Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules that Sexual Abuse Exception To Governmental Immunity Only Applies to Minor Victims

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Pennsylvania Supreme Court

In the case of City of Philadelphia v. J.S. Sr., No. 34 EAP 2024 (Pa. March 26, 2026) (Op. by McCaffery, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the parameters of the sexual abuse exception to the general governmental immunity from tort claims as set forth in Section 8542(b)(9) of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

This matter arose out of claims by an adult Plaintiff alleging that the Plaintiff was subjected to sexual abuse or assaults while the Plaintiff was incarcerated. The record before the court confirmed that the Plaintiff was not a minor at the time of the alleged abuse.

The more specific issue addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is whether this waiver of the immunity afforded to governmental agencies under the sexual abuse exception applies when the victim of the sexual abuse is an adult, or whether the waiver of immunity is limited to only those cases involving sexual abuse committed against a minor.

As noted in Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion, "[t]he sexual-abuse exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act applies to '[c]onduct which constitutes an offense enumerated under Section 5551(7).'  The offenses enumerated in Section 5551(7), in turn, require that 'the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense.'"

In the end, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the unambiguous language of Section 8542(b)(9) waives immunity in favor of political subdivisions or their employees only if the Plaintiff was a minor at the time of the sexual abuse.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority decision may click this LINK.  Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (April 14, 2026).



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Recklessness Claims Allowed to Proceed in Case Where Defendant Driver Was Driving While Wearing Medical Boot

In the case of Shea v. Magar, No. 2025-CV-7877 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 31, 2026 Gibbons, P.J.), President Judge James A. Gibbons of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed Preliminary Objections filed by a Defendant against allegations of recklessness in a motor vehicle accident case.

According to the Opinion, this case matter involved a rear-end accident case. The Defendant was  allegedly wearing a medical boot at the time of the accident against doctor’s orders.  During the course of the accident, the Defendant hit the accelerator with the medical boot instead of the brake.

The court followed the current trend and relied upon the case of Monroe v. CBH2O, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 799 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), and held that, at the pleadings stage, a plaintiff is permitted to make a general averment of gross negligence or recklessness as long as negligence is alleged. 

As such, the court overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objection in this regard.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Brian J. Walsh of the Scranton law firm of Blake & Walsh for bringing this case to my attention

Court Addresses Various Pleadings Issues in a Medical Malpractice Case, Including Allegations of Recklessness

In the case of Limon v. Kontizer, No. 2025-CV-8657 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 30, 2026 Powell, J.), the court addressed various Preliminary Objections filed by Defendants in a medical malpractice case.

According to the Opinion, this wrongful death medical malpractice case was filed relative to the Plaintiff’s decedent’s treatment in the form of an upper GI endoscopy. According to the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that the various medical Defendants failed to properly diagnose, treat, and prevent aspiration pneumonia, sepsis, and multi-organ dysfunction, all of which allegedly led to the Plaintiff’s decedent’s death.

In their Preliminary Objections, the Defendants sought the dismissal of claims for reckless conduct and punitive damages, as well as claims grounded in vicarious liability and negligence.

The court overruled all of the Preliminary Objections filed.

Relative to the claims of recklessness and for punitive damages, the court held that, under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b), conditions of the mind, such as recklessness, may be alleged in a general fashion as long as negligence is pled.

The court additionally noted that the Complaint sufficiently asserted that the Defendants knowingly disregarded serious, life-threatening risk to the decedent. Accepting these allegations are true, the court concluded that the claims for punitive damages were legally sufficient.

With regards to the issues of vicarious liability, the court rejected the Defendants’ arguments that the Complaint was deficient for failing to identify specific agents or employees. The court noted that Pennsylvania law does not require a Plaintiff in a medical malpractice case to identify every individual agent at the pleadings stage. Rather, the court noted that it is sufficient to allege that the individuals acted within the scope of their employment or agency since the identity of every healthcare professional who was involved in the decedent’s treatment during the approximately one month period at issue could be readily ascertained by the Defendants from their own records.

The court further found that the Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the Defendants had knowledge of, and allowed the alleged reckless conduct, thereby satisfying the heightened requirements for allegations of vicarious liability for punitive damages under the MCARE Act.

The court otherwise rejected the Defendant’s objections that the Plaintiff’s negligence claims were overly broad and vague.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Lackawanna Jurist (April 10, 2026).

Court Rules That No New UM Sign Down Form Was Required

In the case of Estate of Woloszyn v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 10246 of 2022, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. Nov. 21, 2025 Hodge, J.), the court granted summary judgment in favor of a UM carrier on a breach of contract and bad faith claim arising out of a dispute over what the appropriate UM limits were under the policy.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motorcycle accident when a vehicle being operated by an uninsured motorist crossed the centerline and struck the Plaintiff’s son’s motorcycle, resulting in a fatal accident.

Following the accident, the Plaintiff’s estate made a claim for UM coverage under various insurance policies. There was a dispute between the parties as to whether the UM coverage should be $100,000.00 or $15,000.00.

The court noted that, in 2015, the Plaintiff’s family had obtained a vehicle insurance policy No. 858 from the carrier prior to the accident. Relative to that policy, the Plaintiff’s family executed a signed down form opting to decrease the uninsured motorist coverage to $15,000.00 per person even though the bodily injury liability limit was $100,000.00 per person.

In October of 2020, the 858 policy was replaced by a No. 916 policy as part of the Defendant carrier’s One Product initiative.

The Plaintiff’s family received a Notice of Policy Change which indicated that the 858 policy was expiring and that the policy would be renewed under the terms of the 916 policy.

The Plaintiff accepted the renewal by paying the premium for the 916 policy.


The 916 policy provided bodily injury limits of $100,000.00 per person and UM coverage limits of $15,000.00 per person, which was the same coverage as was selected by the Plaintiff’s family under the 858 policy. The court noted, however, that the Defendant carrier did not obtain an executed sign down form for the lesser amount of UM coverage from the Plaintiff’s family prior to the issuance of the 916 policy.

After the Plaintiff’s family sued the Defendant UM carrier for claims for declaratory judgment, statutory bad faith, breach of contract, negligence, and a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protections Law, the case proceeded to cross motions for summary judgment.

In ressolving the issues presented, the court ruled that there was no doubt that the policy number had changed from the 858 policy to the 916 policy. The court also noted that the Defendant carrier had provided notice to the Plaintiff that the policy number had changed. It was additionally noted that the Plaintiff did not object to that change and continued to pay the premiums for the new 916 policy.

The court otherwise concluded that the policy language and the sign down form that was previously executed by the Plaintiff relative to the 858 policy were not ambiguous.

After reviewing the facts and circumstances before it, the court concluded that the Defendant carrier’s refusal to pay the higher amount that the Plaintiff desired for the UM claim was not frivolous or unfounded given that the Plaintiff’s family had elected to continue with the reduced UM coverage under the new policy and had evidenced the same by paying the premium.

Based upon this ruling, the court also found that there was no basis for the bad faith claim presented by the Plaintiff given that the Defendant had performed its obligations under the policy by paying out the UM coverage that was paid for by the Plaintiff.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 5, 2026).

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