U.S. Supreme Court Decision Ruling that Delaware Rule Requiring Certificate of Merit for Professional Liability Claims Has Implications In Pennsylvania Matters

In the United State Supreme Court case of Berk v. Choy, No. 24-440 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026) (Op. by Barrett, J.), the United States Supreme Court held that a Delaware law requiring a Plaintiff suing for medical malpractice to provide an affidavit from a medical professional attesting to the merit of the claims presented in the law suit conflicts with valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and, as such, does not apply in federal court proceedings.

According to commentators, this United States Supreme Court decision can be read as establishing that Pennsylvania's requirements for a Certificate of Merit in professional negligence in state court matters would not apply in the federal courts of Pennsylvania.

As such, these commentators have suggested that, in those cases where a plaintiff can establish diversity jurisdiction in order to get into federal court, those plaintiffs may opt to proceed in federal court where they need not secure and produce a Certificate or Merit before proceeding with a professional negligence claim, such as a medical malpractice claim or a legal malpractice claim.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Thomas J. Foley, III of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton, PA for bringing this decision to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Fine Photographics on www.pexels.com.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reviews, in Part, Ability of a Party To Proceed on A Cause of Action Based on Spoliation of Evidence

In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. United Services Auto, No. 19 WAP 2024 (Pa. Jan. 21, 2026) (Op. by Donohue, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether one carrier had a claim against another carrier under and allegation of promissory estoppel due to the failure to preserve evidence pertinent to the damages claims presented in a property damage subrogation claim.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a fire that occurred at an auto repair shop, resulting in damages to the property and several vehicles. 

The insurance company for the property paid out damages and then sought reimbursement from those parties allegedly responsible. The insurer who brought the lawsuit suspected that a specific vehicle, insured by another insurance company, was the source of the fire.  As such, the Plaintiff insurance company requested that the vehicle in question be preserved for further investigation. 

Despite assurances that the vehicle would be preserved, the vehicle was instead sold at a salvage auction, thereby eliminating the possibility of further examination of the vehicle and hindering the Plaintiff’s potential claims against the other parties.  The Plaintiff insurance company filed suit based, in part, on the other insurance company's failure to preserve evidence as requested.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant, concluding that the promissory estoppel claim was, in substance, a claim for negligence spoliation of evidence, which was a cause of action not recognized in Pennsylvania.

The trial court also noted that subrogation principles did not allow recovery because the Defendant had not caused the original property loss.

On appeal, the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed and found that the facts might support a promissory estoppel claim. The Superior Court also felt that the trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint on grounds of speculative damages and unrecognized causes of action.

Further up the appellate ladder, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, as subrogee, the Plaintiff insurance company’s rights were limited to recovery from the party responsible for the original loss and, because that Defendant did not cause the fire, no right of recovery existed. As such, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s erroneous decision, and reinstated the trial court’s Order in favor of the Defendant.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority's decision may click this LINK.

Justice Brobson's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Justice Dougherty's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: Justia Daily Opinion Summaries, www.justia.com (Jan. 22, 2026).

WATCH OUT FOR THIS PITFALL WITH DEADLINES

On December 24, 2025, the U.S. Postal Service implemented new procedures for dating mail.  As of that date and going forward, the Post Office will postmark letters and packages with the date they are processed at the postal facility rather than the date that they are dropped off in the mailbox as was the case in the past. 

This shift in procedure could affect whether time-sensitive mail is considered to be on time.

Commentators have recommended that, if your mail is time-sensitive in this regard, you should walk the mail into the post office and request a manual postmark to ensure that the postmark date matches the day you mailed the item.  You can also request a certificate of mailing.

Source of image:  Photo by Anthony Acosta on www.pexels.com.

Please Consider Signing Up As a Mock Trial Juror for Lackawanna County Competition

 

Summary Judgment Denied in Federal Court Snow and Ice Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Spa Resort, L.P., No. 3:24-CV-0796 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2026 Saporito, J.), the court denied the Defendant resort’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall case.

The Defendant landowner argued that the hills and ridges doctrine applied because the Plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell due to icy conditions that resulted from snowfall on the day of the incident.

In opposition, the Plaintiffs argued that the Plaintiff did not slip and fall due to icy conditions caused by the snowstorm, but rather, because the Defendants’ driveway was improperly maintained and repaired such that the hills and ridges doctrine did not apply.

The court ultimately concluded that questions of fact remained as to whether the hills and ridges doctrine applied to shield the property owner from liability regarding the allegedly slippery conditions on the premises.

Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
M.D. Pa.

In his decision, Judge Saporito provided a detailed review of the current status of the law in Pennsylvania regarding the hills and ridges doctrine.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Jury To Decide If Spa Resort Can Be Liable Under ‘Hills and Ridges’ Doctrine In Slip-And-Fall Case,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Jan. 12, 2026).

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Finds It Cannot Reach Question of Validity of Uber's Arbitration Clause

In the case of Chilutti v. Uber, No. 58 EAP 2024 (Pa. Jan. 21, 2026) (Op by Brobson, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed a request by Uber to refer a personal injury civil litigation matter to arbitration.

According to the Opinion, a woman who uses a wheelchair sued Uber Technologies, Inc. and others after an incident in which an Uber driver failed to provide her with a seat belt while transporting her in a wheelchair-accessible vehicle, causing her to fall and sustain injuries.

The Plaintiff filed a negligence cause of action in court. Uber responded by filing a Petition to Compel Arbitration, arguing that the Plaintiffs had agreed to arbitrate their claims when they enrolled in Uber’s service.

At the trial court level, the trial court granted Uber’s Petition and ordered the parties to proceed to Arbitration.

At the Superior Court level, the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed and held that there was valid agreement to arbitrate and remanded for further proceedings.

In this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme court first reviewed whether an Order compelling Arbitration and staying trial proceedings is an immediately appealable collateral Order. The Supreme Court held that such an Order does not meet the requirements for a collateral Order because the issue can be reviewed after the entry of a final judgment and, as such, did not result in irreparable loss if the judicial review is postponed. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s decision and remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions on how to proceed.

In light of this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address the issue of the validity of the Uber Arbitration Agreement or the merits of whether Arbitration could be compelled in cases involving Uber.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Justia Daily Opinion Summaries, www.justia.com (Jan. 22, 2026).4

Source of image:  Photo by Tingey on www.unsplash.com.

Plaintiff Lost In More Ways Than One: Summary Judgment Granted Where Plaintiff Ventured Onto the Property By Mistake and Fell

In its unpublished decision in the case of DeWitt v. Bedford County Airport Auth., No. 1345 C.D. 2024 (Pa. Cmwlth. Nov. 10, 2025 Wolf, J., Jubelirer, J., and Wojcik, J.) (Op. by Wolf, J.) (unpublished), the Commonwealth Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant after finding that the record confirmed that the Plaintiff, at the time of his premises liability accident, was a trespasser and not a business invitee.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was traveling to a house to take a look at a trailer he was thinking of buying from the owner.  The Plaintiff followed GPS directions via the Google Maps app but ended up unkowningly going to the wrong address. The record confirmed that the Plaintiff was only on the property by mistake at the time he slipped and fell on an icy condition.

After discovery, the Defendant homeowners filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that the Plaintiff was a trespasser and that, therefore, the homeowners legally did not owe the Plaintiff any duty with respect to the icy condition.

The trial court entered summary judgment and the Commonwealth Court affirmed.

In its Opinion, the Commonwealth Court noted that, even if the Plaintiff had license to ask for direction while on the property, the Plaintiff was injured after he went to a second location deeper into the land owned by the landowner, further trespassing on the property.

The court stated a rule of law that a mistake by an entrant onto another’s land as to their status or permission enter the land does not relieve such entrant of a trespasser status.  See Op. at 5 citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 329 [other citations omitted].

The appellate court noted that the implied license doctrine does not extend to premises liability actions.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision, which the Commonwealth Court marked as an "Opinion Not Reported," may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Tamas Tuzes-Katai on www.unsplash.com.