Court Dismisses Case Where Plaintiff Attempted to File a Second Amended Complaint Long After Deadline To Do So

In the case of Coble v. Edrington, No. 2024-CV-00521 (C.P. Dauph. Co. Feb. 13, 2026 Engle, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections filed against a Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint on the basis that the Plaintiff failed to obey the court ordered deadline within which to file the Second Amended Complaint.

According to the Opinion, the case arose out of a breach of contract claim.

Under an Order dated April 18, 2025, the court had granted Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint within twenty (20) days.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff did not file their Second Amended Complaint until October 6, 2025, which was approximately 151 days after the court ordered deadline.  Also, the Second Amended Complaint was filed only after the Defendant moved to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute.

After the Second Amended Complaint was filed, the Defendant then responded with various Preliminary Objections, which included a challenge to the timeliness of the pleadings.

The court sustained the Preliminary Objection under Pa. R.C.P. 1028(e) relative to the untimeliness of the Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s arguments and emphasized that the parties are not able to extend court-imposed deadlines without court approval.

The court otherwise noted that a trial court may dismiss an untimely Amended Complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with a court ordered deadline. The court noted that, while actual prejudice may be factor in some cases, it is not always required, particularly when the delay is significant and unjustified.

Here, the court found that the delay of approximately 151 days after the court ordered deadline for the filing of an Amended Complaint was excessive and unjustified. As such, their Preliminary Objection was sustained and the Second Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Stephen M. Hickey of the York, PA law firm of Griffith, Lerman, Lutz & Schieb for bringing this decision to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Markus Winkler on www.unsplash.com.

Trial Court Dismisses Case for Lack of Timely and Proper Service of Process

In the case of Coleman v. Ducon, Jan. Term 2024, No., 2722 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 19, 2025 Roberts, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the action as a result of the Plaintiff’s failure to make a good faith effort to complete service upon the Defendants.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident.

The court noted that the Plaintiff failed to serve either of the Defendants within thirty (30) days of filing the Complaint. Thereafter, the Plaintiff reinstated the Complaint on three (3) occasions over the next year.

Thereafter, the court sustained Preliminary Objections that raised the failure to properly complete service of process. The Plaintiff’s Complaint was dismissed on the basis that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations due to the fact that the Plaintiff had failed to make a good faith effort to complete service.

More specifically, with respect to one Defendant, the Plaintiff had failed to take any action to attempt to serve the Complaint over an eleven (11) month period.

As to the other Defendant, while the Plaintiff had attempted, through a Delaware County Sheriff, to serve that Defendant, that effort at service was unsuccessful in March of 2024. However, the Plaintiff did not file the Delaware County Sheriff’s Affidavit of Non-Service until December of 2024.

The Plaintiff’s next attempt to serve that particular Defendant, according to the docket, was not until seven (7) months later in July of 2025, at which point the Plaintiff improperly served that Defendant in a manner in which the Delaware County Sheriff was not involved.

Overall he court found that the unexcused delay in completing proper service justified the dismissal of the claims.

In this Rule 1925 Opinion, the trial court requested the Superior Court to affirm its decision.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 26, 2026).

Superior Court Affirms Philadelphia Trial Court's Decision to Slash $25 Million Punitive Damages Award in Trucking Accident Case

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Clemmons v. Lehr, No. 1426 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Feb. 27, 2026 Olson, J., Dubow, J., and Beck, J.)(Mem. Op. by Olson, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld a Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas decision to slash a $25 million dollar punitive damages award down to just $1 million dollars based on the “interests of justice and constitutional considerations.”

In its decision, the appellate court also found that questions remained regarding how much the Plaintiff should be awarded in this regard. The appellate court provided instructions to the trial court to re-evaluate its decision after finding that the trial court failed to consider all compensatory damages awarded, including for loss of consortium, when reviewing the validity of the punitive damages claim.

On appeal, the court noted that the current status of Pennsylvania law requires that, if a compensatory damages award includes a recovery for a claim of loss of consortium, the trial court must consider the entire compensatory award when assessing the ratio between the compensatory award and the punitive damages award entered by a jury.

In this case, a Philadelphia County jury returned an award of $26.2 million dollars, which included $25 million dollars in punitive damages, in a rear-end trucking accident case in which the Plaintiff claimed that he sustained injuries to his head, neck and back as a result.

On appeal, the Superior Court determined that the entry of punitive damages was warranted by the evidence presented but agreed with the trial court that the ratio between the punitive damages award and the compensatory damages award was unduly excessive. 

Pointing to the United States Supreme Court’s 2003 holding in the case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishment on a tortfeasor,” and that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.” 

Here, the Pennsylvania Superior Court determined that the decision to reduce the punitive damages award to $1 million dollars based upon a 2:1 multiplier was incorrect because the trial court had only considered the $500,000.00 in compensatory damages awarded to the injured party Plaintiff and improperly excluded the $700,000.00 loss of consortium damages that was awarded to the wife from the calculations. The court noted that, in committing this error, the trial court erroneously inflated the ratio of the punitive damages award awarded.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “In Case With Slashed $25M Verdict, Pa. Appeals Court Wades Into Constitutionality Of ‘Excessive” Punitive Awards,” By Riley Brennan The Legal Intelligencer (March 2, 2026).

Factual Issues on Question Presented Compel Superior Court To Quash Appeal Under the Collateral Order Doctrine

In the case of Hailu v. Giorgio Fresh Company, No. 2988 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super Feb. 25, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Panella, P.J.E., and Sullivan, J.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed an appeal under the collateral order doctrine in a third party claim arising out of a work injury.

More specifically, the Superior Court quashed an appeal from a trial court’s denial of summary judgment under which a Defendant had asserted worker’s compensation immunity under the borrowed employee doctrine.

The Defendant employer was arguing that, with respect to the Plaintiff’s work place accident, the Plaintiff, who had been hired as a temporary employee from a staffing company should be considered to be a “borrowed employee” and that, therefore, the Defendant employer was immune from suit under the provisions of the Worker’s Compensation Act, which provided for the exclusive remedies to injured parties for work place injuries.

After the trial court denied the Defendant’s Motion without an Opinion, the Defendant filed an appeal and asserted that the Order was a collateral order capable of being appealed under Pa. R.A.P. 313. The Defendant asserted that the issue of whether the Plaintiff was a borrowed employee was separable from the main cause of action and was too important to be denied immediate review given that the issues involved immunities afforded under the Worker’s Compensation Act.

The Superior Court disagreed. The Superior Court found that the Defendant’s appeal did not present a purely legal question, but rather a factual one regarding whether the Defendant employer had sufficient control over the Plaintiff employee’s work, which was central to the determination of whether the borrowed employee doctrine applied.

The Superior Court noted that the trial court had ruled that the evidence was insufficient to establish the borrowed employee doctrine such that there was an indication that further factual development was necessary at the lower court level.

The Superior Court ultimately concluded that the issue of whether the Plaintiff was a borrowed employee required a fact-based inquiry, which was not a suitable topic for collateral review of a matter on appeal. Accordingly, the Superior Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order of the trial court.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed with the Superior Court emphasizing that the collateral order doctrine must be narrowly applied in order to prevent the erosion of the final order rule regarding appeals.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 17, 2026).

Source of image: Photo by Jim Wilson on www.unsplash.com.

Plaintiffs Secure Split Decision on Statute of Limitations Issues in a Professional Negligence Case

In the case of Boyanowski v. Carl J. Babushko, CPA, P.C., No. 2021-CV-1975 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 12, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed a statute of limitation issue in a professional negligence claim filed by taxpayers against their former accountant and his employer for allegedly failing to timely prepare and file their individual and business tax returns.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs asserted causes of action for “professional negligence,” “negligence,” and “breach of contract.”

The court noted that, even when viewing the case in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs as required by the standard of review, the record shows that, for more than two (2) years prior to the commencement of the action, the Plaintiffs had actual or constructive knowledge that the accountant had failed to timely file their tax returns due to alleged accountant malpractice. Accordingly, the court dismissed the claims in professional negligence and negligence.

However, relative to the breach of contract claims, the court found that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the parties’ words and course of conduct created an enforceable contract under which the accountant and his employer allegedly agreed to timely file the Plaintiffs’ federal and state tax returns. As such, the Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the breach of contract claim was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Recha Oktaviani on www.unsplash.com.

U.S. Supreme Court Weighs In On a Pennsylvania Civil Litigation Matter

In the case of Galette v. NJ Transit, Nos. 24-1021, 24-1113 (U.S. March 4, 2026) (Op. by Sotomayor, J.), the United States Supreme Court ruled that New Jersey Transit is not entitled to interstate sovereign immunity. With this decision, the United States Supreme Court overruled the decision entered in the case by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The United States Supreme Court held that the New Jersey Transit Corp. was not an arm of the state. In so ruling, the United States Supreme Court recognized a state’s choice to create a legally separate entity from itself via a corporate form.

Given the finding that New Jersey Transit was not an arm of the state, the court ruled that interstate sovereign immunity did not apply.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “US Supreme Court Rules NJ Transit Is Not Entitled To Interstate Sovereign Immunity,” By Tristin Hoffman of The Legal Intelligencer (March 4, 2026).

Article: The Rise and Fall of The Gist of The Action Doctrine

Here is a LINK to the latest edition of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly which contains an article written by my son, Daniel E. Cummins, Jr. and myself entitled "The Rise and Fall of the Gist of the Action Doctrine." The article can be found on p. 118 of this edition.

My son, Daniel, is currently finishing up his second year at Virginia Law School where he is currently serving as one of the Articles Editors for the Virginia Law Review. He is set to work as a Summer Associate this summer with Cozen & O'Connor in their Philadelphia office. He is also looking forward to his clerkship with Federal Middle District Court Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr. after he graduates from law school next year.

As noted in the article, the gist of the action doctrine prevents plaintiffs from bringing both a breach of contract claim and a negligence claim based on an alleged breach of the same duty.

The article reviews the centuries of jurisprudence behind the gist of the action doctrine as compared to the recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions that call into question the continuing validity of the doctrine. The article also predicts further anticipated developments in the law going forward.

Daniel and I send thanks to Professor Emeritus Robert E. Rains of the Dickinson School of Law, who is the Editor of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly, for selecting this article for publication and for editing it into a better article.  We also thank Tina R. Schreiber for her editorial assistance on the article.



I also proudly note that I am referenced the first article listed in this edition. That article, written by Joel Fishman, Ph.D., M.L.S. and entitled "The Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly: A 10-Year History Volumes 87-96 (2016-2025)," references two past PBA Quarterly articles of mine on pages 80-81 as part of the history of this periodical. I thank Professor Rains for selecting those articles for publication as well.