Superior Court Addresses Discoverability of Internal Post-Incident Investigative Reports in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Griffin v. The Bryn Mawr Hospital, No. 3361 EDA 2024, 2026 Pa. Super. 53 (Pa. Super. March 19, 2026 Bowes, J., Murray, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Beck, J.) (Concurring and Dissenting Op. by Murray, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed whether four internal documents created by the medical providers after the hospital allegedly mishandled fetal remains were protected from disclosure under Pennsylvania’s Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE) and the Federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act.

According to the Opinion, the case arose out of a lawsuit filed by parents who alleged that the hospital mistakenly cremated the placenta instead of their fetus and later admitted to a “mix up.”

During discovery, the hospital withheld four internal reports tied to its investigation. The hospital asserted that these documents were privileged patient-safety materials generated as part of its compliance and internal review processes.

In its Opinion, the court addressed how far hospitals can shield internal investigation documents from discovery under the above-referenced state and federal patient-safety laws.

The Superior Court majority ruled that the documents were not protected under MCARE. The court found that the MCARE statute applied only to events involving direct patient care and not post-treatment conduct. The court here found that the allegations in this case did not implicate any medical treatment issues.

With regards to the application of the federal law, the federal law under the PSQIA, this court entered a split decision. The court held that three of the documents at issue were shielded under the broader scope of the PSQIA law because they were created as part of the hospital’s internal patient safety evaluation system.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority's decision may click this LINK.

Judge Murray's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Source: Article – “Pa. Superior Court Splits On MCARE Patient-Safety Privilege Case,” By Tristin Hoffman of The Legal Intelligencer (March 25, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by RDNE Stock Project on www.pexels.com.

Defendant's Forum Non Conveniens Argument Rejected in Medical Malpractice Case Filed in Philadelphia

In the case of Miller v. Jackson, May Term, 2024, No., 240503457 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 17, 2025 Cohen, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss a case based upon the forum non conveniens doctrine in a medical malpractice case.

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of medical treatment that took place in the state of Delaware.

After the lawsuit was filed in Philadelphia County, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens, arguing that the case should be heard in Delaware where the events occurred.

After the court allowed discovery on the motion, the case came up for a decision.

The Plaintiffs asserted that the individual Defendants resided in Pennsylvania and a foundation related to the matter conducted significant operations in patient interactions in Pennsylvania, which allegedly established a public interest in the case being decided in Pennsylvania.

The Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas denied the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss after finding that the Defendants had failed to provide “weighty reasons” to justify the dismissal and transfer of the case.

The court noted, in part, that while the events regarding the medical treatment occurred in the State of Delaware, Pennsylvania still had a substantial connection to the case due to the residency of the individual Defendants in Pennsylvania and the operations of the foundation taking place in Pennsylvania.

The court additionally noted that the Defendants’ arguments focused on county-level convenience rather than a state-level analysis, which is required for forum non conveniens consideration.

The court otherwise determined that the increased travel time for witnesses to come to Philadelphia was not significant enough to warrant dismissal, especially since many of the witnesses were based in Philadelphia.

The trial court otherwise denied the Defendants’ request for a certification of the issues for an interlocutory appeal found that the issues at hand involved a discretionary matter of convenience and not any controlling question of law. The court additionally found that an immediate appeal would not materially advance the termination of the case but would instead delay the proceedings.

Overall, the court found no compelling reasons supporting the disturbance of the Plaintiffs’ choice of forum. As such, the case was allowed to proceed in Pennsylvania.

In this Rule 1925 Opinion, the court requested the Superior Court to affirm its decisions as noted above.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 26, 2026).

Philadelphia County Court Grants Defendant's Request To Transfer Med Mal Case to a Different County

In the case of McDonald v. York Hospital, Oct. Term 2023, No. 2872 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 11, 2025 Bright, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s decision to transfer a medical malpractice case from Philadelphia County to York County.

According to the Opinion, the case arose out of an alleged medical malpractice from a heart surgery that took place in York County, Pennsylvania.

After the Plaintiff filed suit in Philadelphia County, the issue of venue eventually came before the trial court.

The Defendants argued that their business activities in Philadelphia County were incidental and not sufficient to establish venue.

The court found that the Defendant’s contacts with Philadelphia County were primarily educational and incidental, thereby not meeting the quality and quantity of contacts required to establish venue under Pa. R.C.P. 2179(a)(2).

The court determined that the Defendants’ core mission was to provide healthcare services in Central Pennsylvania and that any affiliations with any Philadelphia institutions was not essential to this mission.

As such, the court sustained Preliminary Objections filed by the Defendants regarding venue and transferred the case to York County where the cause of action arose and where the Defendants had their principal place of business.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 26, 2026).

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Court Dismisses Case Where Plaintiff Attempted to File a Second Amended Complaint Long After Deadline To Do So

In the case of Coble v. Edrington, No. 2024-CV-00521 (C.P. Dauph. Co. Feb. 13, 2026 Engle, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections filed against a Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint on the basis that the Plaintiff failed to obey the court ordered deadline within which to file the Second Amended Complaint.

According to the Opinion, the case arose out of a breach of contract claim.

Under an Order dated April 18, 2025, the court had granted Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint within twenty (20) days.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff did not file their Second Amended Complaint until October 6, 2025, which was approximately 151 days after the court ordered deadline.  Also, the Second Amended Complaint was filed only after the Defendant moved to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute.

After the Second Amended Complaint was filed, the Defendant then responded with various Preliminary Objections, which included a challenge to the timeliness of the pleadings.

The court sustained the Preliminary Objection under Pa. R.C.P. 1028(e) relative to the untimeliness of the Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s arguments and emphasized that the parties are not able to extend court-imposed deadlines without court approval.

The court otherwise noted that a trial court may dismiss an untimely Amended Complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with a court ordered deadline. The court noted that, while actual prejudice may be factor in some cases, it is not always required, particularly when the delay is significant and unjustified.

Here, the court found that the delay of approximately 151 days after the court ordered deadline for the filing of an Amended Complaint was excessive and unjustified. As such, their Preliminary Objection was sustained and the Second Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Stephen M. Hickey of the York, PA law firm of Griffith, Lerman, Lutz & Schieb for bringing this decision to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Markus Winkler on www.unsplash.com.

Trial Court Dismisses Case for Lack of Timely and Proper Service of Process

In the case of Coleman v. Ducon, Jan. Term 2024, No., 2722 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 19, 2025 Roberts, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the action as a result of the Plaintiff’s failure to make a good faith effort to complete service upon the Defendants.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident.

The court noted that the Plaintiff failed to serve either of the Defendants within thirty (30) days of filing the Complaint. Thereafter, the Plaintiff reinstated the Complaint on three (3) occasions over the next year.

Thereafter, the court sustained Preliminary Objections that raised the failure to properly complete service of process. The Plaintiff’s Complaint was dismissed on the basis that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations due to the fact that the Plaintiff had failed to make a good faith effort to complete service.

More specifically, with respect to one Defendant, the Plaintiff had failed to take any action to attempt to serve the Complaint over an eleven (11) month period.

As to the other Defendant, while the Plaintiff had attempted, through a Delaware County Sheriff, to serve that Defendant, that effort at service was unsuccessful in March of 2024. However, the Plaintiff did not file the Delaware County Sheriff’s Affidavit of Non-Service until December of 2024.

The Plaintiff’s next attempt to serve that particular Defendant, according to the docket, was not until seven (7) months later in July of 2025, at which point the Plaintiff improperly served that Defendant in a manner in which the Delaware County Sheriff was not involved.

Overall he court found that the unexcused delay in completing proper service justified the dismissal of the claims.

In this Rule 1925 Opinion, the trial court requested the Superior Court to affirm its decision.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 26, 2026).

Superior Court Affirms Philadelphia Trial Court's Decision to Slash $25 Million Punitive Damages Award in Trucking Accident Case

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Clemmons v. Lehr, No. 1426 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Feb. 27, 2026 Olson, J., Dubow, J., and Beck, J.)(Mem. Op. by Olson, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld a Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas decision to slash a $25 million dollar punitive damages award down to just $1 million dollars based on the “interests of justice and constitutional considerations.”

In its decision, the appellate court also found that questions remained regarding how much the Plaintiff should be awarded in this regard. The appellate court provided instructions to the trial court to re-evaluate its decision after finding that the trial court failed to consider all compensatory damages awarded, including for loss of consortium, when reviewing the validity of the punitive damages claim.

On appeal, the court noted that the current status of Pennsylvania law requires that, if a compensatory damages award includes a recovery for a claim of loss of consortium, the trial court must consider the entire compensatory award when assessing the ratio between the compensatory award and the punitive damages award entered by a jury.

In this case, a Philadelphia County jury returned an award of $26.2 million dollars, which included $25 million dollars in punitive damages, in a rear-end trucking accident case in which the Plaintiff claimed that he sustained injuries to his head, neck and back as a result.

On appeal, the Superior Court determined that the entry of punitive damages was warranted by the evidence presented but agreed with the trial court that the ratio between the punitive damages award and the compensatory damages award was unduly excessive. 

Pointing to the United States Supreme Court’s 2003 holding in the case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishment on a tortfeasor,” and that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.” 

Here, the Pennsylvania Superior Court determined that the decision to reduce the punitive damages award to $1 million dollars based upon a 2:1 multiplier was incorrect because the trial court had only considered the $500,000.00 in compensatory damages awarded to the injured party Plaintiff and improperly excluded the $700,000.00 loss of consortium damages that was awarded to the wife from the calculations. The court noted that, in committing this error, the trial court erroneously inflated the ratio of the punitive damages award awarded.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “In Case With Slashed $25M Verdict, Pa. Appeals Court Wades Into Constitutionality Of ‘Excessive” Punitive Awards,” By Riley Brennan The Legal Intelligencer (March 2, 2026).