Post-Trial Rulings By Trial Court in MVA Case Affirmed on Appeal

In their non-precedential decision in the case of Major v. Five Star Equipment, Inc., No. 735 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 30, 2026 Panella, P.J.E., King, J., and Lane, J.) (Mem. Op. by King, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the post-trial rulings issued by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas related to a motor vehicle versus pedestrian accident case.

According to the Opinion, at a bifurcated trial, the jury attributed 75% of the responsibility for the happening of the accident to the Plaintiff and 25% to the Defendant.

On appeal, the Plaintiff challenged portions of the verdict slip and related jury instructions. The Plaintiff also asserted that the trial court had erred prior to trial in granting partial summary judgment on behalf of the Defendant and dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim for recklessness and in excluding post-accident evidence regarding the Defendant driver’s competence. The Plaintiff also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in bifurcating the trial.

Here, the court had bifurcated the trial based upon the fact that, after the parties were given a trial date with a certain number of trial days based on what the parties had advised the Court as to how much trial time was needed, the parties listed additional witnesses which led the court to conclude that it was highly unlikely that the parties would finish the trial within the allocated time period requested. As such, the court bifurcated the trial to avoid unnecessary cost and to facilitate the interests of judicial economy. The trial was bifurcated into liability and damages phases.

The appellate court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that they were entitled to a new trial on the basis that the trial court had incorrectly bifurcated the case. The appellate court emphasized that the decision whether or not to bifurcate a case is entrusted to the broad discretion of the trial court, which is considered to be in the best position to evaluate the necessity for bifurcation.

Here, after consultation with the parties, the trial court had scheduled five (5) days for trial based upon the parties estimation as to the amount of time they believed the trial would take. Later, at a pre-trial conference, the parties then indicated that they intended to call eleven (11) lay witnesses and nine (9) expert witnesses to testify. The parties further estimated that one of the four days scheduled for trial would be taken up by the jury selection process, the court’s introductory instructions, and counsel’s opening statements.

The trial court had determined that it was highly unlikely that the remaining four (4) days of trial would be sufficient time for all of their testimony, closing arguments, jury instructions and deliberations. The trial court had expressed a concern that it would be forced to declare a mistrial if the trial is not completed within the allotted time. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the interest of judicial economy and conveniens supported the bifurcation of the case. The appellate court was not swayed by the Plaintiff’s argument that the trial actually ended up only taking three (3) days to complete.

On appeal, the appellate court otherwise agreed with the trial court that the Plaintiff had waived her claim of error with regards to the Verdict slip.  The appellate court otherwise agreed with the trial court that separate questions as to each theory of negligence asserted against the Defendant company were unnecessary given that the trial court’s jury instructions specified and explained all of the theories of negligence involved in the case. The appellate court found that the trial court had repeatedly instructed the jury that, if they found negligence on any of the grounds described during the jury instructions, the jury must find that the Defendant company was negligent.

With regards to the trial court having issued a partial summary judgment against the Plaintiff’s claims of recklessness, the appellate court reviewed the law of punitive damages and, after a review of the trial record, found that the Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to support the claims of recklessness. As such, the appellate court stated that the trial court did not err in dismissing the Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims whether in terms of the direct actions of the Defendant company or on the basis of vicarious liability.

Based upon the above reasons, the appellate court affirmed all of the trial court’s post-trial rulings.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

To view the Tort Talk post on Judge Nealon's trial court Opinion and for access to a Link to that Opinion, please click HERE.

Party's Destruction of Evidence Paves The Way For a Spoliation Sanction

In the case of United Paving, LLC v. Plaza Drive, LP, No. 1259-CV-2024 (C.P. West. Co. June 8, 2026 Smail, J.), the court granted a Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for spoliation of evidence in a breach of contract case involving paving work.

A dispute arose between the parties regarding whether the paving work was allegedly correctly completed. The Defendants in this matter allegedly did not pay the Plaintiff for the paving work completed on the basis that the work done was allegedly incorrectly completed.

After the suit was filed, a representative of the contracting party wrote to the Plaintiff’s attorney asserting that the work completed was defective and that, as such, plans were in place to mill and repave the roadway within a few days.

Plaintiff’s counsel advised defense counsel that he would like to have the Plaintiff’s own expert view the job completed within the following two weeks and that if the repaving was done within the next few days as threatened, a spoliation of evidence argument would be raised.

Counsel for the Defendants replied and indicated that the repaving work was going to go ahead as soon as possible.

The Plaintiff’s attorney was able to have an asphalt professional view and photograph the site before it was repaved. However, the Plaintiff was not able to retain an expert in time to complete a site inspection on such short notice. The repaving was then completed.

The Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Sanctions on the basis of spoliation of evidence.   

The court reviewed the current law of spoliation and noted that, under that law, where there is a non-preservation or a significant alteration of evidence by a party for a pending or future litigation, the court has the discretion to impose a range of sanctions against the spoliator.

In this matter, the Defendants argued that the they did not engage in spoliation because the road involved was allegedly in such poor condition that they had no choice but to repave it quickly. The Defendants further argued that to require roads to stay in states of alleged disrepair during litigation would be unreasonable and would violate public policy.

The court noted that, while it understood the defense position, there was no argument being made that the road would have to be preserved until the end of litigation. Rather, the court stated that the “reasonable course of action” would have been for the parties and their attorneys to cooperate to allow both sides to have adequate access to the road for expert analysis. According to the court, this could have been accomplished in a matters of days or weeks after which the road could have been repaved and the Plaintiffs would not have been prejudiced by the failure to have an equal opportunity for expert analysis.

The court found that spoliation indeed occurred under the facts presented. The entire focus of the case was the quality of the paving work completed by the Plaintiffs. The Defendant then destroyed the paving work completed by the Plaintiff shortly after the filing of their Complaint, but prior to the Defendants filing their own Answer to the Complaint. The court also noted that the Defendants were able to obtain two of their own expert reports, while essentially preventing the Plaintiff from doing the same.

As such, the court applied the standard of review under Pennsylvania law to determine what appropriate sanction was required. In this regard, the court noted that, in determining an appropriate sanctions for spoliation, the court must weigh three factors: (1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and (3) whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness to the opposing party and, where the offending party is seriously at fault, a determination as to what type of sanction would serve to deter such conduct by others in the future.

In this matter, the court ruled that the Defendants would be precluded from offering into evidence any and all expert reports and any photographs of the conditions of the asphalt. Moreover, the court stated that, at the time of trial, the court would issue and adverse inference instruction regarding the spoliation of evidence.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


It is noted that the Plaintiff’s attorney in this case was Daniel C. Hudock of the Law Office of Daniel C. Hudock in Latrobe, Pennsylvania. I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Ray Donnelly on www.unsplash.com.

Claims Regarding Duty to Provide Safe Drinking Water Flow Through Summary Judgment Motion

In the case of McNair v. Pennsylvania-America Water Co., No. 2024-CV-5834 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 11, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by a water company in a class action suit by residents of a Monroe County lake community in which the Plaintiffs had asserted claims of public nuisance under the safe drinking water statute, private nuisance, and breach of implied contract for failing to provide clean, safe, and reliable water surface to their company.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs asserted that the drinking water supplied by the utility company was chronically tainted with excessive levels of manganese that adversely affected the color, case, smell, and safety of the water.

The utility company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on several grounds.

Relative to the request for the dismissal of certain nuisance claims based upon the statute of limitations, the court ruled that there were issues of fact under the discovery rule to the statute of limitations that prevented the entry of summary judgment in that regard.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County

Judge Nealon also found that the record before the court confirmed that the Plaintiff’s claims for breach of the utility’s implied duty to provide safe drinking water should be allowed to proceed to the jury.

Relative to the utility’s argument that the Plaintiff’s claims failed due to the Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust their administrative remedies, the court found that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies only applies where the available administrative remedy is adequate and complete with respect to the alleged harm sustained and the specific relief requested. 

Here, the court found that, given that the resident’s public nuisance claims sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the diminution of the value of their property, the loss of the use and enjoyment of the land, and the inconvenience, discomfort and annoyance that they have endured, the circumstances did not meet the elements of the doctrine given that the appropriate state administrative agency had no authority to award damages. 

As such, the court found that residents were not required to first exhaust their available administrative procedures before filing suit in a court of law.

In the end, the court denied the utility’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of top image:  Photo by Wallace Chuck on www.pexels.com.

Court Addresses Various Breach of Contract and Bad Faith Allegations in a First Party Medical Benefits Case

In the case of Castellani v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 2025-CV-3425 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 18, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed various issues raised in a claim for breach of contract and bad faith in a first party medical benefits case.

The Plaintiff basically asserted that the insurance company had allegedly fraudulently induced her to purchase medical expense benefits coverage that it allegedly never truly intended to provide. 

The Plaintiff also asserted that the carrier unjustifiably initiated numerous peer reviews by allegedly biased medical professionals in order to allegedly manufacturer a sham basis upon which to deny coverage for allegedly reasonable and necessary treatment.

In additional to suing the carrier for breach of contract and bad faith, the Plaintiff also sued the individual claims representative as well.

The carrier filed Preliminary Objections relative to the Plaintiff’s demand for counsel fees under §1716 and §1798 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. 

The carrier also filed Preliminary Objections against the bad faith claim.

The claims representative also filed a demurrer on the claims against that party.

Challenges were also made against the claims under the UTPCPL.

The court granted the demurrer asserted by the claims adjuster after finding that the Plaintiff was not able to demonstrate a duty of care owed to the claims adjuster to the insured so as to expose the adjuster to individual tort liability.

The court otherwise found that the Plaintiff had stated a valid cause of action against the carrier for bad faith. The court also found that the claims were not barred by the gist of the action doctrine. The court additionally found that the economic loss doctrine did not preclude the tort claims asserted by the Plaintiff.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Marek Studzinski on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Finds That Having Lunch At Mom's House Doesn't Make You a Resident of that House When You Have Your Own Apartment

In the case of Lanunziata v. Penn. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins., No. 2026 Pa. Super. 97 (Pa. Super. May 13, 2026 Bowes, J., Dubow, J., and Neuman, J.) (Op. by Dubow, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of an insurance company in a declaratory judgment action in which the child of the insured was seeking UIM benefits under his parent’s automobile policy following an accident.

According to the Opinion, under the policy in question, an insured included the named insured and any family member.  A family member was defined, in part, as a resident of the insured's household. 

Here, the record before the court confirmed that the child had moved out of his parents’ home several years before the incident and spent a majority of his time in his own apartment.

After reviewing the case law on the issue of "residency" in this context, the Superior Court rejected the claim that the Plaintiff was a resident of his parents’ home.  The Plaintiff asserted that he ate lunch at his parents' house on a regular basis, had his mail delivered there, and had left a few personal items at his parents’ home.

The Court noted that the Plaintiff had graduated from college in 2016 and had leased an apartment in 2019 and had no intention of returning to his parents' home to live. 

The Court found that the evidence confirmed that the quantity of contacts and time that the Plaintiff spent in his own apartment greatly outweighed his contacts with his parents home.

As such, the Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the carrier on the coverage question presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Court Summaries” by Timothy L. Clawges of The Pennsylvania Bar News (June 15, 2026).

Artificial Citations Lands Another Attorney in Trouble in Pennsylvania

Another Pennsylvania attorney has been sanction for submitting filings in federal court containing AI hallucinations.

In the case of Twigg v. BSN Sports, Inc., No. 4:23-CV-00067-MWB (M.D. Pa. June 18, 2026 Brann, C.J.), Chief Judge Matthew W. Brann sanctioned an attorney by fining him $1,500 and suspending him from practicing in the Middle District Federal Court for six months due to the submission of filings by the attorney containing AI-generated hallucinated citations.

The Court found that the attorney had violated Rule 11 by submitting fabricated and inaccurate case citations.  In his Opinion, Judge Brann also expressed his displeasure with the attorney attempting to shift the blame relative to his responsibility for submitting the erroneous citations contained in the brief that was filed with the Court.

Anyone wishing to review Judge Brann's May 21, 2026 decision in this case may click this LINK.  The portion of the Opinion covering the AI issues is near the end of the Opinion.

The Court's June 18, 2026 Order entering sanctions can be viewed at this LINK.

Source: Article - "Fed. Court Suspends Pa. Attorney for AI-Hallucinated Citations," by Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (June 22, 2026).

Source of image: Photo by Zach M on www.unsplash.com.

Medical Malpractice Case Transferred Under Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens

In the case of Gearhart v. Geisinger Health, No. 2025-CV-44 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 5, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted the Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue of this case from Lackawanna County to Mifflin County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  

According to the Opinion in this medical malpractice case, Mifflin County Plaintiffs commenced a suit against a Mifflin County podiatrist and nurse practitioner, a Union County physician assistant, a Mifflin County hospital, and their employer and corporate parent, which were both headquartered in Montour County. 

After reviewing the evidence presented to the court, Judge Nealon noted that a trial of this matter in Lackawanna County, which is more than 130 miles from the sites of the primary treatment locations and associated evidence would be unduly burdensome for the individual Defendants and would impose considerable hardships relating to their professional and family responsibilities.  

The court also held that Mifflin County would provide far easier access to material witnesses possessing pertinent information and other sources of proof regarding the claimed negligence and damages.  

Accordingly, based upon a totality of the circumstances, the court found Lackawanna County was an oppressive forum for the continued litigation of the malpractice action.  Consequently, the court granted the Defendants’ Motion to Transfer the Case to the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County under Pa. R.C.P. 1006(d)(1).  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.