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Summary Judgment Entered for UIM Carrier Where Plaintiff Did Not Fall Under Definition of a "Covered" Person

In the non-precedential decision in the case of Miller v. USAA General Ind. Co., No. 23-1934 (3d Cir. Jan. 2025 Chagares, C.J., Chung, J., and Fisher, J.) (Op. by Fisher, J.), the court affirmed summary judgment that had been granted by Judge Christopher C. Conner of the Federal Middle District Court in favor of the carrier in a UIM case.

According to the Opinion, a UIM Plaintiff sought coverage under a policy that was issued to the grandmother of the Claimant’s daughter. Both the Claimant and the daughter were living with the grandmother at the time of the accident.

The grandmother was the only named insured on the policy. The Claimant and the grandmother were not related by blood, marriage, or adoption.

The Claimant argued that her daughter was a named insured because she was listed as an “operator” on the declarations page for the applicable policy and that, therefore, the Claimant also qualified as an insured under that policy.

The Claimant additionally argued that the limitation of UIM coverage to the named insured and family members of the named insured, as defined by the policy, violated the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law and the related stacking provisions. In this case, the Claimant invoked the case of Gallagher v. Geico and its precedent.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the Claimant’s arguments. The Third Circuit confirmed that the Claimant did not qualify as an insured under the policy and that, therefore, no UIM benefits were owed to the Claimant.

The Court noted that the issue in this case was not whether the named insured had waived UIM benefits.  Rather, the issue, and the finding, was that the Plaintiff was simply not a "covered" person under the terms of the policy.   

Moreover, the court found that, since the Claimant was not even an insured under the policy, no duty of good faith was owed to her by the carrier.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Christopher W. Woodward of the Camphill office of Marshall Dennehey for bringing this case to my attention.

Western District Federal Court of Pennsylvania Addresses Products Liability Claims In a Prescription Medical Device Litigation

In the case of Blair v. Abbvie, Inc., No. 2:23-CV-1871 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2025 Ranjan, J.), the court granted a Motion to Dismiss in a prescription medical device litigation.

In this decision, the Western Federal District Court confirmed that Pennsylvania’s across-the-board application of the Restatement §402A, comment k, as precluding strict liability design defect claims, but not strict liability manufacturing defect claims.

The court also ruled that, similarly, given that the elements of implied warranty claims are identical to strict liability claims, the Plaintiff’s implied warranty claims were dismissed.

The court also ruled in this case that the manufacturing defect claims asseted by the Plaintiff were inadequately pled because the claims did not reveal either any specific problem with the device or how the device allegedly failed. The court noted that the availability of a malfunction theory manufacturing defect claim does not exclude excuse failure to plead the circumstances of the alleged malfunction.

The court also ruled that the negligent design and warning claims were inadequately pled because the Plaintiff did not identify the design defect, anything about the manufacturing process, or what information should have been given to his medical providers.

Based on these issues, the trial court granted the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Plaintiff's Claims For Tortious Interference with a Dead Body Kept Alive

In the case of McGee v. Bowser, No. 838 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Dec. 30, 2024 Olson, J., Sullivan, J., and Bender, J.)(Op. by Olson, J.), the Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court’s sustaining of Preliminary Objections in a case involving a Plaintiff’s decedent being moved from his original gravesite without consent.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff pled that the Defendant’s conspired to move the decedent from his original gravesite without consent or notice. The Plaintiff also alleged that the disinterment permit had been improperly granted.

Reviewing the claims before it, the appellate court ruled that the Plaintiff had indeed stated a valid claim for tortious interference with a dead body under the elements noted in the Restatement §868.

However, the court found that the Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim failed. The court noted that such a claim requires that a Plaintiff be present when the tort occurred.

However, the appellate court did allow the Plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim brought against the cemetery for breach of fiduciary duty to proceed given that that claim did not require a contemporaneous observation.

Relative to a civil conspiracy claim asserted by the Plaintiff, the court confirmed that a civil conspiracy claim is a derivative claim and that, given that some of the Plaintiff’s other substantive claims were reinstated, the civil conspiracy claim would likewise be allowed to proceed.

On the issue of the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, the appellate court noted that such damages are permitted on a lesser standard of outrageousness in cases involving the mistreatment of corpses.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of Image:  Photo by Scott Rodgerson on www.unsplash.com.

Eastern Federal District Court Judge Issues Rule 11 Sanctions Against Plaintiff's Counsel

 In the case of Shelton v. Chaudhry, No. 24-5657 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2025 McHugh, J.), Eastern Federal District Court Judge Gerald A. McHugh ripped a scathing Opinion meting out Rule 11 sanctions against a Plaintiff's counsel for repeated violations.

According to the decision, in this case arisining out of a motor vehicle accident, the Court faulted the Plaintiff's attorney for repeatedly filing a federal court Complaint rooted in diversity jurisdiction while, at the same time, pleading facts that established that such jurisdiction did not exist.

In his decision, Judge Hughes provides a thorough review of the current status of federal law in the context mandates imposed on attorneys under Rule 11 as well as when sanctions are warranted under that Rule.

In the end, the Court's sanctions imposed included a reprimand addressed to Plaintiff's counsel, the imposition of a $7,500 fine on the attorney, and the issuance of a directive that the attorney circulate the Court's Opinion to the other members of the Plaintiff's law firm at issue.

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

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Superior Court Affirms Entry of Defense Verdict Even Though Defendant's Answer to Complaint Was Stricken Prior to Trial

In the case of Derbyshire v. Jefferson Frankford Hospital, No. 1409 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Dec. 20, 2024 Olson, J., Stabile, J. and Colins, J.) (Op. by Stabile, J.), the Superior Court found that a trial court judge did not commit any error in post-trial proceedings by denying a Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial limited to the issue of damages.

This matter arose out of a slip and fall event.

According to the Opinion, prior to the trial in the underlying matter, a motions court judge had stricken the Defendant’s Answer to the Complaint with prejudice due to untimeliness under Pa. R.C.P. 1029(b).

Later, another judge who presided over the trial, refused the Plaintiff’s request to direct the jury to find in the Plaintiff’s favor on the issues of negligence and causation and, instead, allowed these issues to go to the jury.

The jury then returned a verdict in favor of the Defendant on the issue of causation and awarded zero damages.

The Superior Court held that, while the Defendant’s failure to answer the Complaint resulted in a deemed admission of the facts alleged in the Plaintiff’s Complaint, at trial, the Plaintiff still had a burden to prove a legal causal connection between the Defendant’s alleged negligent conduct and the Plaintiff’s alleged damages. In its ruling, the Superior Court noted that, since the jury found the Defendant negligent, the Plaintiff suffered no prejudice from the trial court’s refusal to deem that issue admitted. The Superior Court therefore focused its attention on the issue of causation.

In ruling in the manner it did, the Superior Court found a 1984 decision from the Supreme Court of Texas to be persuasive. That court in Texas had concluded that a plaintiff who obtains a default judgment in a personal injury matter must still prove damages apart from the deemed admission of liability. 

Here, in this Derbyshire case, the court found that the striking of the Defendant’s Answer and New Matter resulted in a deemed admission of all facts but only an admission of “liability” by the Defendant. 

The Superior Court ruled that the Plaintiff still had to proceed to trial on the issue of damages and, in this regard, the Plaintiff had a burden to establish that the Defendant’s conduct caused the Plaintiff’s damages. 

As noted, in this case, the jury was not convinced that the Plaintiff’s alleged damages were related to the Defendant’s negligent conduct.

The Superior Court ruled that, based upon a review of the evidence in the record, it was within the jury’s prerogative to award zero damages.

Accordingly, the Superior Court ultimately ruled that the trial court did not err in denying the Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Motions seeking a new trial on damages.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 14, 2025).