Court Finds That Arbitration Clause Found on App Inconspicuous and, Therefore, Unenforceable

In the case of Oakley v. FloatMe Corp., No. 1318 WDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Oct. 1, 2026 King, J., Lane, J., and Panella, P.J.E.) (Op. by King, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s rejection of a Defendant’s efforts to compel arbitration of this civil litigation matter.

According to the Opinion, FloatMe is a Texas-based technology company that makes loans or cash advances to Pennsylvania consumers over the internet.

This matter arose out of a Class Action matter. After suit was filed, the Defendant filed Preliminary Objections in the nature of a Motion to Compel Arbitration.

FloatMe asserted that the Plaintiffs were required to sign up via FloatMe’s App before she could obtain a cash advance. FloatMe asserted that the App prompts the user to answer several questions and request certain information. One of the prompts on the App provides that , by continuing with the application process, the applicant agrees to FloatMe’s terms of service and privacy policy.

FloatMe further maintained that the terms of service button is clickable and directs the user to an online format of the terms and condition. The company further asserted that, if a user clicks the phrase terms and conditions, those terms and conditions allegedly clearly indicate that the agreement contains an Arbitration provision and a Class Action waiver.

The Plaintiff asserted that the App’s lengthy sign up process included “at least 16 screens” for a consumer to navigate before they may obtain a case advance. The Plaintiff noted that, at no point in that process did FloatMe mention Arbitration or the waiver of any constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury trial.

The Plaintiffs asserted that this type of a sign up process is not sufficient to bind users to Arbitration or the waiver of any constitutional rights such as the right to a jury trial. 

The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed and held that the FloatMe App did not conspicuously inform the Plaintiff of her rights.  Rather, the court found that the application process on the App allowed users to complete their registration without being fully informed of the rights that the applicant is waiving.

As such, the Superior Court held that there was no mutual assent and no valid agreement entered into with respect to Arbitration.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: The Pa. Super. Blog written by Jon Bruno of Bruno Litigation, LLC in Pittsburgh, PA.

Source of image:  Photo by Brett Jordan on www.unsplash.com.

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Court Addresses AI Hallucinations in Filings By Pro Se Litigant

In the case of Coyne v. Smurl, No. 2025-CV-5844 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 25, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court issued a decision addressing Preliminary Objections filed in a matter involving the Sunshine Act.

Of note, on pgs. 8-10, and in footnote 4 of the Opinion, Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas points out that the pro se litigant in this case appeared to have relied upon generative artificial intelligence (“GenAI”) in creating its filings given that a number of the citations offered up to the court by the pro se litigant were not accurate.

The court noted that, under Pa. R.C.P. 1023.1(c)(2), as well as the local rules of court in Lackawanna County, the signature of an attorney or a self-representative party on a court filing constitutes a certification by that attorney or party that the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions set forth in the filing “are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, or the establishment of new law.”

As such, the court noted that attorneys and pro se litigants have a duty to independently verify the accuracy of all citations generated by AI and the legitimacy of the holdings and the rationales that AI attributes to those identified cases before submitting any filings of record.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image: Photo by Igor Omilaev on www.unsplash.com.

No-Duty Rule Applied to Football Related Head Injury Claims

In the case of Schretzman v. NCAA, Nol 2883 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Sept. 16, 2026 Lane, J.) (Op. by Lane, J.), the court applied the no-duty negligence rule under Pennsylvania law to a claim by a Plaintiff alleging injuries from repeated football-related head injuries.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was a former member of the West Point College football team. He was diagnosed with ALS.

The Plaintiff sued the NCAA under an allegation that the NCAA allegedly failed to warn him of the risks associated with repeated football-related head injuries.

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s entry of the NCAA’s Motion for a Compulsory Nonsuit.

The Superior Court noted that it was “bound under Pennsylvania’s no-duty negligence rule to hold the NCAA did not owe a duty of care to warn college player that repeated head injuries, in the support of football, may cause, decades later, latent neurogenerative disease, including [ALS].”

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Pa. Super. Blog by Jon Bruno of Bruno Litigation, LLC, in Pittsburgh, PA.

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Court Rules That Party Not Entitled to Unsealing of Juvenile Delinquency Records of a Witness

In the case of M.M., a minor v. Lion Tamer, LLC, No. 2025-CV-4113 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 18, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed a Motion by the Defendant seeking to unseal the records relating to the juvenile delinquency proceedings involving a minor identified as “B.S.”

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of a premises liability incident. The Defendant operates an indoor trampoline park. The minor female Plaintiff, M.M., was allegedly lured into a foam pit by a 13 year old teenage boy during which the minor was allegedly sexually assaulted.

The court noted that the Plaintiff did not take any position on the Defendant’s Motion to Unseal Records regarding the juvenile delinquencies proceedings involving a minor identified as B.S.

In reviewing the Motion, the court referred to §6307(a) of the Juvenile Act. 42 Pa. C.S.A. §6307(a).

The court additionally also reviewed Rule 160(A) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure. Pa. R.J.C.P. 160(A).

The Defendant sought access to B.S.’s juvenile records as a party having a legitimate interest in the proceedings. In making the Motion, the Defendant conceded that it could not find any case law directly on point specifically involving a Defendant in a civil case seeking to have a juvenile criminal record unsealed. 

However, Judge Nealon uncovered relevant case law both at the appellate and trial court level. Based upon the case law found, Judge Nealon ruled that the Defendant could not be deemed a party “having a legitimate interest in the proceedings” under the above-referenced Rules as that language has been construed as referring to parties having a legitimate interest in the juvenile court proceedings.

Judge Nealon also noted that, while Subsection (b) of §6307 of the Juvenile Act was added after certain case law and permitted disclosure of limited information from juvenile delinquent proceedings for certain violent criminal conduct committed when the juvenile at issue was 14 years old or older, the individual in this case was only 13 at the time of the incident. As such, the court found that §6307(b) could not serve as a basis for unsealing the requested juvenile records.

Overall, the court in this case decided that based upon the limited record before it as submitted by the parties, the requested juvenile records of B.S. were protected from public access by the above-cited Rules. Accordingly, the Defendant’s Motion to Unseal the Juvenile Delinquency Documents was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Summary Judgment Granted in Favor of Out-of-Possession Landlord

In the case of Bresnahan v. Indian Creek Health Care, Inc., No. 10535 of 2024, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. July 31, 2026 Cox, P.J.), the court granted in part and denied in part a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a premises liability case.

The Plaintiff filed suit alleging injuries as a result of a slip and fall on an alleged accumulation of liquid in a stairwell. Various Defendants affiliated with the property were sued.

Relative to the out-of-possession landlord, the court held that such a defendant could not be held liable without evidence that it retained control over the allegedly defective area.

With respect to one of that defendants, the court found that the Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that that defendant was involved in the control, maintenance, or repair of the premises. There was also no evidence established that that particular defendant had retained any control over the area where the Plaintiff allegedly fell.

A separate Motion for Summary Judgment filed by another defendant that was identified as the management company for the premises was denied.  The court found that sufficient evidence had been produced to support an inference that that defendant had control over the area of the premises in question.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Sept. 17, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Laura Cleffman on www.unsplash.com.

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