Supreme Court Upholds Application of the Immunity Provisions of the Mental Health Procedures Act

In the case of Wunderly v. St. Luke’s Hosp. of Bethlehem, No. 119 MAP 2023 (Pa. Oct. 23, 2025) (Op. by Mundy, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed issues raised in a medical malpractice case under the Mental Health Procedures Act.

In this case, the Plaintiff had filed suit against St. Luke’s Hospital of Bethlehem alleging that the Plaintiff decedent was admitted to St. Luke’s with Stage 1 pressure ulcers on his buttocks and that, during his stay at St. Luke’s he acquired pressured-related skin breakdowns, pressure wounds, and the deterioration of pre-existing pressure wounds, which allegedly caused or contributed to his death.

The trial court had dismissed the Plaintiff’s Complaint after St. Luke’s argued that the decedent was involuntarily admitted to its facility under the Mental Health Procedures Act and that, under the Act, St. Luke’s was immune from liability as the Plaintiff had failed to allege that the medical providers had engaged in willful misconduct or gross negligence that caused the decedent’s death.

The immuity provision of the Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 Pa.C.S.A. Section 7114(a), provides that "[i]n the absence of willful misconduct or gross negligence...a physician...or any other authorized person who participates in a decision that a person be examined or treated under [the MHPA]...shall not be civilly or criminally liable for such decision or for any of its consequences." 

This trial court decision dismissing the case was affirmed by the Superior Court on appeal which found that the decedent was being treated primarily for his mental health after being involuntarily admitted for aggressive behavior related to his dementia. The Superior Court also ruled that the treatment of the Plaintiff’s physical issues was consequence oh the patient's mental health treatment.

Up on the highest rung of the appellate ladder, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision and found that treatment for other medical issues consequent with a patient’s mental health treatment or for medical issues that may arise during a patient’s involuntary inpatient admission fell within the scope of treatment entitled to immunity under the Mental Health Procedures Act.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, (Nov. 11, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Ectactics Inc. on www.unsplash.com.

Judge Powell of Lackawanna County Addresses Plethora of Issues Raised in Medical Malpractice Matter

In the case of Doyle v. Keyed, No. 2024-CV-9036 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Oct. 16, 2025 Powell, J.), the court issued a decision denying various Preliminary Objections filed in a medical malpractice action arising out of the death of an infant during a complicated delivery.

Of note, Judge Powell of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas overruled nearly all of the challenges submitted by the Defendants, including a request by Lehigh Valley Hospital-Pocono Defendants’ request to severe their case from the claims against the St. Luke’s Hospital Defendants.

The court additionally rejected one doctor’s claim that he could not be held vicariously liable for actions by the hospital staff that worked under him. The court noted that vicarious liability may attach in a medical malpractice case under the “captain-of-the-ship” doctrine or where the physician exercises actual control over the staff members.

The court noted that, because the Complaint in this matter alleged that the doctor at issue had directed and supervised others during the delivery, those allegations stated a viable theory of vicarious liability.

The court additionally upheld the Plaintiffs’ claims of direct and corporate negligence against various Defendants.

Judge Mark Powell
Lackawanna County

Judge Powell also overruled objections to the claim for punitive damages. The court found that the facts alleged could, if proven, constitute reckless disregard warranting punitive damages.

The court also noted that, given that mental state conditions may be alleged generally under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b), such claims could survive the pleading stage.

The court also disagreed with the defense argument that childbirth procedures are not surgical acts requiring informed consent. The court noted that the allegations that the doctor failed to discuss surgical alternatives despite risk factors present stated a plausible informed-consent claim.

The court also allowed the Plaintiffs’ claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress to proceed. The court found that the Plaintiff-mother, having suffered a physical impact and having observed her child’s death, and the father, who witnessed the traumatic delivery and aftermath, both fit within the recognized categories of Plaintiffs permitted to pursue negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. In this regard, Judge Powell noted that observation of the results of negligent medical acts can satisfy the contemporaneous observation requirement in a medical malpractice context.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source:  Lackawanna Jurist (Oct. 31, 2025).

Source of image: Photo by Samuel Ramos on www.unsplash.com.

Summary Judgment Denied in Barstool Tip Over Case

In the case of Caskey v. Outback Steakhouse, No. 24-CV-00897 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2025 Young, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a customer’s premises liability suit.

The Plaintiff alleged that, while dining at the bar, the barstool he sat upon slid backwards as he leaned forward to eat, causing him to fall and sustain injuries.

The restaurants manager partially captioned the incident by using his phone to record a short video of the restaurant’s surveillance footage. The original surveillance video was not preserved. Also, the barstool involved in the incident was discarded before an expert site inspection could occur.

The Plaintiff provided evidence that there were multiple prior complaints of slippery and wobbly barstools reported to the Defendant’s managers. Moreover, the Plaintiff personally documented a subsequent incident where another barstool slid out from under his wife.

The Plaintiff continued that the Defendant’s failure to inspect the barstools and maintain appropriate facility inspection records reflected a breach of its duty of care owed to its customers as business invitees.

The Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that there was insufficient evidence of a dangerous condition or of actual or constructive notice of that condition.

The court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment by finding that the Plaintiff had raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the barstool was a dangerous condition and on the issue of whether the condition was open and obvious. The court more specifically found that the evidence presented by the Plaintiff, including eyewitness and expert testimony, prior customer complaints, evidence of barstool deterioration, and inconsistences in the Defendant’s record-keeping, all gave rise to factual disputes that were appropriate for resolution by a jury.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Superior Court Affirms Trial Court Decision Granting Preliminary Objections To Venue

In the its Non-precedential decision in the case of Ojo v. Hanover Foods Corp., No. 2037 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Sept. 25, 2025 Panella, J., Nichols, J., and Ford Elliot, P.J.E.) (Op. by Panella, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s sustaining of Preliminary Objections asserting that venue was not proper in Philadelphia County. 

The court in this matter reviewed the record and stated that there was no evidence that the Defendants in this matter regularly conducted business in Philadelphia. The court noted that the Defendant did not have any products in Philadelphia or any physical presence in that County.

The court noted that the mere shipment of raw materials in sealed containers does not constitute conducting business in this context.

The court also ruled that the purchasing of products from Philadelphia suppliers did not constitute doing business in Philadelphia in this context.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Federal Court Motion To Transfer Denied

In the case of Bryne v. Terex USA, LLC, No. 2:25-CV-00586-GAM (E.D. Pa. McHugh, J. Oct. 28, 2025), the court denied a Motion by a Defendant to Transfer a case from the Eastern District to the Middle District, where the alleged accident occurred.

In so ruling, the court noted that, under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a), District Courts may transfer a case to another district where venue is proper “for the convenience of parties and witnesses or in the interests of justice.”

The court applied the various factors set forth in the case of Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1995) to support the denial of the Motion to Transfer.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “Fed. Judge Rejects Manufacturer’s Attempt to Move Product Liability Suit to Middle District,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Oct. 30, 2025).

Court Finds That Defendant Failed To Produce Evidence in Support of Improper Venue Argument

In the case of Barnowski v. CBRE Global Investors, LLC, No. 2023-CV-2568 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Oct. 2, 2025 Nealon, J.), the court addressed venue issues in a premises liability action.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff commenced this premises liability lawsuit against two (2) owners of a property that was located in Montgomery County where the Plaintiff allegedly fell. 

The Plaintiff asserted that venue was proper in Lackawanna County under Pa. R.C.P. 1006(c) and 2179(a)(2) since he alleged joint and several liability and given that one of the Defendants allegedly regularly conducted business in Lackawanna County.

The Defendants filed Preliminary Objections asserting improper venue. 

Given that the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections were not supported by affidavits or evidence, the parties were initially directed to conduct venue-related discovery pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1028(c)(2) and to, thereafter, resubmit the issue to the court.

During the course of that discovery, the Defendants produced a corporate designee who testified under oath that she did not know whether the Defendant’s conducted any business in Lackawanna County or owned any property or employed any workers in this county.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County

The court noted that the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections asserting improper venue was resubmitted to the court for a decision based upon the limited evidentiary record noted above.

In his decision, Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reaffirmed well-settled law of Pennsylvania that a Plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to “great weight.” 

The court also noted that the Defendants had the burden of producing evidence to establish that venue was improper in the chosen forum and that a change of venue was warranted.

The court found that the Defendants, despite being afforded a reasonable opportunity to produce evidence to support their improper venue argument, had failed to do so. As such, Judge Nealon ruled that, given that the Plaintiff had asserted joint and several liability against the Defendants, venue is proper as to both Defendants and the Preliminary Objections asserting improper venue with respect to Lackawanna County was overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Lackawanna Jurist (Oct. 31, 2025).

Summary Judgment Denied in Case Involving Trip and Fall on Jogging Trail

In the case of Sember v. Lackawanna Heritage Valley Auth., No. 2024-CV-3255 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Oct. 22, 2025 Powell, J.), the court addressed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by the Defendants claiming immunity under the Recreational Use of Land and Water Act relative to a trip and fall incident that occurred while the Plaintiff was jogging on the Lackawanna Heritage Trail.

The City of Scranton, which was a Co-Defendant, additionally asserted that it was entitled to immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

Both Defendants asserted that they were entitled to immunity under the Recreational Use of Land and Water Act given that the trail was on recreational land that was open to the public without charge. 

The Defendants asserted that the Act provided that owners owe no duty to recreational uses to maintain safety or to warn of dangers, including with respect to paved and unpaved trails. The Defendants claimed that the Lackawanna Heritage Valley Authority and the City of Scranton both constituted owners under the Act. 

Here, however, the Plaintiff alleged a man-made hazard, that is, a raised concrete base, and also asserted that the Defendants knew of that condition but failed to repair it or warn the persons entering the land about the condition. 

Judge Mark Powell
Lackawanna County

As such, Judge Mark Powell of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas held that there were issues of fact and that it could not determine from the pleadings alone whether the RULWA applied at this early stage of the litigation.  The court more specifically found that factual development was required to assess whether the condition at issue was part of the trial’s recreational use or an artificial structure beyond the protection of the Act.

Relative to The City’s claim of governmental immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, the City asserted that it was immune because the trail was maintained by the Lackawanna Heritage Valley Authority and was not under The City’s “care, custody, or control.” The City of Scranton also argued that the Plaintiff’s claim did not fall under any of the exceptions to the grant of immunity.

The court found that the record was insufficient to determine the extent of each Defendant's control or whether the defect constituted a dangerous condition of real property that might trigger an exception to immunity. In light of these questions of fact, the court denied the Motion for these additional reasons.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Lackawanna Jurist (Oct. 31, 2025).