According to the Opinion, this matter involved a commercial property policy that offered protection to the Plaintiff’s property. The Plaintiff’s property allegedly sustained damages from a windstorm.
The Plaintiff had an inspection completed and submitted a claim to the insurance company for first-party property coverage. The Plaintiff provided the carrier with the inspection report.
The carrier had their own inspection completed and that report indicated that the damage to the Plaintiff’s roof involved shingles that appeared to be over twenty-five (25) years of age and in very poor condition. That expert also concluded that no sudden loss created the damages to the roof.
The carrier also secured an engineering expert who completed an additional inspection and also concluded that the roof and the shingles on the roof were not damaged by the wind event. Based at least in part on these reports, the carrier denied the claim.
In issuing the denial, the carrier relied upon certain exclusions including a wear-and-tear exclusion and a maintenance exclusion.
Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed suit alleging a breach of contract and bad faith claims. The matter came before this court on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment on the issues presented.
The court denied the Plaintiff’s Motions and granted the insurance company’s Motions.
In reviewing the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on its breach of contract claim, the court noted that, based upon the exclusions claimed by the carrier, the carrier was asserting that summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff was inappropriate because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the damages to the roof pre-existed the storm or were caused by the storm.
In this regard, the court reviewed the efficient proximate cause doctrine and compared it to the concurrent causation doctrine in coverage dispute matters.
In the end, this court predicated that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt and apply the efficient proximate cause doctrine if faced with the issue.
Applying that doctrine to the case presented, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s claims of a breach of contract is not defeated merely because wear-and-tear and/or inadequate maintenance may have contributed to the roof damage. Rather, the Plaintiff must still be provided with an opportunity to prove that the windstorm was the “dominant and efficient” cause of the roof destruction as opposed to being merely a “remote” or “incidental” cause.
In issuing the denial, the carrier relied upon certain exclusions including a wear-and-tear exclusion and a maintenance exclusion.
Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed suit alleging a breach of contract and bad faith claims. The matter came before this court on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment on the issues presented.
The court denied the Plaintiff’s Motions and granted the insurance company’s Motions.
In reviewing the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on its breach of contract claim, the court noted that, based upon the exclusions claimed by the carrier, the carrier was asserting that summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff was inappropriate because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the damages to the roof pre-existed the storm or were caused by the storm.
In this regard, the court reviewed the efficient proximate cause doctrine and compared it to the concurrent causation doctrine in coverage dispute matters.
In the end, this court predicated that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt and apply the efficient proximate cause doctrine if faced with the issue.
Applying that doctrine to the case presented, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s claims of a breach of contract is not defeated merely because wear-and-tear and/or inadequate maintenance may have contributed to the roof damage. Rather, the Plaintiff must still be provided with an opportunity to prove that the windstorm was the “dominant and efficient” cause of the roof destruction as opposed to being merely a “remote” or “incidental” cause.
Given that there were issues of material fact in this regard, the court ruled that this question should be decided by a jury.
Relative to the carrier’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff’s statutory bad faith claim, the court ruled that the Plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that the carrier lacked a reasonable basis to deny the claim.
Relative to the carrier’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff’s statutory bad faith claim, the court ruled that the Plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that the carrier lacked a reasonable basis to deny the claim.
The court noted that the record before it confirmed that the carrier relied upon detailed investigative materials and expert assessments that attributed the roof damage to decay and wear-and-tear.
The court found that these expert assessments supplied an objectively reasonable basis for the carrier to conclude that wear-n-tear and/or inadequate maintenance, as opposed to a covered windstorm, was the dominant and efficient cause of the loss, and that the exclusions therefore applied.
The court noted that the mere possibility that the insured may prevail at proving the Plaintiff’s case in this regard “hardly equates to bad faith.” Rather, the court noted that the question under the bad faith statute, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8371 is whether the denial lacked a reasonable basis. The court cited to other case law confirming that a reasonable basis for the denial of a claim is all that is required in order to defeat a claim of insurance bad faith.
Based on this law, the court ruled in favor of the carrier’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the bad faith issues and dismissed that claim of the Plaintiff with prejudice.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney Robert S. Stickley of Stickley Law LLC in Newtown Square, PA for bringing this case to my attention.
The court noted that the mere possibility that the insured may prevail at proving the Plaintiff’s case in this regard “hardly equates to bad faith.” Rather, the court noted that the question under the bad faith statute, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8371 is whether the denial lacked a reasonable basis. The court cited to other case law confirming that a reasonable basis for the denial of a claim is all that is required in order to defeat a claim of insurance bad faith.
Based on this law, the court ruled in favor of the carrier’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the bad faith issues and dismissed that claim of the Plaintiff with prejudice.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney Robert S. Stickley of Stickley Law LLC in Newtown Square, PA for bringing this case to my attention.
Source of image: Photo by Andreas Ebner on www.pexels.com.







