Lessons In Federal Court Complaint Drafting

In the case of Fike v. Global Pharma Healthcare Private, Ltd., No. 5:23-CV-2981 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2024 Leeson, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part a Motion to Dismiss filed by Amazon in a products liability case.

In his decision, Judge Leeson ruled that the Complaint was sufficiently pled so as to avoid dismissal under an argument of a shotgun pleading. However, the court noted that the allegations against “Defendants” were improperly grouped together.

The court also struck the Plaintiff’s claims alleging a post-sale duty to recall in this products liability case since no such claim is recognized under Pennsylvania law.

The court additionally ruled that shippers or distributors of products do not owe a duty of inspection or investigation into the products that they ship on to customers.

In this case, the court noted that the risk of a bacterial contamination from the product at issue was not foreseeable as to impose a duty upon the shipper. Imposing such an inspection duty on a shipper could hamper the shipper’s ability to distribute and ship products, which is an extremely socially useful service provided to the public at large.

The court additionally struck the punitive damages claim alleged by finding that punitive damages allegations cannot be based on allegations presented “on information and belief.”

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Reed Smith law firm in Philadelphia for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Christian Wiediger on www.unsplash.com.

Federal District Judge Crafts Sanction for Discovery Violations

In the case of Domus BWW Funding, LLC v. Arch Ins. Co., No. 2:23-CV-00094-JDW (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2024 Wolson, J.), the court issued discovery sanctions against the Defendant insurance company related to discovery issues and “sloppy” discovery responses by the carrier. The court declined to impose a monetary sanction and instead decided to create jury instructions regarding the carrier’s actions.

More specifically, the court noted that the deletion of emails during discovery was considered troubling but was also procedural as the insurance company underwent a company wide transition.

In the end, the carrier was hit for sanctions due to his “cavalier attitude” towards its discovery obligations after the carrier was found to have failed to preserve evidence related to the lawsuit.

The judge imposed sanctions under FRCP 37(e)(1) after finding that the Plaintiff was prejudiced by the carrier’s deletion of emails by an underwriter of the policy at issue. As a remedy, the court noted that it was craft appropriate jury instruction regarding evidence of the insurance company’s failure to preserve the emails.

In his decision, the court also faulted the Plaintiff for not bringing the issues to the attention of the court until a summary judgment motion was filed. The court noted that a post-hoc Motion for Sanctions is not the appropriate vehicle to address the prejudice of the insurance company’s negligent approach towards the discovery obligations.

Judge Wolson noted that, although the discovery may, at times, amount to drudgery that lawyers may not enjoy, lawyers have an obligation to take their discovery duties seriously.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE


Source: Article - “Citing ‘Sloppy’ Discovery, Pa. Federal Judge Imposes Sanctions on Insurance Carrier, Calls Out Counsel,” By Marianna Wharry of the Legal Intelligencer (Aug. 15, 2024).

Save the Date: November 14, 2024 - Pro Bono Gala

 

Third Circuit Applies Regular Use Exclusion as a Valid Exclusion

In a recent non-precedential opinion issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the case of Eberly v. LM General Ins. Co., No. 21-2995 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2024),  that court determined that the regular use exclusion does not violate Section 1738 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. 

In Eberly, the Third Circuit rejected the insured’s argument that Gallagher controls whether the regular use exclusions violate Section 1738 by acting as de facto waivers of stacking.

However, the Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court, in the case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, had expressly rejected the argument that Gallagher stands for the proposition that “insurance policy provisions that conflict with the specific requirements of the MVFRL will be declared invalid and unenforceable.

The Third Circuit decided that the regular use exclusion does not act as a de facto waiver of stacked coverage because, in this case, Plaintiffs could still access stacked coverage on their cars and on any cars they drove provided they do not fit within any applicable exclusions to such coverage. 

However, the Third Circuit also noted that the regular use exclusion only applies in the limited circumstance presented in the case before it, that is, where the injured party was operating a vehicle which he did not own but that was provided to him for his regular use and which was not covered under the policy at issue.

As such, the Third Circuit ruled that the regular use exclusion did not violate Section 1738 of the MVFRL under the facts at issue in this matter.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Another Decision by Third Circuit Upholding the Validity of the Regular Use Exclusion

In a non-precedential decision in the case of Burton v. Progressive Adv. Ins. Co., No. 23-1574 (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 2024 Porter, J. Montgomery-Reeves, J. and Roth, J.) (Op. by Roth, J.), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court judge's finding that the regular use exclusion precluded UIM coverage for a plaintiff.

In so ruling, the court relied upon the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in the case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 308 A.3d 780, 802 (Pa. 2024) in which that Court upheld the continued enforceability of the regular use exclusion.

The court additionally noted that the trial court properly found that the regular use exclusion applied in this case where the party at issue was driving her brother’s vehicle which the brother was allowing the driver to continually utilize while her own vehicle was being repaired.

Anyone wishing to review this non-precedential decision by the Third Circuit upholding the enforceability of the regular use exclusion may click this LINK.

No Duty of Care Created by Simply Giving a Thumbs Up To Proceed With Cutting Down a Tree

In the case of Miller v. Kinley, No. 22-00349 (C.P. Lyc. Co. June 18, 2024 Carlucci, J.), the court granted a Defendant summary judgment based on a finding that simply given a Plaintiff a “thumbs up” signal during the course of cutting down a tree did not create a duty of care by that Defendant when the tree that the Plaintiff was cutting fell on the Plaintiff.

In this case, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants had granted him permission to cut down trees on their property. The Plaintiff alleged that one Defendant, who had transported the Plaintiff to the property, agreed to assist in the removal of the trees by acting as a spotter and a safety coordinator.

The court noted that the Plaintiff failed to support this allegation with his deposition testimony.

The Defendant at issue filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The court found that the Defendant was entitled to summary judgment because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to any duty owed by that Defendant to the Plaintiff. The court found that no reasonable jury could find that, by giving the Plaintiff a “thumbs up” signal, that Defendant assumed as duty of care to ensure that the Plaintiff safely cut down the tree and stay out of its way as it fell.

Judge Carlucci noted that, under the common law of Pennsylvania, absent a special relationship between the parties, there is no duty to control the conduct of a third party to protect another from harm.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert” Law.com (Aug. 22, 2024).

Preliminary Objections Regarding Venue and Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens Addressed by Superior Court

In the case of Kennedy v. Crothall Healthcare, Inc., No. 383 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 2024 Collins, J., Stabile, J., and McLaughlin, J.) (Op. by Collins, J.) (McLaughlin, J. dissenting), the Superior Court affirmed a trial court's granting of a defendant's Preliminary Objections based upon a lack of jurisdiction and also affirmed the dismissal of remaining claims under the doctrine forum non conveniens.

Relative to the issue of jurisdiction, the court found that the Plaintiff asserted no valid basis for jurisdiction over a manufacturer for injuries sustained in a surgery that was completed in a state other than Pennsylvania. 

The court also emphasized that the Defendant was not located in Pennsylvania and the product at issue was never manufactured in the state of Pennsylvania.

The court additionally noted that the Plaintiff did not assert general jurisdiction and, as such, any arguments based upon the Pennsylvania registration of the corporation to do business were considered to be waived.  The Plaintiff attempted to request a retroactive application of a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. regarding jurisdiction over corporations that register to do business in Pennsylvania.  However, the Court found that the Plaintiff had waived this issue of general jurisdiction.

In terms of the Plaintiff's efforts to establish specific jurisdiction over the defendant, the court additionally noted that the fact that the payment for the product at issue was sent to a Pennsylvania lock box was insufficient to support a claim of specific personal jurisdiction against the Defendant. The court emphasized that the lock box had nothing to do with the product liability issue.

The court agreed that the Defendants did not otherwise purposefully direct their activities towards Pennsylvania. Also, the Plaintiff’s claims did not, in any meaningful way, arise out of the use of the lock box. Moreover, the court noted that the lock box belonged to the manufacturer’s bank and not toe the Defendant manufacturer. The court reasoned that if the presence of an independent product distributor is insufficient to support jurisdiction, then the presence of an independent lock box also cannot be sufficient.

Relative to the issues raised under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the court found it was also proper for the trial court to have dismissed the case on these grounds as well. In this matter, it was established that every witness was located out of state as were all of the Defendant’s alleged activities related to the lawsuit. The Superior Court agreed that the Defendant had demonstrated the hardship that justified disturbing the Plaintiff’s choice of forum.

The court in Kennedy additionally ruled that the fact that a corporate Defendant had headquarters in Pennsylvania, in and of itself, was not enough to defeat a motion filed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens seeking a transfer of venue.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Reed Smith law firm in Philadelphia for bringing this case to my attention.