Opportunity To Advertise Your Firm Through Sponsorship (And Support a Great Cause)

 

Court Rules That Party Not Entitled to Unsealing of Juvenile Delinquency Records of a Witness

In the case of M.M., a minor v. Lion Tamer, LLC, No. 2025-CV-4113 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 18, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed a Motion by the Defendant seeking to unseal the records relating to the juvenile delinquency proceedings involving a minor identified as “B.S.”

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of a premises liability incident. The Defendant operates an indoor trampoline park. The minor female Plaintiff, M.M., was allegedly lured into a foam pit by a 13 year old teenage boy during which the minor was allegedly sexually assaulted.

The court noted that the Plaintiff did not take any position on the Defendant’s Motion to Unseal Records regarding the juvenile delinquencies proceedings involving a minor identified as B.S.

In reviewing the Motion, the court referred to §6307(a) of the Juvenile Act. 42 Pa. C.S.A. §6307(a).

The court additionally also reviewed Rule 160(A) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure. Pa. R.J.C.P. 160(A).

The Defendant sought access to B.S.’s juvenile records as a party having a legitimate interest in the proceedings. In making the Motion, the Defendant conceded that it could not find any case law directly on point specifically involving a Defendant in a civil case seeking to have a juvenile criminal record unsealed. 

However, Judge Nealon uncovered relevant case law both at the appellate and trial court level. Based upon the case law found, Judge Nealon ruled that the Defendant could not be deemed a party “having a legitimate interest in the proceedings” under the above-referenced Rules as that language has been construed as referring to parties having a legitimate interest in the juvenile court proceedings.

Judge Nealon also noted that, while Subsection (b) of §6307 of the Juvenile Act was added after certain case law and permitted disclosure of limited information from juvenile delinquent proceedings for certain violent criminal conduct committed when the juvenile at issue was 14 years old or older, the individual in this case was only 13 at the time of the incident. As such, the court found that §6307(b) could not serve as a basis for unsealing the requested juvenile records.

Overall, the court in this case decided that based upon the limited record before it as submitted by the parties, the requested juvenile records of B.S. were protected from public access by the above-cited Rules. Accordingly, the Defendant’s Motion to Unseal the Juvenile Delinquency Documents was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Summary Judgment Granted in Favor of Out-of-Possession Landlord

In the case of Bresnahan v. Indian Creek Health Care, Inc., No. 10535 of 2024, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. July 31, 2026 Cox, P.J.), the court granted in part and denied in part a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a premises liability case.

The Plaintiff filed suit alleging injuries as a result of a slip and fall on an alleged accumulation of liquid in a stairwell. Various Defendants affiliated with the property were sued.

Relative to the out-of-possession landlord, the court held that such a defendant could not be held liable without evidence that it retained control over the allegedly defective area.

With respect to one of that defendants, the court found that the Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that that defendant was involved in the control, maintenance, or repair of the premises. There was also no evidence established that that particular defendant had retained any control over the area where the Plaintiff allegedly fell.

A separate Motion for Summary Judgment filed by another defendant that was identified as the management company for the premises was denied.  The court found that sufficient evidence had been produced to support an inference that that defendant had control over the area of the premises in question.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Sept. 17, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Laura Cleffman on www.unsplash.com.

Looking to try to settle a trip or slip and fall case 

before the end of the year?

(570) 319-5899

dancummins@cumminslaw.net

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Upholds Statutory Cap on Tort Claims Against State

In the case Freilich v. SEPTA, No. 10 EAP 2024 (Pa. Oct. 1, 2026) (Op. by Todd, C.J.) (dissenting Op. by Donohue, J. and McCaffery, J.) (concurring Ops. by Dougherty, J. and Mundy, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a 5-2 decision, rejected arguments that the $250,000.00 cap on awards for tort claims against the state were unconstitutional.

More specifically, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument that the state’s Sovereign Immunity Act enforcing the cap violated the constitutional right to a trial by a jury.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was injured when a SEPTA bus ran over her foot as she was walking in a crosswalk in downtown Philadelphia.  

This case arose out of a personal injury litigation in which a stipulated jury verdict totaling $7million dollars had been entered. The Plaintiff also sought an additional $892,979.00 in delay damages against the Defendants. The trial court later granted a $250,000.00 settlement with SEPTA, consistent with the statutory cap. The Plaintiff’s retained their right to challenge the validity of the cap up the appellate ladder.

In coming to its decision, the Court reasoned that the statutory cap did not limit the availability or parameters of a trial by jury. Rather, the cap limited an injury party’s ultimate recovery.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court otherwise rejected arguments from the Plaintiff that the cap violated the state’s remedies clause under its constitution. The Supreme Court upheld the statute legislature’s power to determine how lawsuits can be brought against the state and, therefore, control the limits of liability damages.

As noted, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the statutory cap as being a valid part of Pennsylvania personal injury law relative to governmental agency defendants.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority Opinion for this decision may click this LINK. 

The Concurring Opinion by Chief Justice Todd can be viewed HERE.

The Concurring Opinion by Justice Dougherty can be viewed HERE.

The Concurring Opinin by Justice Wecht can be viewed HERE.

The Dissenting Opinion by Justice Donohue can be viewed HERE.

Source: Article – “Pennsylvania Supreme Court Upholds $250K Cap On Tort Claims Against State” By Cameryn Oakes of The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert (Oct. 1, 2026).

Presenting Civil Litigation Update at Upcoming November 5, 2026 Lackawanna County Bench Bar Conference

On November 5, 2026, Daniel E. Cummins, Esq. of Cummins Law and Neil T. O'Donnell of O'Donnell Law will be presenting a CLE program entitled "2026 Civil Litigation Update With Practice Tips" at the Lackawanna County Bench Bar Conference set to take place at the Hilton Scranton Hotel and Conference Center.

Attendance at the Lackawanna County Bench Bar Conference is open to members of the Lackawanna Bar Association Conference and will be held in person.

Please consider registering to attend the upcoming November 5, 2026 Lackawanna County by utilizing this LINK.

Please also note that a version of this presentation may also be offered on Zoom through another sponsor in the near future. Details to follow.

Preliminary Objections to Claims of Recklessness and Punitive Damages Overruled

In the case of Appleman v. Byrne, No. 2026-CV-498 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 24, 2026 Gibbons, P.J.), the court issued an Opinion denying a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections attacking claims of recklessness and claims of punitive damages in a motor vehicle accident case. 

President Judge James A. Gibbons reviewed the current status of the law which allows for the pleading of allegations regarding a defendant’s general state of mind, such as an allegation of recklessness, as being permitted without any supporting facts at the pleading stage.  

President Judge James A. Gibbons
Lackawanna County

The court noted that a plaintiff is not required to produce any evidence of recklessness on the part of a defendant “until after the completion of discovery.”  See Op. at 5.

The trial court additionally noted that, with respect to claims of punitive damages, the appellate courts have held that claims of wanton and reckless conduct can be alleged generally.  

In this matter, the court found that the Plaintiff was not only allowed to generally plead claims of recklessness and/or punitive damages, but also found that the Plaintiff did assert facts in the Complaint to support the same. 

More specifically, the court noted that the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant driver was recklessness because he allegedly took his eyes off the road for an extended period of time when he allegedly dropped his coffee on his lap and looked down to grab it, during which the rear-end accident occurred. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Case Provides Lessons On The Business Records Exception to the Hearsay Rule

As identified by Attorney Jon Bruno on his excellent Pa. Super Blog, the Pennsylvania Superior Court provided an excellent analysis of the business records exception to the rule against hearsay in the case of Commonwealth v. Thomas, No. 429 WDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Sept. 21, 2026 Neuman, J., Lazarus, P.J., and Stabile, J.) (Op. by Stabile, J.).

This is another example of an appellate court decision in a criminal court case having possible applicability to the civil litigation arena.

At pags. 28-37 of the Opinion, the Superior Court reviewed the parameters of Pa. R.E. 803(6) regarding the business records exception.

The appellate court held that it was error to admit into evidence under the business records exception, a Pennsylvania State Police record that contained multiple layers of hearsay.

At a minimum, the Superior Court held that the business records exception was improperly applied because the law enforcement officer who testified about the record was not the custodian of the record or other qualified witness capable of laying the type of foundation required by Rule 803(6) for the exception to apply.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Jon Bruno of the Pittsburgh law firm of Bruno Litigation, LLC for publicizing this Opinion on his excellent Pa. Super blog.