Judge Linhardt of Lycoming County Rules that Allegations of Recklessness Must Be Supported By Facts Pled in the Complaint

In the case of Charles v. Martin, No. CV25-00, 974 (C.P. Lyc. Co. Dec. 12, 2025 Linhardt, J.), Judge Eric R. Linhardt of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas overruled a Defendant-driver’s Preliminary Objections against allegations of recklessness in a motor vehicle accident case in a matter in which intoxication on the part of the Defendant-driver was alleged.

Notably, in his decision, Judge Linhardt held that, while allegations of recklessness could be pled generally, a plaintiff still also has to plead facts in the Complaint to support such a claim.   

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a fatal motor vehicle accident during which it was alleged that the Defendant-driver crossed the center line and was involved in a head-on collision with the decedent’s vehicle.  As noted, included in the Complaint were allegations that the Defendant-driver was intoxicated and under the influence of a controlled substance at the time of the incident.

After the Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging, in part, that the Defendant driver was negligent, careless and reckless, the Defendant-driver filed Preliminary Objections for a variety of reasons. In part, the Defendant asserted that the Complaint contained non-specific allegations of recklessness which should be stricken or dismissed. The Defendant also requested that the Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages also be stricken or dismissed.

After reviewing the current status of Pennsylvania law regarding the pleading of recklessness allegations and claim for punitive damages, the court noted that, while Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state which requires a Plaintiff to plead the material facts upon which a cause of action is based, notwithstanding this rule, allegations regarding conditions of a tortfeasor’s mind may be alleged generally.

However, in his decision, even after referring to the Superior Court's decision in the case of Monroe v. CBH2O, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 798-99 (Pa. Super. 2022), Judge Linhardt noted that the exception to the general rules of pleading permitting a party’s state of mind to be pled generally does not dispense with the requirement that material facts constituting the conduct of a Defendant must also still be pled. See Op. at 7 citing Ammlung v. City of Chester, 302 A.2d 491, 497-98 (Pa. Super. 1973).

Judge Eric R. Linhardt
Lycoming Co.

Accordingly, Judge Linhardt held that, although a Plaintiff may generally allege that the Defendant- driver acted recklessly, the Plaintiff still “must allege sufficient material facts to support their general allegation and, if the material facts proposed in their Complaint operate to disprove their allegations of recklessness, those allegations must be dismissed.” See Op. at 7 citing with see, e.g. signal, Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 87 A.3d 1014, 1025-26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

In this case, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged that the Defendant acted recklessly because he operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated and under the influence of a controlled substance. The Complaint also alleged a number of ways in which the Defendant was reckless by violating several provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code.

Judge Linhardt pointed to case law confirming that the operation of a vehicle while under the influence is sufficient to support allegations that a Defendant driver acted recklessly and may be exposed to an award of punitive damages.

Accordingly, the court found that the Plaintiff had sufficiently pled their allegations of recklessness such that the Preliminary Objections were overruled. 

Judge Linhardt ended his decision by noting that, should facts emerge during discovery calling the Plaintiff’s allegations into question, the Defendant had the right to file an appropriate Motion.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 8, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Olia Danilevich on www.pexels.com.

Summary Judgment Granted Due to Lack of Actual or Constructive Notice of a Spill

In the case of Donahue v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. 2:24-68 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025 Dodge, M.J.), the court granted summary judgment in a slip and fall case.

The court ruled that the mere existence of an allegedly harmful condition or the mere happening of an accident is not evidence of negligence nor does it create a presumption of negligence.

In this matter, the court confirmed that the Plaintiff did not have any evidence of any actual notice on the part of the Defendant of the alleged spill.

The court additionally found that evidence of seven (7) incidents over the previous five (5) years in other areas of the store were insufficient to impute knowledge on the part of the Defendant.

The court also noted that the Plaintiff failed to present any evidence as to the amount of time that the alleged spill existed.

Without such evidence, the court noted that a claim of constructive notice cannot be supported. The court also noted that constructive notice cannot be shown by a negative inference.

Any speculation about how long the alleged condition may have existed before the start of the surveillance video available was insufficient.

The court also held that liability cannot be based on the Defendant’s failure to adhere to its own inspection policies or that its inspection policies were generally inadequate. Rather, there may be a duty of care before there can be a breach.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Eva Bronzini on www.pexels.com.

Heavy Reading: Summary Judgment Recommended in Case Where Plaintiff Hit By Books He Accidentally Pulled From Shop Shelf

In the case Pidich v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:24-CV-1848 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2025 Bloom, M.J.), the court recommended the entry of summary judgment.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was reaching up to try to get a book out of a box on a top shelf.  The book was wedged in the box tightly with other books.  The Plaintiff testified that he "pulled really hard" and the Plaintiff was then hit by multiple falling books.

This all occurred in an aisle where there was a sign that directed customers to "[a]sk for assistance with items on the top shelf."  

In this matter, Federal Magistrate Judge Bloom found that the Plaintiff violated an explicit warning to ask for assistance for items on the top shelf. As such, the court found that the evidence established that the Plaintiff caused his own injuries when the item he pulled off the top shelf fell upon him.

The court additionally noted that, assuming that the item was not, in fact, on the top shelf, then the Plaintiff had no evidence to show that the Defendant had notice of an allegedly dangerous condition.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Becca Correia on www.pexels.com.

ARTICLE: Preserving Confidentiality When Using AI Platforms

 The below article of written by myself and my son, Michael appeared in the January 22, 2026 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.

Michael is a Computer Science major focusing on Artificial Intelligence studies at Ursinus College outside of Philadelphia, PA. He provided the insight on the computer science aspects of the article and I focused on the legal points included in the article.

Expert Opinion/Legal Ethics and Attorney Discipline

Preserving Confidentiality When Using AI Platforms

By

Daniel E. Cummins & Michael J. Cummins

As the use of artificial intelligence (AI) rises in the practice of law, so does the concern for preserving confidentiality. Whether it be preserving one’s own client’s confidentiality as required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Responsibility, or preserving the confidentiality of records related to an opposing party under the requirements of HIPAA, counsel must be careful.

This is particularly so with the rising trend of automation through the use of AI platforms for completing tasks such as streamlining review and summarization of documents, including medical records, in the practice of law. In this day in age, lawyers can upload documents to an AI platform and have the platform review the records and create a summary of the same. In fact, some insurance carriers are beginning to mandate that their defense counsel do so. This practice raises ethical and confidentiality concerns.

The Requirement of Confidentiality

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, attorneys are required to protect the confidentiality of certain information that they are handling. Under Rule 1.6, titled “Confidentiality of Information,” it is provided, in pertinent part, that “a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation … .”

The commentary to the rule notes that the rule of confidentiality “contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.” With confidentiality, a client is encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer on the subject matter of the representation. The rule also emphasizes that the lawyer may not disclose confidential information provided to the lawyer by the client except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or some other pertinent law.

As such, utilizing an AI platform that results in the inadvertent disclosure of a client’s private information could land an attorney in hot water with an unforgiving Disciplinary Board.


HIPAA Violations and Enforcement

In addition to attorneys needing to protect the private information of their own clients, lawyers also have to be careful with the confidential information of opposing parties, such as medical records of an opposing party.

HIPAA requires both physical and digital safeguards for patient data. In addition to mandating that medical files should not be left unattended in public areas, the law also requires that private health information must be stored digitally in a secured fashion that prevents unauthorized viewing.

The requirement of keeping an opposing party’s medical records private is mandated by HIPAA. Under the relevant law, failure to comply with HIPAA can result in civil and criminal penalties.

If a HIPAA complaint describes an action that could be a violation of the criminal provisions of HIPAA, the office for civil rights under the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services may refer the complaint to the Department of Justice for an investigation.

Criminal charges typically only arise where an individual “knowingly” obtains and/or discloses individually identifiable confidential health information. The question of whether such criminal penalties could be extended to lawyers handling medical records in a civil litigation matter is subject to dispute. The HIPAA law appears to limit criminal penalties to certain entities within the health care field. Yet, HIPAA also covers third parties that handle private health information on behalf of covered entities, including law firms assisting with medical-related legal matters.

In terms of any noncompliance that may result in the imposition of civil money penalties, the Secretary of the Health and Human Services Department has the discretion in determining the amount of the penalty based upon the nature and extent of the violation and the nature and the extent of the harm resulting from the violation. Civil penalties can range from $100 to $50,000 per violation, with additional penalties for repeat violations.

Based upon the stiff HIPAA penalties that can result from violating client confidentiality or the privacy of third parties, attorneys must be very careful in the use of artificial intelligence when using such platforms to review and summarize medical records and other private information that may arise in a civil litigation matter.


Local AI versus Third-Party AI

When utilizing an AI chatbot, such as Chat-GPT or Google’s Gemini, it may appear that it is entirely personalized and private to yourself. In reality, when utilizing any form of cloud based large-language models (LLM), there is a high risk that the company that provides the model will save, maintain, and even train future models based upon the data the user inputs.

In other words, if you provide a document for Chat-GPT to summarize or prompt a question, you are giving permission for OpenAI, the company that developed and owns Chat-GPT, to save and use that document or question for future training purposes. In addition to utilizing the information or documentation to train the model, this also leaves your documents vulnerable in the case of a data breach of the model provider.

However, this does not mean that this technology is completely useless. If you want to utilize an AI tool without the potential data security risks, you can locally host one within your organization.


How to Create Your Own Safe AI Platform

Using a designated device or server, you can download a model (there are free or pay-to-use options), design an interface for your organization, and run the model locally.

Once the model is running within your network, it will not even require an internet connection, meaning that all data and documents provided to the model will remain safely within your control within your office.

In order to take advantage of such a strategy, a law firm would likely need to hire an AI consultant company or professional to set up, design, and secure the system within one’s own office. There are also options to enter enterprise agreements with companies like OpenAI to establish a business relationship which does not allow them to retain the user input and data for training purposes.


Conclusion

While the use of AI platforms to automate certain tasks in a law office, such as the review and summarization of medical records, provides certain challenges, those challenges are not insurmountable.

Certain vendors who subpoena medical records for law firms have begun to provide AI generated summaries of medical records. Steps should be taken by law firms to ensure that these vendors are utilizing closed AI platforms that protect the confidentiality of the documents.

For those law firms that wish to begin to utilize AI platforms in-house, IT professionals can be retained to assist those firms in creating AI programs that prevent the information being handled from being disclosed outside of the office.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing attorney at Cummins Law where he focuses his practice on motor vehicle and trucking liability cases, products liability matters, and premises liability cases. He also serves as a mediator for the Federal Middle District Court and for Cummins Mediation. He is additionally the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog at www.TortTalk.com. 

Michael Cummins, Daniel's son, is a computer science and philosophy major at Ursinus College with a focus on researching artificial intelligence.




Reprinted with permission from the January 22, 2026 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2026 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Federal Court Addresses Liability of Both Renters of Vehicles and Out-of-Possession Landlords Under Dram Shop Act

In the case of Stopko v. Cobbs, No. 2:25-CV-00074-CB (W.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2025 Bissoon, J.), the court addressed the issue of the liability of renters of cars and issues surrounding the Dram Shop statute.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant rented a vehicle from a Co-Defendant company. T

The Plaintiff alleged that the Co-Defendant company did not perform any background check on the Defendant driver or review the Defendant driver’s driver’s history before renting him the vehicle. The Plaintiff alleged that, if the rental company had done so, they would have discovered that the Defendant driver should not have been entrusted with the rental vehicle.

The Plaintiff further alleged that, on the date of the accident, the Defendant driver went to a bar where he was allegedly served alcohol, including allegedly being served after he was allegedly visibly intoxicated.

The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant driver then got into the vehicle that he had rented from the rental company and drove it, while intoxicated, the wrong way on the roadway, colliding in a head-on fashion with the Plaintiff.

In this decision, the court was addressing Motions to Dismiss filed by the Defendants with respect to allegations of negligence against the rental car company and with respect to the Defendant owners of the bar where the Defendant driver was drinking on the night of the accident.

The court granted the rental car company’s Motion to Dismiss after finding that the Plaintiff’s allegations were both factually and legally insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The court noted that the Plaintiff’s entire theory of liability rested on the allegation that the rental car company should have performed a background check on the Defendant driver or investigated his driver’s history before renting him the vehicle. The Plaintiff alleged that, due to these failures, the Defendant rental car company was negligent in entrusting the driver with the vehicle.

The court found that the Plaintiff had only pled conclusory statements regarding the Defendant driver’s driver’s history in support of these allegations. The court noted that no facts regarding the actual driver’s history appeared anywhere in the Complaint. The court held that, without more, the Plaintiff had failed to plead sufficient facts to support the claim stated.

The court otherwise noted that lessors of vehicles are not liable for a lessee’s negligent driving, unless the lessor was negligent in leasing or renting the vehicle to a person they had reason to know was incompetent to drive the vehicle. 

The court also noted that there was no basis under Pennsylvania law to interpret this standard to impose a duty on rental car companies to investigate a driver’s history before renting a vehicle to them.

The court also noted that other Pennsylvania courts have only considered lessors liable for the harm caused by a lessee’s intoxicated driving when the lessee was intoxicated at the time the vehicle was entrusted to the driver, or where the lessor had reason to know that the driver would later drink and drive. Such was not the case under the facts presented in this matter.

The court noted that, where lessees or drivers unexpectedly become intoxicated later unbeknownst to the lessor or owner of the vehicle, other courts had found that the owners and/or lessors are not liable for the injuries caused by the driver.

Relative to the separate claims against the liquor license holder for the bar and the owner of the bar, the court found that there was no basis in Pennsylvania law to support and argument by the Plaintiff that there is a duty on such Defendants, that is, bars and taverns, to prevent visibly intoxicated patrons from leaving the establishment without safe transportation, to offer alternative transportation, or to contact friends or family of the intoxicated customer. 

This court noted that there was no Pennsylvania or federal appellate court decisions in the Third Circuit that appeared to have directly addressed this issue. However, the court pointed to an unreported Eastern District court decision in which that court found that there was no basis in Pennsylvania law to impose a duty on an alcohol licensee or its agents to prevent an intoxicated patron from operating a motor vehicle.

Relative to the separate argument by the Defendants that all of the Plaintiff’s common law negligence claims should be dismissed because the Pennsylvania Dram Shop Act restricts liability for liquor licensees only to those duties imposed by the Act, the court stated that there was a lack of consensus among the Pennsylvania courts on the exclusivity of the Act. As such, this court attempted to anticipate how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule if faced with this issue.

In the end, this court noted that the Dram Shop Act imposes a statutorily created duty on liquor licensees not to sell alcohol to visibly intoxicated customers and that the breach of such a duty constitutes negligence per say under the Act. This court noted that, once this duty is breached, “it does not stand to reason that [the Dram Shop Act] should shield licensees from all derivative common law liability for their actions in breaching it, including the negligent supervision that led to the breach.” See Op. at 12. Accordingly, the court allowed the Plaintiff’s common law negligence claim to proceed.

This court otherwise ruled that there was support under Pennsylvania law to also allow a claim against a landlord to go forward under an allegation that the landlord may be liable for injuries caused by their tenants’ intoxicated business invitees when the landlord knew, at the time of the lease, that the tenant would sell alcohol on the property, and later, that tenant was doing so improperly. As such, the court in this case allowed the claims against the landlord Defendant to proceed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the law firm of Summers McDonnell Hudock Guthrie & Rauch P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Brett Jordan on www.pexels.com.

Premises Liability Plaintiff Tripped Up By Lack of Medical Expert

In the case of Montanez-Fontanez v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, No. 2023-C-0880 (C.P. Lehigh Co. Oct. 16, 2025 Reichley, J.), the court granted summary judgment due to a Plaintiff’s failure to produce expert evidence on the issue of causation with respect to the Plaintiff’s injuries that resulted from a fall down event.

In this matter, the Plaintiff was attending a physical therapy appointment to undergo therapy for her knee which had undergone a replacement surgery a month before.  As the Plaintiff was leaving the facility, she fell.

During the course of the matter, the defense filed a motion in limine and secured a Court Order holding that the Plaintiff's treating medical providers would be limited to the opinions noted in their office notes and were precluded from offering any opinions on causation.

The defense then followed up with a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the Plaintiff had not secured and produced an expert opinion on the causation of her alleged injuries.   

The Court noted that, while the Plaintiff’s injuries were immediate and of the type that could be expected to result from the nature of the alleged accident, the Plaintiff’s failure to produce expert causation evidence was still fatal. The Court ruled that, in this matter, unlike other cases that hold that causation may be sufficiently obvious such that no expert testimony is necessary, this Plaintiff was not in good health and had prior medical issues with regards to the same parts of her body before the subject incident.

As such, the Court noted that the facts in this matter that surrounded the Plaintiff’s injuries were not so apparent that a lay person on a jury could diagnose the cause of those injuries as being solely from the Plaintiff’s alleged incident.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of imaging: Photo by Online Marketing on www.unsplash.com.

Application of Sidewalk Exception to Governmental Immunity Statute Defeats Summary Judgment Motion

Jim Thorpe, PA

In the case of Hontz v. McFarland, No. 22-CV-2524 (C.P. Carbon Co. Dec. 5, 2025 Matika, J.), the trial court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Borough of Jim Thorpe after determining that the Borough was not immune from liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff tripped and fell over the base of a broken pole that was affixed to a sidewalk. Two days prior to the Plaintiff’s trip and fall, there was a motor vehicle accident during which a vehicle collided with the metal pole and broke it. This left a base of the sign protruding out of the sidewalk surface by 5-6 inches. 

In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff asserted that it was permitted to proceed against the Borough under the sidewalk exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. That exception is found at 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542(b)(7).

Here, the court found that the Borough was not permitted to raise the defense of governmental immunity where the dangerous condition at issue was “of” the sidewalk where the defect was caused by the Borough’s failure after due notice to properly maintain or to repair the defect in question.

As such, the court denied the Borough’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert” www.Law.com (Jan. 21, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Mariya E. on www.pexels.com.