Superior Court Affirms Trial Court's Refusal to Open a Default Judgment Against a Defendant

In the case of Kitner’s Lawn & Landscaping, LLC v. LRM Masonry, LLC, No. 699 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. March 24, 2026 Panella, P.J.E., King, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by Lane, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a Defendant’s Petition to Open a Default Judgment.

According to the Opinion, there was a contract between the parties under which it was agreed that the Plaintiff landscaping business would provide services as a subcontractor to the Defendant masonry company.

After a dispute arose between the parties, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking payment for services rendered. The Writ of Summons was personally served on the owner of the Defendant, who accepted service.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint and served the Defendant by mail. The mailing was not returned.

The trial court later entered a default judgment against the Defendant for failing to file an Answer to the Complaint.

Sixty-seven days after the entry of the default judgment, the Defendant filed a Petition to Open the Judgment. The Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff was aware that the Defendant’s principal place of business was at the Defendant’s home and not another address at which the ten day notice of intent to enter a default was sent and.  The Defendant also noted that the mailing of the ten day notice was filed of record with the court and was marked as “undeliverable.”

The appellate court agreed that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and refusing to open the default judgment. The appellate court emphasized that the Defendant had no official address filed with the Department of State in Pennsylvania. It was additionally noted that the sheriff had successfully served original process, which was the Writ of Summons, on the Defendant.

The appellate court also noted that the Plaintiff sent the Complaint, the Notice of the Default Judgment, and other filings to the same address that was on the Writ of Summons. That address was noted to also appear on the Defendant’s website. Accordingly, the appellate court found that the Plaintiff had met the service requirements under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellate court also agreed that the Defendant did not establish a reasonable excuse for failing to file a responsive pleading to the Complaint.

The court otherwise noted that it saw no fatal defect on the record to support any separate Motion to Strike.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (April 7, 2026).

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Defendant Found to Be Statutory Employer and Entitled to Immunity

In the case of Edie v. George Junior Republic In Pennsylvania, No. 546 C.D. 2025 (Pa. Cmwlth. March 27, 2026 Cohn Jubelirer, P.J., Covey, J. Wallis, J.) (Op. by Covey, J.), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court addressed the application of the statutory employer doctrine in a third party negligence case.

According to the Opinion, the Defendant operated a youth residential institution and contracted with a food service company to provide food services at the facility.

The Plaintiff, who was employed by the food services facility, was cleaning a grill while working in the kitchen at the facility when the Plaintiff was caused to fall and suffer injuries.

The Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the youth residential institution alleging negligence due to unsafe conditions in the kitchen.

The Defendant youth residential institution responding by asserting immunity under the Worker’s Compensation Act as a statutory employer.

The trial court agreed with the Defendant and dismissed the case under a summary judgment motion. The Plaintiff appealed.

The Commonwealth Court applied the McDonald test, which requires that five (5) elements be established to establish a statutory employer status. Those elements include the existence of a contract with the owner, proof that the premises were occupied or controlled by the employer, a subcontract between the parties at issue, and proof that part of the employer’s regular business was entrusted to the subcontractor, and, finally, that the Plaintiff was an employee of the subcontractor.

Here, the Plaintiff only contested the second element, arguing that the Defendant did not have the necessary level of control or occupancy to meet this element of the doctrine.

The appellate court found that the youth residential institution occupied the premises given that its food services director was present daily and oversaw the food services provider’s operations by ensuring compliance with contractual and regulatory requirements. 

The court additionally noted that the residential facility’s employees were also regularly present in the kitchen. It was additionally noted that the residential facility maintained control over the kitchen's equipment and operation.

As such, the Commonwealth Court agreed that the Defendant residential facility had met the occupancy requirement, thereby satisfying that contested element of the McDonald test.

Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant as a statutory employer of the Plaintiff.  As a statutory employer, the Defendant facility was found to be entitled to immunity under the Worker’s Compensation Act from the claims presented in the third party personal injury liability lawsuit.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (April 14, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Pylyp Sukhenko on www.unsplash.com.

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Superior Court Clarifies Application of Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens

In the case of Duxbury v. Reconstructive Orthopedic Assoc. II, P.C., No. 2876 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. March 25, 2026 Bowes, J., Murray, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Beck, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed an appeal from an Order entered by the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas in a medical malpractice case granting a Motion to Dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens filed by the Defendant. The trial court had directed that the action be refiled in New Jersey.

The Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in its application of the existing precedent regarding the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Plaintiffs more specifically argued that a review of the facts under a correct application of the doctrine did not support the transfer of the action to New Jersey.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court’s Order and remanded the case for further proceedings in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. Here, the court noted that the trial court was obligated to further weigh the circumstances linking the case to Pennsylvania to determine whether Pennsylvania was an inconvenient forum, and not simply review whether New Jersey was a more convenient forum for the Defendants.

In other words, the court noted that Pennsylvania law requires that, when courts review arguments under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, at least in a case involving two (2) separate states as here, the court is required to consider the relative convenience of allowing the claim to proceed in either of the states at issue.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (April 14, 2026).

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules that Sexual Abuse Exception To Governmental Immunity Only Applies to Minor Victims

Capitol Building
Pennsylvania Supreme Court

In the case of City of Philadelphia v. J.S. Sr., No. 34 EAP 2024 (Pa. March 26, 2026) (Op. by McCaffery, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the parameters of the sexual abuse exception to the general governmental immunity from tort claims as set forth in Section 8542(b)(9) of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

This matter arose out of claims by an adult Plaintiff alleging that the Plaintiff was subjected to sexual abuse or assaults while the Plaintiff was incarcerated. The record before the court confirmed that the Plaintiff was not a minor at the time of the alleged abuse.

The more specific issue addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is whether this waiver of the immunity afforded to governmental agencies under the sexual abuse exception applies when the victim of the sexual abuse is an adult, or whether the waiver of immunity is limited to only those cases involving sexual abuse committed against a minor.

As noted in Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion, "[t]he sexual-abuse exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act applies to '[c]onduct which constitutes an offense enumerated under Section 5551(7).'  The offenses enumerated in Section 5551(7), in turn, require that 'the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense.'"

In the end, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the unambiguous language of Section 8542(b)(9) waives immunity in favor of political subdivisions or their employees only if the Plaintiff was a minor at the time of the sexual abuse.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority decision may click this LINK.  Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (April 14, 2026).



Source of image: Photo by Lacey Reapsome on www.unsplash.com.