Article: Remedies for Late Payment of Settlement Funds

The below article of mine recently appeared in the June 18, 2026 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.

Remedies for Late Payment of Settlement Funds

June 18, 2026

By

Daniel E. Cummins


In most instances, once a civil litigation matter is settled, the defendant’s liability insurance carrier promptly issues payment. In this regard, the carrier has an interest in both protecting its insured in this regard and in closing out another file. However, in rare instances, a settlement payment may be delayed for an inordinate period of time for one reason or another.

When a settlement payment is delayed, plaintiffs have options to compel the production of the settlement payment or to secure sanctions against the defendant relative to the delay. Most settlement agreements themselves outline when payment is due. And, whether or not there is such a provision in a release regarding the timing of a payment, plaintiffs also have the benefit of the mandate under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1, which requires that the settlement payment be “delivered … within 20 calendar days from the defendant’s receipt of an executed release.”

In terms of the status of Pennsylvania law in this regard, it is often said by many that, if one needs a thorough overview of the current status of a particular area of the law, one should look for a decision on the issue written by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas. This advice holds true with Nealon’s recent opinion in the case of Hill v. Riverside Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center, No. 2023-CV-3399 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 22, 2026 Nealon, J.), in which Nealon addressed the topic of remedies available to a plaintiff under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 where a defendant fails to produce a settlement payment in a timely fashion after the receipt of an executed release.

According to the opinion, this matter involved a professional liability action against the health care and rehab center. The plaintiff’s decedent’s had been a patient at the defendant’s facility. The defendant facility owner at issue in this case eventually became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy.

During the course of this litigation, the parties agreed to participate in a settlement conference with a private mediator. Prior to the mediation, the defendant’s attorney confirmed in writing that the parent and affiliate entities of the defendant were insolvent and in bankruptcy proceedings. Defense counsel also confirmed that, as such, the defendant would not be able to satisfy the first $75,000 of any settlement as that represented the amount of the defendant’s deductible, but that any obligation above that amount would be covered by the defendant’s liability insurance policy.

As a result of the mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement for a net payment of $175,000. The total amount of the party’s settlement was actually $250,000 but the plaintiff agreed to waive the defendant’s payment of its $75,000 deductible. The net settlement payment of $175,000 was to be paid entirely by the defendant’s liability insurance carrier.

The court’s opinion emphasized that the insurance company’s adjuster had agreed to the settlement without any indication of any coverage issues existing between the defendant and its insurance company.

After the settlement, the plaintiff proceeded to court on a petition for court approval of the settlement in this death case. The court granted the Plaintiff’s petition and approved the settlement. The parties then executed the settlement agreement.

Plaintiff’s counsel then sent the signed release, the court order approving the settlement and other closing documents to the defendant’s counsel and requested the settlement payment.

In his opinion in this Hill case, Nealon emphasized that noticeably absent from the settlement agreement was any indication or even a suggestion that a coverage issue may exist between the defendant and its insurance company. Nor was there any reference that any such coverage issue needed to be resolved before the plaintiff would receive the settlement payment.

Thereafter, when plaintiff’s counsel wrote for the status of the settlement check, defense counsel indicated that there was some issue that the adjuster had to work out. Again, there was no reference made to any insurance coverage issues.

The opinion of the court noted facts that showed that the plaintiff’s attorney showed great patience and was more than accommodating in his repeated efforts to secure the production of the settlement check over the next several months. After several months then went by with no production of the settlement check, counsel for the plaintiff filed a motion under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 relative to the defendant’s failure to produce the settlement check in a timely fashion after the production of the executed release.

Judge Nealon reviewed Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 229.1 which governs the prompt delivery of settlement funds within 20 days of the receipt of an executed release by the defendant.

The rule otherwise provides that, if court approval of the settlement is required, the mandated 20-day time period under Rule 229.1 does not become operative until the settlement is so approved.

Nealon noted that, under Rule 229.1, if a defendant fails to timely deliver settlement funds, a plaintiff has the right to seek either of two remedies. First, a plaintiff can seek to invalidate the settlement agreement and request that the matter return to the trial list. Second, a plaintiff can seek certain sanctions against the defendant.

The court in Hill noted that, if the plaintiff opt to pursue sanctions against the defendant, Rule 229.1(e) directs the plaintiff to file an affidavit “attesting to nonpayment,” and to submit six items for the court’s review with the affidavit. Among the documents to be submitted with the affidavit are a copy of “any document evidencing the terms of the settlement agreement,” a copy of “the executed release,” a copy of “a receipt reflecting delivery of the executed release,” a certification by counsel “the applicable interest rate,” and “that the affidavit and accompanying documents have been served on the attorneys for all interested parties.” Lastly, also attached to the affidavit should be “the form of order prescribed by subdivision (h)” of Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 for execution by the court.

Nealon additionally noted that the type of sanctions allowed in this instance are spelled out under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1. More specifically, under Rule 229.1(g), if the court determines that a defendant has failed to deliver the settlement funds within 20 days and there is no material dispute as to the terms of the settlement or the terms of the release, the court “shall impose sanctions in the form of interests calculated at the rate equal to the prime rate as listed in the First Edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year for which interest is awarded, plus 1%, not compounded, running from the 21st day to the date of delivery of the settlement funds, together with reasonable attorney fees incurred in the preparation of the affidavit.”

Nealon otherwise ruled in the Hill case that the fact that the insurance company’s noncompliance with the payment requirement may be attributable to a post-settlement assertion of a potential coverage issue did not warrant the denial of the plaintiff’s request for sanctions relative to the failure of the carrier to produce the settlement check within 20 days of the production of the executed release.
Conclusion

The Hill decision written by Judge Nealon provides thorough guidance on the steps to take in securing sanctions relative to a late payment of settlement funds required by an executed release.

As evidenced by plaintiff’s counsel’s actions in the Hill case, it is advisable for the plaintiff to show some patience while repeatedly requesting, in writing, the settlement payment once the mandated 20-day time period has expired for the timely production of the check. By showing some patience and creating a written record of repeated requests for the production of the check, the plaintiff will be able to bolster their request for sanctions as opposed to the case where a plaintiff runs to the courthouse on a motion for sanctions on the 21st day after the release was received by the defense counsel.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner at Cummins Law in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania. Contact him at dancummins@cumminslaw.net.




Reprinted with permission from the June 18, 2026 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2026 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Court Finds That Determination if Plaintiff Was an Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser is for the Jury

In the case Martin v. Cable Services Co., Inc., No. CV-2025-00988 (C.P. Lyc. Co. April 23, 2026 Carlucci, J.), the court denied Preliminary Objections filed by various Defendants in a premises liability case involving the death of the Plaintiff. One of the Defendants involved was charged with criminal homicide.

According to the Opinion, an incident took place at the business premises of Cable Services Co., Inc. which resulted in the death of the Plaintiff’s decedent. As a result of that incident and death, one of the Defendants was charged with criminal homicide. No more details regarding the facts of the incident were provided in the Opinion.

This Opinion addressed various Preliminary Objections filed by certain Defendants against the Complaint. The Defendants essentially asserted that the Plaintiff’s reference to a corporate safety manual in the Complaint was insufficient to establish any duty owed to the decedent because the decedent was not an employee of Cable Services on the date of the incident.

The Defendants additionally asserted that the allegations in the Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to establish that the decedent was a public invitee to whom the Defendants owed a duty of care.

Judge William P. Carlucci
Lycoming County

Judge William P. Carlucci noted that he was declining to determine whether or not the Defendants owed a duty of care to the decedent at this Preliminary Objections stage. The court noted that, generally speaking, in premises liability cases, the determination of whether an individual is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser is a question of fact for the jury.

The court also noted that the issues of foreseeability with respect to the harm suffered by the decedent is also ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.

As such, the various Preliminary Objections filed by the Defendant were overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (May 28, 2026).

Judge Allows Trip And Fall Case To Proceed Beyond Summary Judgment

In the case of Bonnell v. Knight-Confer Funeral Home, Inc., No. CV0-2023-01345 (C.P. Lyc. Co. March 23, 2026 Carlucci, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a trip and fall case based upon the expert opinion of the Plaintiff’s expert engineer creating questions of fact to be decided decision by the jury.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff allegedly tripped and fell on a step on the Defendant’s premises. During her deposition, the Plaintiff did not assert that there was any debris on the step where she fell,  Nor did the Plaintiff point to any defect in the step itself.

Rather, the Plaintiff testified that she opened the door and thought she was stepping onto the sidewalk and, as a result, missed the step and fell.

The Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the complete absence of any debris or any defects with regards to the step confirm that there was no material evidence upon which a jury could base any finding of negligence. The Defendant additionally pointed out that the Plaintiff had traveled over the same step on her way into the building without incident.

The Plaintiff’s opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was based, in part, on the fact that the Plaintiff produced an expert engineering report. That expert offered an opinion that the single step condition at the threshold of the doorway created a hazardous condition which endangered the public. The expert further concluded that the actions and/or inactions of the Plaintiff did not cause the incident to occur. The expert otherwise noted that the step was below the normal line of sight and the Plaintiff was therefore unable to perceive it as she exited the doorway.

After reviewing the record before him as applied to Pennsylvania law, the judge noted that, if the jury believed the testimony of the Plaintiff’s engineering expert, a jury could reasonably find that the condition at the threshold of the doorway was a hazardous condition which endangered the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff’s own conduct was not a legal cause of her injuries. 

Accordingly, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and allowed the case to proceed forward.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (May 28, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Becca Lavin on www.unsplash.com.

Trial Court Provides Lessons on Propriety of New Matter Pleading by Defendants

In the case of Cancilliere v. Custom Etch, Inc., No. 11163 of 2025, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. May 4, 2026 Flannery, J.), the court addressed the propriety of allegations contained in a Defendant’s New Matter in a civil litigation case.

According to the Opinion, the civil litigation matter arose out a dispute relative to the application of a trust agreement.

After the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint and the Defendants filed an Answer and New Matter, the Plaintiffs filed Preliminary Objections to the Defendant’s New Matter asserting that the allegations contained within the New Matter were improper pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1030 and that the allegations lacked the specificity required by Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a).

More specifcally, the Plaintiff initially asserted that the allegations contained within the Defendant’s New Matter were improper under Pa. R.C.P. 1030 as the allegations did not set forth affirmative defenses.

The court noted that, under Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a), it is provided that a Defendant may assert affirmative defenses in a New Matter in response to a Complaint. The court also noted, howerver, that Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a) additionally expressly provides “[a] party may set forth as new matter any other material facts which are not merely denials of the averments of the preceding pleading.” See Op. at p. 4.

The court read this portion of the Rule in to indicate that a responding party may assert new facts in a New Matter which were not previously pled in the Complaint.

The court additionally noted that a New Matter may include conclusions of law, such as an allegation that a Complaint failed to state a cause of action, but that, under Pennsylvania law, no responsive pleading by the Plaintiff is required in response to any conclusions of law contained in a New Matter. See Op. at p. 4.

Based upon the above, the court additionally noted that, when the allegations in a New Matter are either mere conclusions of law or merely a reiteration of the same facts that may have already been placed into issue in the Complaint of the Plaintiff or the Answer of the Defendant, then the Plaintiff is not required to provide a response to the same allegations in a New Matter. Rather, such allegations would be deemed to be denied, and the court is not otherwise required to strike those paragraphs in the New Matter in response to any Preliminary Objections that may be filed by a plaintiff.

The court reiterated that the inclusion of conclusions of law by a Defendant in a New Matter does not require the court to strike the same from the pleading as such pleadings are permissible.

The court did go on to note, however, that general assertions by a Defendant of affirmative defenses lacking any factual allegations in a New Matter do violate Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) given that a Plaintiff would be unable to confirm or deny those paragraphs. Such general allegations within a New Matter can be attacked by Preliminary Objections. 

The court noted that a Defendant must pled facts to support the existence of an affirmative defense and, the failure to do so, will result in the court sustaining a Preliminary Objection for lack of specificity in violation of the requirements of Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) with regards to pleadings.

The court also noted that, when a court sustains a Preliminary Objection for lack of specificity relative to a New Matter defense, the Defendant should generally be given an opportunity to amend its New Matter to comply with Pa. R.C.P. 1019.

Here, in this case, the court denied the Preliminary Objections given that while the Defendant’s allegations in the New Matter were insufficient to create a factual basis for potential affirmative defenses, in this case, the Defendants were not attempting to assert affirmative defenses in the New Matter but rather, were providing additional facts on the case presented as permitted by Pa. R.C.P. 1030.

The court also noted that its review of the factual allegations in the New Matter confirmed that the Plaintiff had the capability of either admitting or denying the Defendant's factual allegations.

With regards to the Plaintiff’s complaint that the New Matter contained legal conclusions, the court reiterated that the Plaintiff was not required to file a response to those types of allegations as they would be deemed to be denied.  The court reiterated that there is no legal basis for the court to strike those paragraphs simply because such allegations may have amounted to legal conclusions.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (June 4, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by G. Fring on www.pexels.com.

Court Allows Plaintiff's Expert To Testify in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Pratt v. Shahid, No. CV-23-00720 (C.P. Lyc. Co. April 14, 2026 Carlucci, J.), the court denied the Defendants’ Motion In Limine seeking to preclude the Plaintiff from introducing the testimony of a doctor in a medical malpractice case.

In this case, the court denied the Defendants’ request for an exclusion of the Plaintiff’s medical expert’s testimony given that the Plaintiff’s expert’s opinion was found to be supported by medical literature.

The court also noted that the Defendants’ challenge went to the Plaintiff’s expert’s conclusions rather than the methodology utilized by the expert. 

The court found that the Plaintiff’s expert’s methodology was not novel, as it was similar to the methodology used by the Defendants’ expert. The court further noted that, even if the Plaintiff’s methodology was considered to be novel, it was still generally accepted in the scientific community as supported by articles from scientific journals submitted by the Plaintiff.

In the end, the court ruled that, while the Plaintiff’s expert’s conclusions differed from those advanced by the Defendants’ expert, that difference is not a proper basis for excluding the testimony of the Plaintiff’s expert.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (May 28, 2026). 

Issues of Fact Preclude Entry of Summary Judgment in Case Challenging the Design of an Intersection

In the case of Leger v. Martin, No. 253 C.D. 2025 (Pa. Cmwlth. May 19, 2026 Cohn Jubelirer, J., Wolf, J., Leadbetter, J.) (Op. by Cohn Jubelirer, J.), the Commonwealth Court reversed a lower court’s entry of summary judgment granting a township summary judgment in a motor vehicle accident matter in which allegations were made that the intersection at issue was a dangerous intersection.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident during which the Plaintiff commenced a left hand turn from a stop sign and was hit by a tractor trailer.

The Plaintiff sued various parties including the township. The Plaintiff alleged that the township was liable under a duty to design, construct, and maintain its roads in a safe condition for travelers, including having proper signage and intersection site triangles. The Plaintiff also asserted that the township placed and/or directed to be placed a stop sign at the intersection with insufficient sight distances. The Plaintiff otherwise noted that the stop sign created a dangerous condition of which the township had actual or constructive notice, making the township liable under exceptions to the governmental immunity provided under §8542 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

The trial court had granted the township’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

The primary argument by the township on appeal was that the Plaintiff had not produced evidence showing that the stop sign had caused or contributed to his injuries, that the township had notice of any dangerous condition, or that the township owned the intersection because it was controlled by PennDOT.

On appeal, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the notice issue was for the jury and that summary judgment had, therefore, been improperly entered. The court pointed to evidence before it, including expert reports, indicating that the township would have been responsible for the initial design of the intersection and that the evidence established that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the alleged dangerous condition was apparent upon reasonable inspection before the subject crash.

Accordingly, the granting of summary judgment in favor of the township was reversed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (June 9, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Josiah Niklas on www.unsplash.com.

Appellate Court Finds that Plaintiff's Med Mal Claims Were Sufficiently Stated in Complaint

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Dasilva v. Abington Memorial Hospital, No. 1707 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 2, 2026 Kunselman, J., Nichols, J., and Sullivan, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the court reversed a trial court’s decision in a medical malpractice case sustaining the Preliminary Objections of the Defendant hospital dismissing the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with prejudice.

The trial court had dismissed the Plaintiff’s Complaint due to the alleged insufficiency of the factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. Primarily, the Defendants asserted, in part, that the Plaintiff’s allegations of negligence and agency were vague and/or insufficiently specific.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reinstated the medical malpractice action after finding that the Plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the medical staff failed to properly monitor a patient who was experiencing a psychiatric episode by allowing the patient to leave the emergency room at which point he was then struck by a vehicle.

The appellate court concluded that the Plaintiffs had met the state’s fact-pleading standard by outlining key facts, including the Plaintiff’s mental state, the awareness of the hospital staff of the Plaintiff’s condition, and the alleged failure of the hospital staff to monitor or prevent the patient’s departure from the hospital.

The appellate court otherwise held that a Plaintiff need not identify any specific employees in the medical malpractice case in order to pursue vicarious liability claims against a hospital. The court noted that references contained in the Complaint to the emergency room staff were sufficiently specific to enable the Defendants to respond to the Complaint.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the Dasilva may click this LINK.

Source: Article – “Abington Hospital Must Face Med Mal Claims Over Patient’s ER Escape, Pa. Appellate Court Says,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (June 4, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by National Cancer Institute on www.unsplash.com.