summary judgment in this slip and fall matter.  

With regards to the Defendant’s argument that the interpretation of the video established the assumption of the risk defense as a matter of law, the court noted that it was for the jury to decide whether the Plaintiff’s account of the events leading to the fall down event was believable.  

The court additionally noted that the Defendant should have taken customer distraction into account in maintaining safety on the premises. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.  

BOOK PUBLISHED: RAISING THE BAR - A Practical Guide to the Practice of Law by Daniel E. Cummins

The Pennsylvania Bar Institute recently published my book entitled Raising the Bar: A Practical Guide to the Practice of Law.  This book has been published as an e-book.

To the extent you may be interested in the same, here is a LINK to the Book cover, the Table of Contents so that you can get a sense of the content, and an excerpt from the article entitled "Lessons from The Godfather."

The book compiles my articles from over the past two decades providing a wide variety of tips and encouragement to help young lawyers and experienced lawyers alike improve their practice of law.

Here is the LINK to the webpage on the PBI's website where the book can be purchased if you are interested.

Thank you for your consideration.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reaffirms the Statutory Employer Doctrine

In the case of Yoder v. McCarty Construction, 43 MAP (Pa. Oct. 23, 2025) (Op. by Brobson, J.)(McCaffery, J., concurring), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of the statutory employer doctrine under the Worker’s Compensation Act and rejected arguments from the Plaintiff seeking to abolish this doctrine.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff suffered a workplace injury when he fell through a hole during roofing work. The Plaintiff was an employee of a subcontractor.

The general contractor asserted the defense of statutory employer immunity in the personal injury action arising out of the accident.

The Supreme Court began its decision by reaffirming the law behind the statutory employer doctrine that has been in effect in Pennsylvania since 1930.

That long-standing law provides that, under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), a general contractor that hires a subcontractor to perform work on a jobsite is deemed an “employer” that is secondarily liable to the injured employee of the subcontractor for the payment of compensation under the Act, provided that the subcontractor—the one primarily liable—fails to make payment. Section 302(b) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 462.

In exchange for this imposition of secondary liability, the Act’s statutory employer provision in Section 203 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 52, extends to a general contractor the same tort immunity afforded to the subcontractor of the injured worker.

At the Supreme Court level in this Yoder case, the court rejected arguments by the Plaintiff that the statutory employer doctrine should be rejected and/or that such immunity should be deemed to be waivable in certain circumstances. As noted, the Court rejected these arguments and instead reaffirmed that the statutory employer doctrine remains a valid part of Pennsylvania worker’s compensation law.

The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether the general contractor satisfied the elements of the five (5) part statutory employer test as formulated back in 1930 in the case of McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 153 A. 424, 426 (Pa. 1930).

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Concurring Opinion by Justice McCaffery can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney Glen Ricketti of the Philadelphia office of the Margolis Edelstein law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Summary Judgment Still Entered For Trucker Where GPS Confirmed Speed Contradicts Witness's Testimony on Speed

In the case of Thomas v. Orozco-Pineda, No. 3:24-CV-288 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2025 Mannion, J.), the court granted a partial Motion for Summary Judgment on a claim for punitive damages in a trucking accident case.

The court noted that the undisputed GPS data in the record established that the Defendant’s driver was not speeding at the time of the accident.

However, the court also noted that a witness testified at a deposition that the tractor trailer driver had been speeding moments before the accident.

Nevertheless, the court found that the witness's testimony did not establish a factual dispute sufficient to defeat the Defendant's summary judgment motion.

The court noted that where one party’s or witnesses’ version of events is blatantly contradicted by the record, such that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not accept or adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment.

In addition to the GPS data confirming that the driver was traveling at or around 55 mph in a 65 mph speed limit zone at the time of the accident, the court stated that there was no other credible evidence of speeding.

The court additionally found that the "clean" road conditions did not support the Plaintiffs’ claims that even driving below the speed limit was too fast for the conditions. The court also noted that there was no reduced speed limit in effect at the time the accident occurred.

Accordingly, the court found that, given that there was no credible evidence of speeding on the part of the Defendants, the Plaintiffs had no factual basis for seeking punitive damages.

The court also ruled that, therefore, there was also no vicarious basis for punitive damages against the driver’s employer.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Le Minh on www.pexels.com.