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Discovery Sanctions Awarded

In the case of Hamilton Law Group P.C. v. Hardenstine, No. 1464-CV2020 (C.P. Monroe Co. Nov. 22, 2024 C. Daniel Higgins, Jr., J.), the court granted a Motion for Discovery Sanctions after the Defendants failed to obey a court Order regarding the production of discoverable documents.

The court found that the Defendants’ continued and willful refusal to supply timely and full responses to discovery, even after being ordered to do so, demonstrated disdain towards the court. The court found that appropriate sanctions were authorized by Pa. R.C.P. 4019(a).

The court reaffirmed the general law of Pennsylvania that the imposition of discovery sanctions is a matter that falls under the broad discretion of a trial court judge. Judge Higgins noted that the factors to be considered were (1) the prejudice endured by the non-offending party and the ability of the opposing party to cure any prejudice; (2) the non-complying party’s willfulness or bad faith in failing to provide the requested discovery, (3) the importance of the excluded evidence in light of the failure to provide discovery, and (4) the number of discovery violations by the defending party.

Here, the court granted the Motion for Sanctions and ordered the Defendants to pay $750.00 in attorneys’ fees to the Plaintiffs’ attorneys. The Defendants were also ordered to provide full and complete Responses to the Request for Production of Documents at issue within thirty (30) days.

The court otherwise noted that, if the Defendants again fail to comply, the Plaintiffs were invited to apply for additional sanctions, including attorney’s fees and, possibly incarceration.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 16, 2025).

Trial Court Grants Discovery Sanctions After Med Mal Defendant Led Plaintiff on Wild Goose Chase

In the case of Lapteff v. Abington Mem. Hosp., No. 2021-CV-00536 (C.P. Montg. Co. Nov. 15, 2024 Saltz, J.), the court entered an Order in favor of a Plaintiff in a medical malpractice claim on issues regarding alleged spoliation of evidence and discovery sanctions.

In this medical malpractice case, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Sanctions relative to the Defendant hospital’s alleged spoliation of an audit trail for electronic medical records.

The court granted the motion in part by ordering the Defendant to pay the Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees and costs in seeking the production of an audit trail after the Defendant only belated explained that the discovery requested was unnecessary because pertinent medical record updates were reflected on the records themselves.

The court otherwise denied the Plaintiff’s request for an entry of judgment in its favor given that the spoliation committed by the Defendant did not serve to prejudice the Plaintiffs’ ability to prove their case. This was because the details of any after-the-fact changes to the Plaintiff’s medical records were confirmed to be in the medical records themselves.

Nonetheless, the court found that the Plaintiffs were prejudiced by being led on a wild goose chase by the Defendant which had originally simply maintained that it had no responsive documents in its possession when the Plaintiff originally requested the medical record audit trail. At no time did the Defendant, early on, inform the parties or the court that an audit trail was not required because any changes would be noted on the face of the medical records themselves. This revelation was only made after the court invited the Plaintiffs to file a Motion for Sanctions.

The court noted that, whether the Defendant’s conduct was intentional or not, a timely disclosure would have saved the parties and the court from considerable needless effort.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert. (Jan. 8, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Cottonbro Studios on www.pexels.com.

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Summary Judgment Entered for UIM Carrier Where Plaintiff Did Not Fall Under Definition of a "Covered" Person

In the non-precedential decision in the case of Miller v. USAA General Ind. Co., No. 23-1934 (3d Cir. Jan. 2025 Chagares, C.J., Chung, J., and Fisher, J.) (Op. by Fisher, J.), the court affirmed summary judgment that had been granted by Judge Christopher C. Conner of the Federal Middle District Court in favor of the carrier in a UIM case.

According to the Opinion, a UIM Plaintiff sought coverage under a policy that was issued to the grandmother of the Claimant’s daughter. Both the Claimant and the daughter were living with the grandmother at the time of the accident.

The grandmother was the only named insured on the policy. The Claimant and the grandmother were not related by blood, marriage, or adoption.

The Claimant argued that her daughter was a named insured because she was listed as an “operator” on the declarations page for the applicable policy and that, therefore, the Claimant also qualified as an insured under that policy.

The Claimant additionally argued that the limitation of UIM coverage to the named insured and family members of the named insured, as defined by the policy, violated the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law and the related stacking provisions. In this case, the Claimant invoked the case of Gallagher v. Geico and its precedent.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the Claimant’s arguments. The Third Circuit confirmed that the Claimant did not qualify as an insured under the policy and that, therefore, no UIM benefits were owed to the Claimant.

The Court noted that the issue in this case was not whether the named insured had waived UIM benefits.  Rather, the issue, and the finding, was that the Plaintiff was simply not a "covered" person under the terms of the policy.   

Moreover, the court found that, since the Claimant was not even an insured under the policy, no duty of good faith was owed to her by the carrier.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Christopher W. Woodward of the Camphill office of Marshall Dennehey for bringing this case to my attention.

Western District Federal Court of Pennsylvania Addresses Products Liability Claims In a Prescription Medical Device Litigation

In the case of Blair v. Abbvie, Inc., No. 2:23-CV-1871 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2025 Ranjan, J.), the court granted a Motion to Dismiss in a prescription medical device litigation.

In this decision, the Western Federal District Court confirmed that Pennsylvania’s across-the-board application of the Restatement §402A, comment k, as precluding strict liability design defect claims, but not strict liability manufacturing defect claims.

The court also ruled that, similarly, given that the elements of implied warranty claims are identical to strict liability claims, the Plaintiff’s implied warranty claims were dismissed.

The court also ruled in this case that the manufacturing defect claims asseted by the Plaintiff were inadequately pled because the claims did not reveal either any specific problem with the device or how the device allegedly failed. The court noted that the availability of a malfunction theory manufacturing defect claim does not exclude excuse failure to plead the circumstances of the alleged malfunction.

The court also ruled that the negligent design and warning claims were inadequately pled because the Plaintiff did not identify the design defect, anything about the manufacturing process, or what information should have been given to his medical providers.

Based on these issues, the trial court granted the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Plaintiff's Claims For Tortious Interference with a Dead Body Kept Alive

In the case of McGee v. Bowser, No. 838 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Dec. 30, 2024 Olson, J., Sullivan, J., and Bender, J.)(Op. by Olson, J.), the Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court’s sustaining of Preliminary Objections in a case involving a Plaintiff’s decedent being moved from his original gravesite without consent.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff pled that the Defendant’s conspired to move the decedent from his original gravesite without consent or notice. The Plaintiff also alleged that the disinterment permit had been improperly granted.

Reviewing the claims before it, the appellate court ruled that the Plaintiff had indeed stated a valid claim for tortious interference with a dead body under the elements noted in the Restatement §868.

However, the court found that the Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim failed. The court noted that such a claim requires that a Plaintiff be present when the tort occurred.

However, the appellate court did allow the Plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim brought against the cemetery for breach of fiduciary duty to proceed given that that claim did not require a contemporaneous observation.

Relative to a civil conspiracy claim asserted by the Plaintiff, the court confirmed that a civil conspiracy claim is a derivative claim and that, given that some of the Plaintiff’s other substantive claims were reinstated, the civil conspiracy claim would likewise be allowed to proceed.

On the issue of the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, the appellate court noted that such damages are permitted on a lesser standard of outrageousness in cases involving the mistreatment of corpses.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of Image:  Photo by Scott Rodgerson on www.unsplash.com.