Party's Destruction of Evidence Paves The Way For a Spoliation Sanction

In the case of United Paving, LLC v. Plaza Drive, LP, No. 1259-CV-2024 (C.P. West. Co. June 8, 2026 Smail, J.), the court granted a Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for spoliation of evidence in a breach of contract case involving paving work.

A dispute arose between the parties regarding whether the paving work was allegedly correctly completed. The Defendants in this matter allegedly did not pay the Plaintiff for the paving work completed on the basis that the work done was allegedly incorrectly completed.

After the suit was filed, a representative of the contracting party wrote to the Plaintiff’s attorney asserting that the work completed was defective and that, as such, plans were in place to mill and repave the roadway within a few days.

Plaintiff’s counsel advised defense counsel that he would like to have the Plaintiff’s own expert view the job completed within the following two weeks and that if the repaving was done within the next few days as threatened, a spoliation of evidence argument would be raised.

Counsel for the Defendants replied and indicated that the repaving work was going to go ahead as soon as possible.

The Plaintiff’s attorney was able to have an asphalt professional view and photograph the site before it was repaved. However, the Plaintiff was not able to retain an expert in time to complete a site inspection on such short notice. The repaving was then completed.

The Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Sanctions on the basis of spoliation of evidence.   

The court reviewed the current law of spoliation and noted that, under that law, where there is a non-preservation or a significant alteration of evidence by a party for a pending or future litigation, the court has the discretion to impose a range of sanctions against the spoliator.

In this matter, the Defendants argued that the they did not engage in spoliation because the road involved was allegedly in such poor condition that they had no choice but to repave it quickly. The Defendants further argued that to require roads to stay in states of alleged disrepair during litigation would be unreasonable and would violate public policy.

The court noted that, while it understood the defense position, there was no argument being made that the road would have to be preserved until the end of litigation. Rather, the court stated that the “reasonable course of action” would have been for the parties and their attorneys to cooperate to allow both sides to have adequate access to the road for expert analysis. According to the court, this could have been accomplished in a matters of days or weeks after which the road could have been repaved and the Plaintiffs would not have been prejudiced by the failure to have an equal opportunity for expert analysis.

The court found that spoliation indeed occurred under the facts presented. The entire focus of the case was the quality of the paving work completed by the Plaintiffs. The Defendant then destroyed the paving work completed by the Plaintiff shortly after the filing of their Complaint, but prior to the Defendants filing their own Answer to the Complaint. The court also noted that the Defendants were able to obtain two of their own expert reports, while essentially preventing the Plaintiff from doing the same.

As such, the court applied the standard of review under Pennsylvania law to determine what appropriate sanction was required. In this regard, the court noted that, in determining an appropriate sanctions for spoliation, the court must weigh three factors: (1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and (3) whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness to the opposing party and, where the offending party is seriously at fault, a determination as to what type of sanction would serve to deter such conduct by others in the future.

In this matter, the court ruled that the Defendants would be precluded from offering into evidence any and all expert reports and any photographs of the conditions of the asphalt. Moreover, the court stated that, at the time of trial, the court would issue and adverse inference instruction regarding the spoliation of evidence.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


It is noted that the Plaintiff’s attorney in this case was Daniel C. Hudock of the Law Office of Daniel C. Hudock in Latrobe, Pennsylvania. I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Ray Donnelly on www.unsplash.com.

Claims Regarding Duty to Provide Safe Drinking Water Flow Through Summary Judgment Motion

In the case of McNair v. Pennsylvania-America Water Co., No. 2024-CV-5834 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 11, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by a water company in a class action suit by residents of a Monroe County lake community in which the Plaintiffs had asserted claims of public nuisance under the safe drinking water statute, private nuisance, and breach of implied contract for failing to provide clean, safe, and reliable water surface to their company.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs asserted that the drinking water supplied by the utility company was chronically tainted with excessive levels of manganese that adversely affected the color, case, smell, and safety of the water.

The utility company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on several grounds.

Relative to the request for the dismissal of certain nuisance claims based upon the statute of limitations, the court ruled that there were issues of fact under the discovery rule to the statute of limitations that prevented the entry of summary judgment in that regard.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County

Judge Nealon also found that the record before the court confirmed that the Plaintiff’s claims for breach of the utility’s implied duty to provide safe drinking water should be allowed to proceed to the jury.

Relative to the utility’s argument that the Plaintiff’s claims failed due to the Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust their administrative remedies, the court found that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies only applies where the available administrative remedy is adequate and complete with respect to the alleged harm sustained and the specific relief requested. 

Here, the court found that, given that the resident’s public nuisance claims sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the diminution of the value of their property, the loss of the use and enjoyment of the land, and the inconvenience, discomfort and annoyance that they have endured, the circumstances did not meet the elements of the doctrine given that the appropriate state administrative agency had no authority to award damages. 

As such, the court found that residents were not required to first exhaust their available administrative procedures before filing suit in a court of law.

In the end, the court denied the utility’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of top image:  Photo by Wallace Chuck on www.pexels.com.

Court Addresses Various Breach of Contract and Bad Faith Allegations in a First Party Medical Benefits Case

In the case of Castellani v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 2025-CV-3425 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 18, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed various issues raised in a claim for breach of contract and bad faith in a first party medical benefits case.

The Plaintiff basically asserted that the insurance company had allegedly fraudulently induced her to purchase medical expense benefits coverage that it allegedly never truly intended to provide. 

The Plaintiff also asserted that the carrier unjustifiably initiated numerous peer reviews by allegedly biased medical professionals in order to allegedly manufacturer a sham basis upon which to deny coverage for allegedly reasonable and necessary treatment.

In additional to suing the carrier for breach of contract and bad faith, the Plaintiff also sued the individual claims representative as well.

The carrier filed Preliminary Objections relative to the Plaintiff’s demand for counsel fees under §1716 and §1798 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. 

The carrier also filed Preliminary Objections against the bad faith claim.

The claims representative also filed a demurrer on the claims against that party.

Challenges were also made against the claims under the UTPCPL.

The court granted the demurrer asserted by the claims adjuster after finding that the Plaintiff was not able to demonstrate a duty of care owed to the claims adjuster to the insured so as to expose the adjuster to individual tort liability.

The court otherwise found that the Plaintiff had stated a valid cause of action against the carrier for bad faith. The court also found that the claims were not barred by the gist of the action doctrine. The court additionally found that the economic loss doctrine did not preclude the tort claims asserted by the Plaintiff.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Marek Studzinski on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Finds That Having Lunch At Mom's House Doesn't Make You a Resident of that House When You Have Your Own Apartment

In the case of Lanunziata v. Penn. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins., No. 2026 Pa. Super. 97 (Pa. Super. May 13, 2026 Bowes, J., Dubow, J., and Neuman, J.) (Op. by Dubow, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of an insurance company in a declaratory judgment action in which the child of the insured was seeking UIM benefits under his parent’s automobile policy following an accident.

According to the Opinion, under the policy in question, an insured included the named insured and any family member.  A family member was defined, in part, as a resident of the insured's household. 

Here, the record before the court confirmed that the child had moved out of his parents’ home several years before the incident and spent a majority of his time in his own apartment.

After reviewing the case law on the issue of "residency" in this context, the Superior Court rejected the claim that the Plaintiff was a resident of his parents’ home.  The Plaintiff asserted that he ate lunch at his parents' house on a regular basis, had his mail delivered there, and had left a few personal items at his parents’ home.

The Court noted that the Plaintiff had graduated from college in 2016 and had leased an apartment in 2019 and had no intention of returning to his parents' home to live. 

The Court found that the evidence confirmed that the quantity of contacts and time that the Plaintiff spent in his own apartment greatly outweighed his contacts with his parents home.

As such, the Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the carrier on the coverage question presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Court Summaries” by Timothy L. Clawges of The Pennsylvania Bar News (June 15, 2026).

Artificial Citations Lands Another Attorney in Trouble in Pennsylvania

Another Pennsylvania attorney has been sanction for submitting filings in federal court containing AI hallucinations.

In the case of Twigg v. BSN Sports, Inc., No. 4:23-CV-00067-MWB (M.D. Pa. June 18, 2026 Brann, C.J.), Chief Judge Matthew W. Brann sanctioned an attorney by fining him $1,500 and suspending him from practicing in the Middle District Federal Court for six months due to the submission of filings by the attorney containing AI-generated hallucinated citations.

The Court found that the attorney had violated Rule 11 by submitting fabricated and inaccurate case citations.  In his Opinion, Judge Brann also expressed his displeasure with the attorney attempting to shift the blame relative to his responsibility for submitting the erroneous citations contained in the brief that was filed with the Court.

Anyone wishing to review Judge Brann's May 21, 2026 decision in this case may click this LINK.  The portion of the Opinion covering the AI issues is near the end of the Opinion.

The Court's June 18, 2026 Order entering sanctions can be viewed at this LINK.

Source: Article - "Fed. Court Suspends Pa. Attorney for AI-Hallucinated Citations," by Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (June 22, 2026).

Source of image: Photo by Zach M on www.unsplash.com.

Medical Malpractice Case Transferred Under Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens

In the case of Gearhart v. Geisinger Health, No. 2025-CV-44 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 5, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted the Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue of this case from Lackawanna County to Mifflin County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  

According to the Opinion in this medical malpractice case, Mifflin County Plaintiffs commenced a suit against a Mifflin County podiatrist and nurse practitioner, a Union County physician assistant, a Mifflin County hospital, and their employer and corporate parent, which were both headquartered in Montour County. 

After reviewing the evidence presented to the court, Judge Nealon noted that a trial of this matter in Lackawanna County, which is more than 130 miles from the sites of the primary treatment locations and associated evidence would be unduly burdensome for the individual Defendants and would impose considerable hardships relating to their professional and family responsibilities.  

The court also held that Mifflin County would provide far easier access to material witnesses possessing pertinent information and other sources of proof regarding the claimed negligence and damages.  

Accordingly, based upon a totality of the circumstances, the court found Lackawanna County was an oppressive forum for the continued litigation of the malpractice action.  Consequently, the court granted the Defendants’ Motion to Transfer the Case to the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County under Pa. R.C.P. 1006(d)(1).  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Article: Remedies for Late Payment of Settlement Funds

The below article of mine recently appeared in the June 18, 2026 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.

Remedies for Late Payment of Settlement Funds

June 18, 2026

By

Daniel E. Cummins


In most instances, once a civil litigation matter is settled, the defendant’s liability insurance carrier promptly issues payment. In this regard, the carrier has an interest in both protecting its insured in this regard and in closing out another file. However, in rare instances, a settlement payment may be delayed for an inordinate period of time for one reason or another.

When a settlement payment is delayed, plaintiffs have options to compel the production of the settlement payment or to secure sanctions against the defendant relative to the delay. Most settlement agreements themselves outline when payment is due. And, whether or not there is such a provision in a release regarding the timing of a payment, plaintiffs also have the benefit of the mandate under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1, which requires that the settlement payment be “delivered … within 20 calendar days from the defendant’s receipt of an executed release.”

In terms of the status of Pennsylvania law in this regard, it is often said by many that, if one needs a thorough overview of the current status of a particular area of the law, one should look for a decision on the issue written by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas. This advice holds true with Nealon’s recent opinion in the case of Hill v. Riverside Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center, No. 2023-CV-3399 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 22, 2026 Nealon, J.), in which Nealon addressed the topic of remedies available to a plaintiff under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 where a defendant fails to produce a settlement payment in a timely fashion after the receipt of an executed release.

According to the opinion, this matter involved a professional liability action against the health care and rehab center. The plaintiff’s decedent’s had been a patient at the defendant’s facility. The defendant facility owner at issue in this case eventually became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy.

During the course of this litigation, the parties agreed to participate in a settlement conference with a private mediator. Prior to the mediation, the defendant’s attorney confirmed in writing that the parent and affiliate entities of the defendant were insolvent and in bankruptcy proceedings. Defense counsel also confirmed that, as such, the defendant would not be able to satisfy the first $75,000 of any settlement as that represented the amount of the defendant’s deductible, but that any obligation above that amount would be covered by the defendant’s liability insurance policy.

As a result of the mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement for a net payment of $175,000. The total amount of the party’s settlement was actually $250,000 but the plaintiff agreed to waive the defendant’s payment of its $75,000 deductible. The net settlement payment of $175,000 was to be paid entirely by the defendant’s liability insurance carrier.

The court’s opinion emphasized that the insurance company’s adjuster had agreed to the settlement without any indication of any coverage issues existing between the defendant and its insurance company.

After the settlement, the plaintiff proceeded to court on a petition for court approval of the settlement in this death case. The court granted the Plaintiff’s petition and approved the settlement. The parties then executed the settlement agreement.

Plaintiff’s counsel then sent the signed release, the court order approving the settlement and other closing documents to the defendant’s counsel and requested the settlement payment.

In his opinion in this Hill case, Nealon emphasized that noticeably absent from the settlement agreement was any indication or even a suggestion that a coverage issue may exist between the defendant and its insurance company. Nor was there any reference that any such coverage issue needed to be resolved before the plaintiff would receive the settlement payment.

Thereafter, when plaintiff’s counsel wrote for the status of the settlement check, defense counsel indicated that there was some issue that the adjuster had to work out. Again, there was no reference made to any insurance coverage issues.

The opinion of the court noted facts that showed that the plaintiff’s attorney showed great patience and was more than accommodating in his repeated efforts to secure the production of the settlement check over the next several months. After several months then went by with no production of the settlement check, counsel for the plaintiff filed a motion under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 relative to the defendant’s failure to produce the settlement check in a timely fashion after the production of the executed release.

Judge Nealon reviewed Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 229.1 which governs the prompt delivery of settlement funds within 20 days of the receipt of an executed release by the defendant.

The rule otherwise provides that, if court approval of the settlement is required, the mandated 20-day time period under Rule 229.1 does not become operative until the settlement is so approved.

Nealon noted that, under Rule 229.1, if a defendant fails to timely deliver settlement funds, a plaintiff has the right to seek either of two remedies. First, a plaintiff can seek to invalidate the settlement agreement and request that the matter return to the trial list. Second, a plaintiff can seek certain sanctions against the defendant.

The court in Hill noted that, if the plaintiff opt to pursue sanctions against the defendant, Rule 229.1(e) directs the plaintiff to file an affidavit “attesting to nonpayment,” and to submit six items for the court’s review with the affidavit. Among the documents to be submitted with the affidavit are a copy of “any document evidencing the terms of the settlement agreement,” a copy of “the executed release,” a copy of “a receipt reflecting delivery of the executed release,” a certification by counsel “the applicable interest rate,” and “that the affidavit and accompanying documents have been served on the attorneys for all interested parties.” Lastly, also attached to the affidavit should be “the form of order prescribed by subdivision (h)” of Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 for execution by the court.

Nealon additionally noted that the type of sanctions allowed in this instance are spelled out under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1. More specifically, under Rule 229.1(g), if the court determines that a defendant has failed to deliver the settlement funds within 20 days and there is no material dispute as to the terms of the settlement or the terms of the release, the court “shall impose sanctions in the form of interests calculated at the rate equal to the prime rate as listed in the First Edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year for which interest is awarded, plus 1%, not compounded, running from the 21st day to the date of delivery of the settlement funds, together with reasonable attorney fees incurred in the preparation of the affidavit.”

Nealon otherwise ruled in the Hill case that the fact that the insurance company’s noncompliance with the payment requirement may be attributable to a post-settlement assertion of a potential coverage issue did not warrant the denial of the plaintiff’s request for sanctions relative to the failure of the carrier to produce the settlement check within 20 days of the production of the executed release.
Conclusion

The Hill decision written by Judge Nealon provides thorough guidance on the steps to take in securing sanctions relative to a late payment of settlement funds required by an executed release.

As evidenced by plaintiff’s counsel’s actions in the Hill case, it is advisable for the plaintiff to show some patience while repeatedly requesting, in writing, the settlement payment once the mandated 20-day time period has expired for the timely production of the check. By showing some patience and creating a written record of repeated requests for the production of the check, the plaintiff will be able to bolster their request for sanctions as opposed to the case where a plaintiff runs to the courthouse on a motion for sanctions on the 21st day after the release was received by the defense counsel.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner at Cummins Law in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania. Contact him at dancummins@cumminslaw.net.




Reprinted with permission from the June 18, 2026 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2026 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.