BRING YOUR CASE TO A CLOSE

 BRING YOUR CASE TO A CLOSE

DANIEL E. CUMMINS, ESQ.

570-319-5899

dancummins@CumminsLaw.net

Contact CUMMINS MEDIATION SERVICES to set up your Mediation to bring your case to a close.

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HERE'S A SAMPLING OF JUST SOME OF THE FIRMS

WHO PREVIOUSLY SECURED SETTLEMENTS AT MEDIATIONS WITH CUMMINS MEDIATION SERVICES:

HOURIGAN, KLUGER & QUINN

LENAHAN & DEMPSEY

ABRAHAMSEN, CONABOY & ABRAHAMSEN

POWELL LAW

CEFALO & ASSOCIATES

LAW OFFICES OF JAMES D. FAMIGLIO

FOLEY LAW FIRM

NEEDLE LAW

OSTROFF GODSHALL

FISHER & FISHER

BLAKE & WALSH

CAPUTO & MARRIOTTI

HAGGERTY, HINTON & COSGROVE

SLUSSER LAW

VINSKO & ASSOCIATES

BISCONTINI LAW FIRM

MECADON LAW

LAW OFFICES OF LEO JACKSON

SOBO & SOBO

MARKS O'NEILL, O'BRIEN, DOHERTY & KELLY

RAWLE & HENDERSON

POST & SCHELL

SWARTZ CAMPBELL

BENNETT BRICKLIN & SALTZBURG

CIPRIANI & WERNER

MINTZER SAROWITZ, ZERIS, LEDVA & MEYERS

SHAY, SANTEE, KELHART & DESCHLER, LLC

McCORMICK & PRIORE

THOMAS, THOMAS & HAFER

SCANLON, HOWLEY & DOHERTY

MARGOLIS EDELSTEIN

MARSHALL DENNEHEY

ELLIOTT GREENLEAF

COLEMAN LAW OFFICES

PennDOT

SELECTIVE INSURANCE IN-HOUSE COUNSEL OFFICE

NATIONWIDE INSURANCE IN-HOUSE COUNSEL

TRAVELERS INSURANCE IN-HOUSE COUNSEL

What Constitutes The "Record" To Be Reviewed On Summary Judgment?

In the case of L.T. v. Kubota Manufacturing, No. 1310 MDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Feb. 14, 2025 Bowes, J., Olson, J., and Stabile, J.) (Op. by Bowes, J.), the Pennsylvania Supeiror court overruled a trial court’s entry of summary judgment in a products liability case.

According to the Opinion, the case arose out of a rider mower accident in which a grandmother accidentally ran over her 7 year old grandson who had come into the yard and slipped on the grass behind her. The Plaintiff alleged that the mower lacked appropriate rear guarding and was negligently designed such that the blades remained engaged even when the tractor was in reverse. The minor’s lower leg eventually had to be amputated.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the trial court erred by not reviewing certain expert reports offered by the Plaintiff which were attached to the Plaintiff’s Brief which were filed of record.

The Superior Court, citing Pa. R.C.P. 1035.1, confirmed in its Opinion that the Rules of Civil Procedure define “record” for purposes of summary judgment as including pleadings, depositions, Answers to Interrogatories, admissions and affidavits, and reports signed by an expert witness that would, “if filed,” comply with Rule 4003.5(a)(1), whether or not the reports have been produced in response to Interrogatories

The court noted that the language of the rule suggest that expert reports need only be submitted to the court, not filed, in order to be considered in Motion for Summary Judgment proceedings.

As such, the appellate court noted that the trial court should have considered the Plaintiff’s expert report, which would have created issues of fact for the jury’s resolution.

In this decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court also provided a thorough recitation of the current status of products liability law in Pennsylvania, including the law as altered by the case of Tincher v. Omega Flex, 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014). In reviewing that law, the court reiterated that there were indeed issues of fact that needed to be decided by a jury.

As such, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Mock Trial Jurors Needed To Fill Jury Box for the Finals in Scranton Next Tuesday

 

Superior Court Affirms Trial Court Rulings in MVA Case Precluding Introduction of Criminal Acts by Defendant

In the non-precedential decision by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the case of Bazzano v. Spade, No. 99 WDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Dec. 23, 2024 McLaughlin, J., King, J., and Beck, J.) (Mem. by McLaughlin, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions on evidentiary rulings during the course of a motor vehicle accident trial in which the jury awarded the Plaintiff $7,500.00 in damages.

According to the Opinion, the Defendant struck the Plaintiff with his vehicle while the Plaintiff was walking through a parking lot. After the accident, in a companion criminal case, the Defendant had pled guilty to simple assault and recklessly endangering another person, which were misdemeanors of the second degree.

Among the issues raised on appeal after this personal injury trial was the Plaintiff’s desire to introduce into evidence the Defendant's guilty plea from the criminal case during the course of the civil jury trial on the personal injury claims.

Along these lines, the Plaintiff noted that the trial court had allowed the Plaintiff to amend the Complaint to assert claims of recklessness and punitive damages.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that the trial court had properly precluded the references to the Defendant’s criminal charges. In part, the court noted that the Defendant admitted liability for the happening of the accident in this civil litigation and that, therefore, the only issues present in the civil trial were the issues of damages. 

The court also noted that, given that the Defendant had pled guilty to misdemeanors, as opposed to any felonies, the use of the criminal convictions for the purposes of establishing reckless behavior in the civil trial was properly precluded by the trial court. 

The Superior Court otherwise noted that any relevance that the conviction would have had as a statement against interest by the Defendant, would have been outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 

Accordingly, the Superior Court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in keeping out this guilty plea.

The Superior Court also affirmed the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence the Defendant’s prior DUI convictions. The Plaintiffs attempted to utilize this evidence to establish the Defendant’s habit and pattern of recklessness. The Plaintiffs argued that the Defendant's recklessness in this case was in conformity with his past actions demonstrating recklessness while driving.

The Plaintiff was relying upon Pa.R.E. 406 which provides that evidence of a person’s habit may be admitted to prove that, on a particular occasion, the person acted in accordance with that habit.

The Superior Court found that the trial court properly denied the Plaintiff’s request to admit the Defendant’s two (2) prior DUI convictions to demonstrate of recklessness. The Superior Court noted that there was no evidence that the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the subject accident. The Superior Court agreed that the evidence was not relevant and the prejudicial impact of that evidence outweighed any potential relevance.

Based on these reasons, and other reasons, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings. The judgment was affirmed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Krista M. Corabi, Esquire of the Pittsburgh office of the Summers, McDonnell Hudak, Guthrie & Rauch law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Kindel Media on www.pexels.com.

Liability for Skiing Accident Found to be Barred by Signed Waiver and Under the Skier's Responsibility Act

The case of Lin v. Shawnee Mountain Ski Resort, No. 4031-CV-2022 (C.P. Monroe Co. Dec. 11, 2024 Williamson, J.), the court granted the Defendant ski resort’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a case arising out of a skiing accident at the resort.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was relatively a novice at skiing.  As part of the ski rental process at the resort, the Plaintiff executed a release or waiver document.

After some time on the “bunny slope,” the Plaintiff and her friend went to ski on other trails on the mountain. 

At some point during the day, when coming down one of the other trails, the Plaintiff came all the way down the hill and was unable to slow or stop allegedly due to icy conditions and missed crashing into the ski racks situated outside of the lodge but skied into the lodge itself. The Plaintiff, who was wearing a helmet, went head first through a glass window of the lodge. 

The Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the collision, she suffered a broken pelvis and multiple stomach lacerations which have resulted in considerable scarring.

The Plaintiff sued on various theories of negligence. In part, the Plaintiff alleged that the lodge was located too close to the bottom of the trail, that the Defendants failed to provide some sort of stopping mechanism in front of the ski racks in the lodge, and that the Defendants should have installed safety glass in the lodge's windows. The Plaintiff additionally alleged that the trail she came down was mislabeled as a easier or beginner's slope.

The Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that the Plaintiff’s inability to stop and result an accident where inherent risks of skiing which is deemed to be an assumed risk under the Pennsylvania Skier’s Responsibility Act.

In the alternative, the Defendants alleged that the Plaintiff's claims were barred by the release that the Plaintiff signed at the time she rented the ski equipment.

The Defendants also requested summary judgment on the punitive damages claims asserted.

Judge David J. Williamson of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas granted the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, holding in pertinent part, that the Plaintiff’s negligence claims were barred by both the Skier’s Responsibility Act and the liability waiver that the Plaintiff had signed before commencing her skiing activities.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 29, 2025).

Joinder of Additional Defendants Denied in Federal Court as Untimely

In the case of Cooney v. Buck Motorsports Park LLC, No. 5:23-CV-02346-MKC (E.D. Pa. Jan 15, 2025 Costello, J.), the court addressed a Plaintiff’s opposition to a Defendant’s Motion for Leave of Court to Join Additional Defendants into the case which involved allegations of personal injury after a truck allegedly struck the Plaintiff during a dirt race track event.

The Plaintiffs opposed the joinder of the proposed third party Defendants under Federal Rule 14(a) and Local Rule 14.1(a) by asserting that the Motion to Join was untimely.

The court noted that, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 14(a), a “defending party may, as third-party Plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or maybe liable to it for all or part of the claim against it.” 

The court additionally noted that, under F.R.C.P. 14(a)(1), “the third-party Plaintiff must, by motion obtain the court’s leave if it files the third-party complaint more than 14 days after serving its original answer.”

Moreover, the court noted that the Eastern District Local Rule of Court 14.1 holds that applications pursuant to F.R.C.P. 14 for leave to join additional Defendants after the expiration of the time limit specified in that rule “will ordinarily be denied as untimely unless filed not more than 90 days after the service of the moving party’s answer.” However, the court noted that the trial court retained discretion on whether or not to apply that local rule or not.

The court additionally noted that, in this matter, the scheduled trial was only a few months away, that the discovery deadline had already been previously extended, and that the addition of the third party Defendants would not only extend the discovery period further, but would also guarantee a delay of trial and would complicate the issues at trial.

The court additionally noted that the late joinder would also likely harm the proposed third-party Defendants given how far along the original case had already proceeded. The court additionally noted that prejudice could result to the Plaintiff for the same reasons.

For all of these reasons, the court denied the Motion to Join the Third Party Defendants after finding that the motion was untimely and without sufficient justification where the original Defendants had sought the leave of court more than a year after they filed their Answer to the Complaint. 

The court also noted that the Defendants were long aware of the existence of the proposed third-party Defendants, having listed them as individuals with discoverable information in the original Defendant’s initial federal court disclosures.

The court also noted that the Defendants who wished to join the third-party Defendants failed to explain to the court why they could not have learned of their alleged claims against the third-party Defendants sooner.

As such, the Motion to Join was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.

Source: The Legal Intelligencer Federal Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 6, 2025).

Federal Court Rules Just Because Experts Agree That There Was An Injury Doesn't Automatically Mean That Causation Has Been Established

In the case of Gross v. Villeneuve, No. 2:23-CV-00705-NBF (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2025 Fischer, S.J.), the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to a Defendant’s negligence, which had been conceded, but otherwise denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a case involving a motor vehicle accident.

While the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in terms of the liability issue in this rear-end accident, the court denied the Plaintiff’s argument that, given the Defendant's concession on liability, the Plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to a further concession on the issue of causation relative to the physical injuries and damages alleged by the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff asserted that he was entitled to summary judgment on the “factual cause” question where both parties’ medical experts attributed some degree of injury to the accident. 

Here, citing to Pennsylvania Superior Court precedent, the federal court ruled that a defense expert’s opinion that a Plaintiff suffered an injury, based on the history given to the expert, is not an uncontroverted admission on the issue of causation by a defendant. 

The court confirmed the well-settled rule that a jury was free to render its own decision on the case presented even where the experts of the parties may agree, to some extent, that the Plaintiff sustained an injury as a result of the accident. 

More specifically, the court reasoned that “[a] medical expert report concluding that, based on the evidence provided (including a Plaintiff’s history and subjective complaints), the ‘mechanism of injury’ and clinical findings were ‘consistent with’ some of the allegedly consequent injuries (i.e., some injury could be resultant from the collision), is simply not a concession. To the contrary, it is an insufficient basis on which to usurp a trial jury’s credibility determinations and broader fact-finding role.” See Op. at 5.

As such, the court denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on the causation issues presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh law office of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Nikita Nikitin on www.pexels.com.