Court Rules that Placement of Wet Floor Signs Constitute Adequate Warning

In the case of Pitts v. Sonesta Intern. Hotel, Corp., No. 231002600 (C.P. Phila. Co. Nov. 24, 2025 Moore, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of a hotel in a case where a Plaintiff slipped and fell on a wet floor in the hotel’s foyer area.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff slipped and fell in an area where a maintenance worker for the hotel had recently mopped the floor but had also put out yellow caution signs. Videos surveillance footage confirmed that the maintenance worker had put the signs out.

According to the Opinion, during her testimony, the Plaintiff acknowledged the presence of the signs inside the foyer. However, the Plaintiff claimed that she did not see the signs before she slipped and fell.

At trial, the court granted the defense Motion for a Non Suit on the basis that there was no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by the jury once the Plaintiff rested and given that the Plaintiff had failed to establish a right to relief.

The court emphasized that, in Pennsylvania, a business owner had a duty to maintain a reasonably safe property and must either fix dangerous conditions or warn invitees about them.

The court additionally noted that invitees are expected to be aware of their surroundings in order to appreciate possible dangers and also to appreciate warnings of any hazards.

Here in this case, the court found that, by clearly placing the yellow “Wet Floor” signs on the floor in the hotel foyer, the Defendant had adequately warned the Plaintiff about the possibility of the foyer floor being slippery.

The court emphasized that the Plaintiff acknowledged the presence of the wet floor signs inside the foyer before she walked into the area. On cross-examination at trial, the Plaintiff agreed that she had seen at least one (1) of the yellow signs before she entered the foyer and prior to falling down. The trial court noted that, even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, it was the trial court’s opinion that the Plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of proving that the Defendant was liable for her fall.

Notably, the court noted in its Opinion that the placement of yellow warning signs in and around the foyer was conduct that established that the Defendant had adequately warned the Plaintiff of the dangers of the wet floor.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s suggestion that the hotel should have also have had someone standing near the foyer to tell customers inside the hotel that the floor was wet. The court found that this was not a reasonable requirement and that the law does not require a business owner to undertake such unreasonable measures to warn of hazards on the property.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 5, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Sandiyu Nuryono on www.pexels.com.

Watch Out For That Hole That is Open and Obvious

In the case of Harris v. Hutchinson Sportsman’s Club, No. 1007 WDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Feb. 4, 2026 Stabile, J., Murray, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Murray, J.), the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment under the open and obvious doctrine in a case involving a Plaintiff who crashed his bike on a road owned by the Defendant.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff testified that he noticed a “giant hole” in the road and attempted to avoid it as he was operating his son’s electric bike.

The Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Plaintiff was aware of the road conditions and that they were open and obvious.

The Superior Court agreed with the trial court’s finding that the Plaintiff had failed to establish a case of negligence. The appellate court noted that the trial court had properly found that the conditions on the road were open and obvious, and that the Plaintiff was aware of the conditions, thereby negating any duty on the part of the landowner to warn or protect the Plaintiff.

The Superior Court also agreed with the trial court that the Plaintiff’s inability to pinpoint the cause of his bike accident with his testimony further undermined the Plaintiff’s negligence claim.

As such, the Superior Court upheld the entry of summary judgment, finding that the Plaintiff did not meet his burden of proof on his negligence claim.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert (Feb. 24, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by KBO Bike on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Addresses Discoverability of Internal Post-Incident Investigative Reports in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Griffin v. The Bryn Mawr Hospital, No. 3361 EDA 2024, 2026 Pa. Super. 53 (Pa. Super. March 19, 2026 Bowes, J., Murray, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Beck, J.) (Concurring and Dissenting Op. by Murray, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed whether four internal documents created by the medical providers after the hospital allegedly mishandled fetal remains were protected from disclosure under Pennsylvania’s Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE) and the Federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act.

According to the Opinion, the case arose out of a lawsuit filed by parents who alleged that the hospital mistakenly cremated the placenta instead of their fetus and later admitted to a “mix up.”

During discovery, the hospital withheld four internal reports tied to its investigation. The hospital asserted that these documents were privileged patient-safety materials generated as part of its compliance and internal review processes.

In its Opinion, the court addressed how far hospitals can shield internal investigation documents from discovery under the above-referenced state and federal patient-safety laws.

The Superior Court majority ruled that the documents were not protected under MCARE. The court found that the MCARE statute applied only to events involving direct patient care and not post-treatment conduct. The court here found that the allegations in this case did not implicate any medical treatment issues.

With regards to the application of the federal law, the federal law under the PSQIA, this court entered a split decision. The court held that three of the documents at issue were shielded under the broader scope of the PSQIA law because they were created as part of the hospital’s internal patient safety evaluation system.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority's decision may click this LINK.

Judge Murray's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Source: Article – “Pa. Superior Court Splits On MCARE Patient-Safety Privilege Case,” By Tristin Hoffman of The Legal Intelligencer (March 25, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by RDNE Stock Project on www.pexels.com.

Defendant's Forum Non Conveniens Argument Rejected in Medical Malpractice Case Filed in Philadelphia

In the case of Miller v. Jackson, May Term, 2024, No., 240503457 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 17, 2025 Cohen, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss a case based upon the forum non conveniens doctrine in a medical malpractice case.

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of medical treatment that took place in the state of Delaware.

After the lawsuit was filed in Philadelphia County, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens, arguing that the case should be heard in Delaware where the events occurred.

After the court allowed discovery on the motion, the case came up for a decision.

The Plaintiffs asserted that the individual Defendants resided in Pennsylvania and a foundation related to the matter conducted significant operations in patient interactions in Pennsylvania, which allegedly established a public interest in the case being decided in Pennsylvania.

The Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas denied the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss after finding that the Defendants had failed to provide “weighty reasons” to justify the dismissal and transfer of the case.

The court noted, in part, that while the events regarding the medical treatment occurred in the State of Delaware, Pennsylvania still had a substantial connection to the case due to the residency of the individual Defendants in Pennsylvania and the operations of the foundation taking place in Pennsylvania.

The court additionally noted that the Defendants’ arguments focused on county-level convenience rather than a state-level analysis, which is required for forum non conveniens consideration.

The court otherwise determined that the increased travel time for witnesses to come to Philadelphia was not significant enough to warrant dismissal, especially since many of the witnesses were based in Philadelphia.

The trial court otherwise denied the Defendants’ request for a certification of the issues for an interlocutory appeal found that the issues at hand involved a discretionary matter of convenience and not any controlling question of law. The court additionally found that an immediate appeal would not materially advance the termination of the case but would instead delay the proceedings.

Overall, the court found no compelling reasons supporting the disturbance of the Plaintiffs’ choice of forum. As such, the case was allowed to proceed in Pennsylvania.

In this Rule 1925 Opinion, the court requested the Superior Court to affirm its decisions as noted above.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 26, 2026).

Philadelphia County Court Grants Defendant's Request To Transfer Med Mal Case to a Different County

In the case of McDonald v. York Hospital, Oct. Term 2023, No. 2872 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 11, 2025 Bright, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s decision to transfer a medical malpractice case from Philadelphia County to York County.

According to the Opinion, the case arose out of an alleged medical malpractice from a heart surgery that took place in York County, Pennsylvania.

After the Plaintiff filed suit in Philadelphia County, the issue of venue eventually came before the trial court.

The Defendants argued that their business activities in Philadelphia County were incidental and not sufficient to establish venue.

The court found that the Defendant’s contacts with Philadelphia County were primarily educational and incidental, thereby not meeting the quality and quantity of contacts required to establish venue under Pa. R.C.P. 2179(a)(2).

The court determined that the Defendants’ core mission was to provide healthcare services in Central Pennsylvania and that any affiliations with any Philadelphia institutions was not essential to this mission.

As such, the court sustained Preliminary Objections filed by the Defendants regarding venue and transferred the case to York County where the cause of action arose and where the Defendants had their principal place of business.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 26, 2026).

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Court Dismisses Case Where Plaintiff Attempted to File a Second Amended Complaint Long After Deadline To Do So

In the case of Coble v. Edrington, No. 2024-CV-00521 (C.P. Dauph. Co. Feb. 13, 2026 Engle, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections filed against a Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint on the basis that the Plaintiff failed to obey the court ordered deadline within which to file the Second Amended Complaint.

According to the Opinion, the case arose out of a breach of contract claim.

Under an Order dated April 18, 2025, the court had granted Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint within twenty (20) days.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff did not file their Second Amended Complaint until October 6, 2025, which was approximately 151 days after the court ordered deadline.  Also, the Second Amended Complaint was filed only after the Defendant moved to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute.

After the Second Amended Complaint was filed, the Defendant then responded with various Preliminary Objections, which included a challenge to the timeliness of the pleadings.

The court sustained the Preliminary Objection under Pa. R.C.P. 1028(e) relative to the untimeliness of the Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s arguments and emphasized that the parties are not able to extend court-imposed deadlines without court approval.

The court otherwise noted that a trial court may dismiss an untimely Amended Complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with a court ordered deadline. The court noted that, while actual prejudice may be factor in some cases, it is not always required, particularly when the delay is significant and unjustified.

Here, the court found that the delay of approximately 151 days after the court ordered deadline for the filing of an Amended Complaint was excessive and unjustified. As such, their Preliminary Objection was sustained and the Second Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Stephen M. Hickey of the York, PA law firm of Griffith, Lerman, Lutz & Schieb for bringing this decision to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Markus Winkler on www.unsplash.com.