As Currently Required, Court Follows the Fad of Allowing Claims of Recklessness Regardless of the Facts Pled

In the case of Tierney v. Miggy’s Corporation Six, No. 3632-CV-2025 (C.P. Monroe Co. Sept. 10, 2025 Zulick, J.), the court overruled a Defendant’s Motion to Strike allegations of recklessness and punitive damages from the Plaintiff’s slip and fall Complaint.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged that she slipped and fell on a puddle caused by a leaky air conditioner at the Defendants’ grocery store and sustained injuries as a result. The Plaintiff also claimed, in part, that the puddle in question was caused by the carelessness, recklessness, and negligence of the Defendants. The Plaintiff additionally asserted a claim for punitive damages.

The court followed the current fad of courts allowing general allegations of recklessness to be pled as an allegation of a state mind under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b). The court noted that the issue of the validity of the claims could be revisited after discovery at the summary judgment stage.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Nov. 20, 2025).

Trial Court Judge Orders Opening of a Snap Default Judgment

In the case of Susquehanna Legal Aid For Adults & Youth v. Winkleman, No. CV-2024-01041 (C.P. Lyc. Co. Sept. 23, 2025 Carlucci, J.), Judge William P. Carlucci of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas granted a Plaintiff’s Petition to Open a Defendant’s default judgment filed relative to the Defendant’s counterclaim where the court found that the Defendants had entered a “snap” default judgment.

In ruling upon the Plaintiff’s Petition to Open and/or Strike the default judgment, the court reviewed the standard of review which required the court to determine (1) whether the default was excusable; (2) whether the parties seeking to open the judgment has shown a meritorious defense or claim, and (3) whether the Petition to Open has been promptly filed.

The court also noted that it “sincerely believe[d]” that the Rules of Civil Procedure are not intended to become a “bag of tricks.” See Op. at 5. 

In so noting, the court also referred to Pa. R.C.P. 126 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure that requires the rules to be liberally applied to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. Judge Carlucci noted that, under that rule, a court is, at every stage of the action, permitted to disregard any error or defect of procedure that does not affect the substantive rights of the parties.

Judge William P. Carlucci
Lycoming County 

Judge Carlucci additionally noted that it is the well-settled law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that “snap judgments” are heavily disfavored.

According to the record before the court in this case, forty-one (41) minutes after the Defendants electronically filed their default judgment on their counterclaim against the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff had electronically filed their Preliminary Objections to the Defendants’ counterclaim.

Judge Carlucci noted that, had counsel for the Defendants made any effort to contact counsel for the Plaintiff before taking the default judgment, counsel for the Defendant would have learned that a responsive pleading was only minutes away from being filed.

Based upon the record before the court, the court found that the Petition to Open or Strike was promptly filed and was worthy of being granted. As such, the court opened the default judgment and directed the Plaintiff to file its responsive pleading.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Nov. 6, 2025).

Court Strikes Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim But Allows Punitive Damages Claim to Proceed In Premises Liability Case

In the case of Abda v. Keystone Klub Keyser Oak, LLC, No. 2024-CV-7649 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 20, 2025 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas overruled a Preliminary Objection in the nature of a demurrer filed against the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages but sustained Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurrer filed against the Plaintiff’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress in a personal injury case.

According to the Opinion, a customer at a skill-based games venue sued the Defendant entertainment lounge for negligence and sued its owner for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress after the owner allegedly attacked and injured the customer on the premises.

In support of his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the customer alleged that the owner later used his vehicle to cause damage to the grounds of the customer's residence and shouted profanities at the customer’s minor son in the process.

In response to the Complaint, the owner Defendant filed demurrers, including with respect to the Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages. The Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff failed to allege specific facts to support a finding of willful or wanton misconduct.

The Defendant also filed a demurrer against the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In his Opinion, Judge Nealon noted that claims of willful or wanton misconduct may be averred generally under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b).

The court additionally held that a demand for punitive damages is not governed by the “material facts” pleading requirement found under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) because a demand for punitive damages does not constitute a “cause of action.” Instead, a demand for punitive damages is viewed merely as an element of damages that is incidental to an underlying cause of action.

Here, where the customer stated a prima facie claim for assault and battery against the owner and had generally alleged willful and wanton misconduct by the owner, the court found support for overruling the demurrer to the claim for punitive damages.

With respect to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court found that the Plaintiff’s Complaint did not describe conduct that was so outrageous in nature and extreme in degree so as to exceed all bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. Accordingly, in the absence of such facts, the court sustained the Defendant’s demurrer to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Summary Judgment Denied in Supermarket Parking Lot Pothole Case

In the case of Schwab v. Giant Food Stores, No. 2024-CV-3936 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Dec. 2, 2025 Nealon, J.), the court denied summary judgment in a supermarket parking lot slip and fall involving a pothole.

In its responsive pleadings, the supermarket denied liability and also asserted that it did not own or control the parking lot at issue.

In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff asserted that discovery was ongoing with respect to the ownership and maintenance of the parking lot at issue.

The court noted that the supermarket Defendant merely alleged in its pleadings and its Motion for Summary Judgment that it did not own or maintain the parking lot. However, the supermarket Defendant did not submit any evidence in support of that allegation.

As such, the court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment based on issues of fact and allowed the case to proceed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Judge Nealon of Lackawanna County Reviews the Standard of Review Applicable to a Motion for Recusal

In the case of Correctional Care, Inc. v. Lackawanna County, PA, No. 2021-CV-3079 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Oct. 10, 2025 Nealon, J.), the trial court set out the standard of review relative to a Petition to the court requesting a recusal of a trial judge or the entire trial bench.

In this case, the provider of healthcare services to correctional facilities filed a lawsuit against the County seeking compensation for monies allegedly owed to the Plaintiff under the parties’ contract.

During summary judgment proceedings, the healthcare provider produced a testimonial affidavit from one of the County judges who served as a prison board member during the relevant time period under the contract. In that affidavit, the County judge made references to facts pertinent to the issues presented under the contract.

Following its production of that affidavit, the healthcare provider filed a Petition requesting a “full bench recusal” based upon the other judge’s status as a potential trial witness. The healthcare provider also sought a change of venue.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, who addressed the recusal request, set out the standard of review.  Judge Nealon was not the judge who had provided the above-referenced affidavit.

Judge Nealon noted that a judge faced with a recusal request must first make a conscientious determination of the judge’s ability to assess the case in an impartial manner.

If the judge is satisfied with that subjective self-examination of objectivity, the judge must then consider whether the judge’s continued involvement in the case could reasonably create an appearance of impropriety.

The court referred to other cases in which judges of this particular court had recused themselves from matters in which a colleague was likely to testify.

The court noted that the presiding judge at the trial of this matter would have to determine whether the judge’s proffered testimony is admissible, and if that testimony is admissible, the acceptable scope of the cross-examination of the judge.

In this case, Judge Nealon noted that, although the court believed that it would decide those evidentiary issues impartially and objectively based upon the applicable law, the court’s consideration of the other factors led him to conclude that his proceeding in the matter as the judge when a colleague of his was a witness in the case could create an appearance of impropriety in reasonable minds.

Accordingly, Judge Nealon granted the request to recuse the bench from this case and directed the court administrator to reassign the pending summary judgment motions filed by parties, along with the Motion for a Venue Transfer, to another judge.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Tingey Law Office on www.unsplash.com.

HOLIDAY GIFT FROM TORT TALK: Complimentary Copy of the 2025 Tort Talk Civil Litigation Update

Here is the LINK to a complimentary copy of the 199 paged 2025 Tort Talk Civil Litigation Update booklet that was created Daniel E. Cummins, Esq.   

Tort Talk has been putting out this annual Civil Litigation Update Booklet over the past 14 years since at least 2011, whether it be at the Tort Talk Expos or here on the Blog.

The 2025 Tort Talk Civil Litigation Update is a compilation of the most notable Tort Talk posts over the past year or so and is offered here FREE OF CHARGE as a Holiday gift to all Tort Talkers.

If you wish to review the actual Opinion of any of the cases summarized in the Tort Talk 2025 Civil Litigation Update, please go to www.TortTalk.com and type the case name, or the name of the Plaintiff, into the SEARCH BOX near the upper right hand corner of the blog (not the top box, the second from the top box).  That will take you to the Tort Talk post on that case, in which post there should be a LINK to the actual Opinion.

I note that the PBI sells its annual Civil Litigation Update Booklet for approximately $79.00!  The Tort Talk Civil Litigation Update Booklet is FREE.

As such, to the extent you may have a desire to pay it forward in another way with kindness this Holiday season, I would politely propose that you please consider making a donation to a charity or a non-profit organization of your choice, or to Lackawanna Pro Bono or The Children's Advocacy Center.

Thanks for reading Tort Talk and and thank you for providing me with notable cases to highlight here on Tort Talk.  All is greatly appreciated.

HAPPY HOLIDAYS!

Daniel E. Cummins, Esq.

Cummins Law

Clarks Summit, PA

579-319-5899

dancummins@cumminslaw.net

Source of  top image:  Photo by Thais Araujo on www.pexels.com

Supreme Court Upholds Application of the Immunity Provisions of the Mental Health Procedures Act

In the case of Wunderly v. St. Luke’s Hosp. of Bethlehem, No. 119 MAP 2023 (Pa. Oct. 23, 2025) (Op. by Mundy, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed issues raised in a medical malpractice case under the Mental Health Procedures Act.

In this case, the Plaintiff had filed suit against St. Luke’s Hospital of Bethlehem alleging that the Plaintiff decedent was admitted to St. Luke’s with Stage 1 pressure ulcers on his buttocks and that, during his stay at St. Luke’s he acquired pressured-related skin breakdowns, pressure wounds, and the deterioration of pre-existing pressure wounds, which allegedly caused or contributed to his death.

The trial court had dismissed the Plaintiff’s Complaint after St. Luke’s argued that the decedent was involuntarily admitted to its facility under the Mental Health Procedures Act and that, under the Act, St. Luke’s was immune from liability as the Plaintiff had failed to allege that the medical providers had engaged in willful misconduct or gross negligence that caused the decedent’s death.

The immuity provision of the Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 Pa.C.S.A. Section 7114(a), provides that "[i]n the absence of willful misconduct or gross negligence...a physician...or any other authorized person who participates in a decision that a person be examined or treated under [the MHPA]...shall not be civilly or criminally liable for such decision or for any of its consequences." 

This trial court decision dismissing the case was affirmed by the Superior Court on appeal which found that the decedent was being treated primarily for his mental health after being involuntarily admitted for aggressive behavior related to his dementia. The Superior Court also ruled that the treatment of the Plaintiff’s physical issues was consequence oh the patient's mental health treatment.

Up on the highest rung of the appellate ladder, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision and found that treatment for other medical issues consequent with a patient’s mental health treatment or for medical issues that may arise during a patient’s involuntary inpatient admission fell within the scope of treatment entitled to immunity under the Mental Health Procedures Act.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, (Nov. 11, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Ectactics Inc. on www.unsplash.com.