Joinder of Additional Defendants Denied in Federal Court as Untimely

In the case of Cooney v. Buck Motorsports Park LLC, No. 5:23-CV-02346-MKC (E.D. Pa. Jan 15, 2025 Costello, J.), the court addressed a Plaintiff’s opposition to a Defendant’s Motion for Leave of Court to Join Additional Defendants into the case which involved allegations of personal injury after a truck allegedly struck the Plaintiff during a dirt race track event.

The Plaintiffs opposed the joinder of the proposed third party Defendants under Federal Rule 14(a) and Local Rule 14.1(a) by asserting that the Motion to Join was untimely.

The court noted that, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 14(a), a “defending party may, as third-party Plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or maybe liable to it for all or part of the claim against it.” 

The court additionally noted that, under F.R.C.P. 14(a)(1), “the third-party Plaintiff must, by motion obtain the court’s leave if it files the third-party complaint more than 14 days after serving its original answer.”

Moreover, the court noted that the Eastern District Local Rule of Court 14.1 holds that applications pursuant to F.R.C.P. 14 for leave to join additional Defendants after the expiration of the time limit specified in that rule “will ordinarily be denied as untimely unless filed not more than 90 days after the service of the moving party’s answer.” However, the court noted that the trial court retained discretion on whether or not to apply that local rule or not.

The court additionally noted that, in this matter, the scheduled trial was only a few months away, that the discovery deadline had already been previously extended, and that the addition of the third party Defendants would not only extend the discovery period further, but would also guarantee a delay of trial and would complicate the issues at trial.

The court additionally noted that the late joinder would also likely harm the proposed third-party Defendants given how far along the original case had already proceeded. The court additionally noted that prejudice could result to the Plaintiff for the same reasons.

For all of these reasons, the court denied the Motion to Join the Third Party Defendants after finding that the motion was untimely and without sufficient justification where the original Defendants had sought the leave of court more than a year after they filed their Answer to the Complaint. 

The court also noted that the Defendants were long aware of the existence of the proposed third-party Defendants, having listed them as individuals with discoverable information in the original Defendant’s initial federal court disclosures.

The court also noted that the Defendants who wished to join the third-party Defendants failed to explain to the court why they could not have learned of their alleged claims against the third-party Defendants sooner.

As such, the Motion to Join was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.

Source: The Legal Intelligencer Federal Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 6, 2025).

Federal Court Rules Just Because Experts Agree That There Was An Injury Doesn't Automatically Mean That Causation Has Been Established

In the case of Gross v. Villeneuve, No. 2:23-CV-00705-NBF (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2025 Fischer, S.J.), the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to a Defendant’s negligence, which had been conceded, but otherwise denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a case involving a motor vehicle accident.

While the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in terms of the liability issue in this rear-end accident, the court denied the Plaintiff’s argument that, given the Defendant's concession on liability, the Plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to a further concession on the issue of causation relative to the physical injuries and damages alleged by the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff asserted that he was entitled to summary judgment on the “factual cause” question where both parties’ medical experts attributed some degree of injury to the accident. 

Here, citing to Pennsylvania Superior Court precedent, the federal court ruled that a defense expert’s opinion that a Plaintiff suffered an injury, based on the history given to the expert, is not an uncontroverted admission on the issue of causation by a defendant. 

The court confirmed the well-settled rule that a jury was free to render its own decision on the case presented even where the experts of the parties may agree, to some extent, that the Plaintiff sustained an injury as a result of the accident. 

More specifically, the court reasoned that “[a] medical expert report concluding that, based on the evidence provided (including a Plaintiff’s history and subjective complaints), the ‘mechanism of injury’ and clinical findings were ‘consistent with’ some of the allegedly consequent injuries (i.e., some injury could be resultant from the collision), is simply not a concession. To the contrary, it is an insufficient basis on which to usurp a trial jury’s credibility determinations and broader fact-finding role.” See Op. at 5.

As such, the court denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on the causation issues presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh law office of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Nikita Nikitin on www.pexels.com.

Summary Judgment Granted Relative To Slip and Fall That Occurred During an Active Snowstorm

In the case of King v. Hermitage Plaza, No. 2023-CV-1055 (C.P. Mercer Co. Jan. 14, 2025 Amrhein, Jr., J.), the court entered summary judgment in a slip and fall case where the Plaintiff slipped and fell in a parking lot owned by the Defendant during an ongoing snowstorm.

According to the Opinion, on the day of the incident, the Plaintiff exited her place of employment during an ongoing snowstorm, walked across the parking lot owned by the Defendant and went to her vehicle. The Plaintiff then moved her vehicle closer to her place of business by parking at the curb. When the Plaintiff then exited her vehicle again at that point, she slipped and fell on the snow and/or ice that had accumulated near the curb.

The Plaintiff alleged injuries as a result and attributed the incident to the Defendant’s failure to fully remove snow and ice from the premises. The Plaintiff sued both the landowner and a snow removal contractor.

In its decision, the court reviewed the current status of the hills and ridges doctrine in Pennsylvania. The court also cited to the case of Collins v. Phila. Suburban Dev. Corp., 179 A.3d 69, 75 (Pa. Super. 2018), for the proposition that a landowner has no obligation to address any snow and ice on the premises “until a reasonable time after the winter storm has ended.”

The court in this case, again relying on the Collins decision, ruled that a period of approximately six (6) hours (or overnight) does not constitute an unreasonable passage of time concerning a landowner’s failure to remove ice and snow, particularly when a winter storm is ongoing during that period.

The court emphasized that the record in this case demonstrated that the site of the incident experienced severe winter weather conditions before, during, and after the subject slip and fall incident. The Plaintiff noted that she had observed the Defendant snow removal contractor plowing the lot approximately one hour before her fall. The court stated that this plowing activity fell within the six hour to overnight window established in the Collins case.

The court also noted that photographs of the parking lot which were taken by the Plaintiff immediately after the fall demonstrated that the lot was actively being cleared throughout the day. There was also a continued snow fall thereafter.

The court also found here that the Plaintiff did not present evidence to show that snow and ice has unreasonably accumulated to such a degree as to unreasonably obstruct travel so as to satisfy the elements of the Hills and Ridges Doctrine, or that an unreasonable time has passed after the end of a storm. 

Consequently, the Plaintiff was unable to prove the breach of duty element essential to this negligent claim. Accordingly, the Plaintiff was not able to sustain a negligence claim and the court therefore entered summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Annie Niemaszyk on www.unsplash.com.

Third Circuit Affirms Trial Court's Giving Plaintiff the Boot in a Shoe Store Slip and Fall Case

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Liveshitz v. Designer Brands, Inc., No. 23-3082 (3d Cir. Jan. 13, 2025 Matey, J., Shwartz, J., and McKee, J.) (Op. by Matey, J.), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the entry of summary judgment in a slip and fall case.

In this case, the Plaintiff alleges that she slipped and fell on a clear and odorless substance on the restroom floor of a store.

The Third Circuit reaffirmed the well-settled rule that a premises liability case requires that a defendant either created the harmful condition that caused the plaintiff to fall or had actual or constructive notice of that condition a sufficient time prior to the event to enable the defendant to address the condition.

Here, the court found that whether the Defendant exercised reasonable care was immaterial because there was no duty owed in the first place. The court found that the Plaintiff had failed to establish actual or constructive notice of the condition on the part of the Defendant.

The court also ruled that the Plaintiff's spoliation of evidence argument failed to create a genuine issue of material fact where there was no evidence of any actual or constructive notice on the part of the Defendant of the alleged condition that allegedly caused the Plaintiff to fall.  

The court ruled that a jury could only speculate on how long the substance at issue was on the floor before the Plaintiff encountered it.

As such, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was affirmed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Volunteer Mock Trial Jurors Needed For Next Tuesday's Semi-Finals Trials in Lackawanna County

 

Venue of UIM Case Transferred Due To Terms of Forum Selection Clause in Policy

In the case of Winner v. Progressive Adv. Ins. Co., March Term, 2023, No. 1654 (C.P. Phila. Co. Nov. 15, 2024 Bright, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion addressed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court relative to an appeal when trial court decisions in response to a Motion to Transfer UIM and Bad Claims from Philadelphia County to Chester County.

In its Opinion, the trial court asserted that it did not commit error in transferring the UIM and bad faith claims from the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas to the Chester County Court of Common Pleas based upon an unambiguous forum selection clause contained in the automobile insurance policy at issue.

The trial court also asserted that it did not err in deciding the Preliminary Objections at issue without ruling on discovery motions which, according to the trial court, had become moot.

The trial court also requested that the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law Claim be remanded to the trial court for further consideration.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 23, 2025).

Federal Court Finds No Jurisdiction Over Insurance Company Existed Under Claims Asserted

In the case of Abira Medical Laboratories, LLC v. Freedom Life Insurance Co., No. 2:24-CV-02110-JHS (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2025 Slomsky, J.), the Eastern District Federal Court of Pennsylvania, addressing a question of first impression, held that a Defendant foreign insurance company did not consent to general personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania to be sued by a private party on its own behalf for any cause of action simply based on the fact that the carrier obtained a Certificate of Authority issued pursuant to 40 Pa. C.S.A. § 46 in order to conduct business in Pennsylvania.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was a medical testing laboratory that provided testing services to the Defendant insurance company’s insured members as an out-of-network provider.

When the Plaintiff had a billing dispute with the insurance company regarding services performed, the Plaintiff sued the Defendant in a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas.

The Defendant carrier removed the action to federal court on the basis of diversity and then filed this Motion to Dismiss. The Defendant carrier asserted, in part, that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the insurance company.

The Plaintiff argued that the Defendant carrier had consented to general personal jurisdiction on any claim because the Defendant had applied for and received a Certificate of Authority to do insurance business in Pennsylvania pursuant to 40 Pa. C.S.A. § 46.

The court noted that the referenced statute did not provide for general jurisdiction over foreign insurance companies conducting business in Pennsylvania.

Rather, the court noted that, under the plain language of § 46 foreign insurance companies wishing to conduct business in Pennsylvania must obtain a Certificate of Authority from Pennsylvania’s Department of Insurance. The statute further provides that, upon obtaining a Certificate of Authority, § 46 allows for any action arising out of a violation of § 46 that is instituted by or on behalf of the insurance commissioner to be brought against the foreign insurance company in Pennsylvania.

Here, given that the current action was not commenced by the insurance commissioner arising out of a violation of § 46, but rather was an action brought by a private party, the grant of jurisdiction provided under § 46 over a foreign insurance company was not found not to be implicated.

The court also held that the Defendant insurance company had no otherwise consented to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.

Given that the court found that it lacked general personal jurisdiction, as well as specific personal jurisdiction over the Defendant insurance company, the court granted the carrier’s Motion to Dismiss.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Federal Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 30, 2025).