Need CLE Credits? Presenting At an Upcoming Seminar With Settlement Strategies and Tips

Will be presenting "Settlement Strategies & Tips 2024" for the Pennsylvania Bar Institute (PBI) via a Live Webcast on November 6, 2024 at 1 p.m. with other panelists. 

This two-hour long CLE is designed to provide the audience with tips from Mediators and Arbitrators from around the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to improve chances for success at such ADR proceedings.

The presenters are Daniel E. Cummins, Esq., Paul Oven, Esq., John Noble Esq., and Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie (ret.).

The program offers two substantive CLE credits.

Here is a LINK to the registration page for this CLE if you are interested.

Superior Court Addresses Venue Issues in a Case Originally Filed in Philadelphia

In a non-precedential decision in the case of Troseth v. Carson Helicopters Holdings Co., No. 249 EDA 2022 (Pa. Super. Oct. 8, 2024 Bowes, J., Olson, J., McLaughlin, J.) (Op. by Bowes, J.) (McLaughlin, J., dissenting), the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a trial court’s overruling of Preliminary Objections asserted by a Defendant on the issue of proper venue in Philadelphia County.

The court ruled that other Defendants having a contractual relationship with a Philadelphia-based company, largely prior to the filing of the subject lawsuit, was insufficient to support a finding of proper venue in Philadelphia County. The court emphasized that the question of proper venue is to be determined based upon the facts at issue at the point the lawsuit is filed.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court otherwise ruled that incidental dealings with a company, not involving a Defendant’s core business purposes, are insufficient to establish venue.

The court more specifically indicated that doing business with a Philadelphia County company does not amount to doing business in Philadelphia County if the obtained goods, services, or personnel are utilized elsewhere to further the Defendant’s business activities.

The court additionally ruled that venue as to a subsidiary does to automatically create proper venue relative to a parent corporation.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.  The Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Please Consider Supporting a Great Cause

 

Superior Court Finds That Jury Should Have Been Allowed To Consider Comparative Negligence Where Evidence Plaintiff's Alleged Excessive Speed Presented

In the case of Dailey v. Smith, No. 2024 Pa. Super. 235 (Pa. Super. Oct. 10, 2024 Collins, J., Stabile, J., and McLaughlin, J.) (Op. by Collins, J.) (McLaughlin, J. dissenting), the Superior Court reversed a trial court’s decision to remove comparative negligence issues from the jury's consideration in a motor vehicle accident case.

According to the Superior Court’s Opinion, in the trial below, Plaintiff admitted to speeding at the time of the accident.

As such, the appellate court found that the trial court had abused its discretion in removing the issue of Plaintiff’s comparative negligence from the jury’s consideration. The Superior Court noted that where there is evidence in a case that a Plaintiff was negligent and that the Plaintiff’s negligence may have caused the Plaintiff’s alleged injuries, such issues must be allowed to proceed to a jury.

The appellate court noted that speeding is not just mere negligence, but could be negligence per se.

The Superior Court additionally confirmed that causation and routine automobile accident negligence cases do not require expert testimony on the liability issues. In this case, neither side had an expert on the liability issues presented.

The appellate court noted that a vehicle speed could have affected both the time to avoid a collision and the forces involved in the collision.

The Superior Court noted that the jury in this case was incorrectly prevented from considering the causal effect of the Plaintiff’s speed. The appellate court noted that this evidence was not only important to the liability issues but also was intertwined with the damages issues as the evidence implicates whether, if at all, the speed of the Plaintiff’s vehicle contributed to the Plaintiff’s own injuries.

In the Dissenting Opinion, Judge McLaughlin asserted that the Plaintiff's speed should not have been considered because, even if the Plaintiff was speeding, although this does amount to negligence per se, there was no evidence to conclude that the accident would not have happened if the Plaintiff was not speeding and/or that there was no evidence that, if the Plaintiff was traveling slower, the Plaintiff's injuries would have been less.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Covid-19 Related Claims Against College Allowed to Proceed

In the case of Dantone v. Kings College, No. 3:23-CV-1365 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2024 Munley, J.), the court ruled that Pennsylvania’s prohibition against claims for educational malpractice did not bar the Plaintiff’s COVID-related claims against the Defendant university for converting from in-person to on-line education to the alleged detriment to the Plaintiff.

The court noted that the Plaintiff did not claim that the education was inadequate, but that an in-person college experience was essential to the enrollment bargain.

The court also allowed the Plaintiff to plead unjust enrichment claims at this initial stage of the litigation even though Pennsylvania precludes unjust enrichment claims between parties whose relationship is governed by either an express or implied contract.  The court noted that, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a Plaintiff is entitled to plead in the alternative.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reverses and Rules in Favor of Insurance Carrier in Covid-19 Business Interruption Coverage Case

In the case of Ungarean v. CNA, No. 12 WAP 2023 (Pa. Sept. 26, 2024) (Op. by Brobson, J.), the court addressed issues regarding business interruption coverage in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

This case involved a class action that was led by a dental practice which had purchased a commercial property insurance policy from an insurance company, which policy was intended to cover business-related losses.

After the court mandated closures as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the insured filed a claim under the policy, which was denied by the insurance company on the grounds that there was no physical damage to the property.

The trial court had granted summary judgment in favor of the insureds. The trial court had interpreted the policy language to include loss of use of the property as a form of “direct physical loss.”

That trial court decision was affirmed by the Superior Court who also found the policy language at issue was ambiguous and should be construed in favor of the insured.

However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the policy language was unambiguous and required a physical alteration to the insured’s property for the coverage to apply.

The court ruled that the economic losses sustained by the insured due to the government shutdown did not meet this requirement.

As such, the Supreme Court ruled that the insured was not entitled to coverage under the policy. The case was remanded to the Superior Court with instructions for summary judgment to be entered in favor of the insurance company.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Scott B. Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this case to my attention.

Federal District Court Confirms that Fraudulent Misjoinder Doctrine Not Adopted in Third Circuit Relative to Remand Analysis

In the case of Ashworth v. Eurofins Donor & Product Testing, Inc., No. 23-1958 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2024 Schmehl, J.), the court granted a Motion to Remand and denied a Motion to Dismiss. In this case, the Plaintiff brought products liability claims against a diverse product manufacturer Defendant and medical malpractice claims against a non-diverse implantation surgeon.

The court ruled that remand was appropriate because the doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder is not recognized in the Third Circuit Court. The court noted that the elements of the doctrine were too unsettled to be adopted in this federal court.

As such, the Court ultimately ruled that a remand of this matter to the state court was proper.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.