Civil Trial Bifurcated Where Parties Did Not Advise Court of Proper Time Needed To Complete Trial

In the case of Major v. Five Start Equipment, Inc., No. 2020-CV-3550 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Oct. 28, 2024 Nealon, J.), the court addressed a Motion to Bifurcate the liability issues from the damages issues at the trial of a personal injury action involving a motor vehicle accident during which a pedestrian was struck.

In this decision, the court noted that it was the parties' plan to present numerous lay witnesses and expert witnesses. The court ultimately ruled that the liability and damages portions of this action would be split given that there would not be enough time in the allotted trial window in order to hear from all of the witnesses.  This was due, in part, to the parties not originally requesting sufficient within which to complete the trial when the issue of the anticipated length of the trial previously came up at a pre-trial conference.

The court noted that the jury selected for the trial would only decide the issues of liability. If that first jury entered a finding in favor of the Plaintiff, a separate jury would then be called to determine the amount of compensatory damages.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Chester County Court Addresses Post-Koken Issues of Note

Levels of Coverage in Question

In the case of Crook v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 2014-00867-TT (C.P. Chester Co. June 14, 2024 Binder, J.), the court addressed various Preliminary Objections filed by a carrier in a Post-Koken uninsured (UM) motorist litigation.

Among the issues raised by the second level UIM carrier defendant in this case involving two (2) levels of UIM coverage was an argument that the claim against the second level UIM carrier was premature given that it was not clear as to whether or not the Plaintiff’s alleged damages would be fully covered by the first level of UM coverage.

The court emphasized that, while the second level of UM carrier was entitled to a credit for the policy limits under the first level UIM coverage, the Plaintiff was not required to exhaust the first level of UM coverage before pursuing the secondary coverage available from the second level UM carrier.

The court also addressed the separate issue of whether the Plaintiff properly also included a claim against the uninsured tortfeasor in this matter and whether that was an improper joinder.

The court reviewed cases on this issue involving permissive joinder of tort and UIM claims under Pa. R.C.P. 2229 and found that the same were indeed permitted. In this regards, Judge Binder elected to follow the approach enunciated by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas in the case of Bingham v. Poswistilo, 24 Pa. D. & C. 5th 17 (C.P. Lacka. Co. 2011 Nealon, J.) and allowed the claims to proceed into discovery under the same caption.

Accordingly, the court overruled the objections to Joinder at this pre-trial stage of the case without prejudice to the rights of the parties to request a bifurcation at the trial of the tort and the UIM claims and/or to otherwise request limits on the disclosure of the identity or existence of insurance coverage at trial.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert” (Nov. 6, 2024).

What Constitues Recklessness in Terms of Operators of Emergency Vehicles?

In the case of Piotrowski v. Department of Health, No. 1232 C.D. 2023 (Pa. Cmwlth. Oct 24, 2024 Ceisler, J., Dumas, J., and Leavitt, S.J.) (Op. by Leavitt, S.J.), the court reviewed any Petition for an Adjudication of the Department of Health that suspended the Petitioner’s license as an emergency medical services provider for operating an ambulance in a reckless manner.

Relative to the suspension, the health department rejected the proposed adjuciation of its hearing officer that the Petitioner’s operation of an ambulance en route to an emergency in excess of the posted speed limit did not, ipso facto, constitute reckless conduct.

At issue on appeal was the interpretation and application of the term “reckless” as set forth in §8121(a)(6) of the Emergency Medical Services System Act (EMS Act), 35 Pa. C.S.A. §8121(a)(6).

After a review of the matter, the Commwealth Court reversed the health department’s adjudication.

In its Opinion, the Commonwealth Court began with a review of the Vehicle Code, which, under 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3105, grants special privileges to drivers of emergency vehicles responding to an emergency call.

The court also referred to the other provisions of the Vehicle Code that relate to vehicle speed and safety. The court noted that 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3736 prohibits reckless driving.

The court then turned to the EMS Act and noted that the Act sets forth numerous grounds for the suspension or revocation of an EMS provider’s certification. Under 35 Pa. C.S.A. §8121(a)(6), the Department of Health is authorized to discipline an EMS provider relative to the “operation of an emergency vehicle in a reckless manner….”

In this case, the Petitioner was charged with operating his ambulance in a reckless manner.

The issue before the court centered over a proper definition for the word “reckless” in this context.

The court turned to the rules of statutory construction. The court noted that the word “reckless” is not defined in the EMS Act. This allowed the court to consider dictionary sources. The court also referred to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for guidance.

In the end, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that “for a person’s conduct to be reckless,” there must be “conscious” or “deliberate” indifference to the risk of causing harm to others. In this regard, the court cited to Black’s Law Dictionary.

In this case, the court noted that the hearing officer improperly construed reckless as careless, which only implicated absent-mindedness or negligence and overlooked the conscious or deliberate intent of required in order to prove recklessness as a matter of law.

Turning the facts of the case, the Petitioner was arguing that the deputy secretary erred in concluding that he violated the EMS Act.

The court noted that the evidence showed that the Petitioner drove the ambulance in excess of the posted speed limit. However, the Petitioner also noted that he was on his way to an emergency with his lights and sirens activated. There is also evidence that the ambulance crew was responding to a call of a drug overdose, making time of the essence.

The Commonwealth Court noted that there was no evidence presented that the Petitioner’s excessive speed made the accident highly probable. Rather, relative to the underlying accident at issue, the court noted that it was the decedent’s failure to stop at a posted stop sign that caused the accident.

In the end, the court noted that exceeding the speed limit alone cannot be said to be reckless conduct in this context. Finding that the Petitioner’s actions in this case did not rise to the level of recklessness, but rather showed care for the safety of others, including a victim of a drug overdose, the court found that the health department did not establish that the Petitioner had violated the EMS Act.

It is noted, however, that, although the court found that the ambulance driver did not exhibit recklessness in driving over the speed limit in the context of this case, in footnote 12 of the Opinion on page 21 of the Opinion, the court noted that there may be cases where the rate of speed of an ambulance could constitute recklessness. 

The court noted that an example of an ambulance crew driving an ambulance over the speed limit with the lights and sirens activated in order to get to a party, as opposed to a dispatch emergency, could constitute a violation of the EMS Act. 

In that footnote, the court also noted that an accident, or lack thereof, is not required to prove or disprove reckless.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph T. Healey of the Kingston, PA office of Burns White for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Camilo Jiminez on www.unsplash.com.

Court Rules That Defense Can Challenge Life Expectancy With Evidence of Plaintiff's Alcohol Abuse

In the case of Mackey v. Chipotle, No. 2:23-cv-00519-GAM (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2024 McHugh, J.), the court addressed the admissibility of a Plaintiff’s history of alcohol consumption as part of a defense to a Plaintiff’s future economic damages claims in a personal injury matter.

This case arose out of a trip and fall event.

Before the court was a motion by the Plaintiff to preclude any introduction of the Plaintiff’s history of alcohol consumption. The Plaintiff was asserting that this evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial.

The Defendant contended that the Plaintiff’s consumption was relevant to the Plaintiff’s projected life expectancy and that the evidence also provided an explanation for a subsequent fall unrelated to the Plaintiff’s physical limitations.

After reviewing the evidence presented and weighing the probative value against the prejudicial impact of that evidence as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the court concluded that the Plaintiff’s history of alcohol consumption was admissible as to the Plaintiff’s evidence of his life expectancy, but inadmissible for any other purpose. 

The court noted that, because life expectancy is the single most critical determinant of the estimated future damages, factors that may influence one’s life expectancy are “highly relevant” under Rules of Evidence.

While noting that evidence of alcohol consumption can create a risk of unfair prejudice under the Rules of Relevance, the court found that the evidence in this context did not substantially outweigh the highly probative value that the evidence of alcohol consumption had on the Plaintiff’s life expectancy and future damages. 

Accordingly, the evidence of Plaintiff’s alcohol consumption, which court to the Opinion was significant on a daily basis, was allowed to be introduced for the jury’s assessment in determining life expectancy. The court noted that it would provide a cautionary instruction with the intent of attempting to limiting any possible prejudice.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “‘Well-Documented’ Medical Records of Alcohol Consumption Rates Maybe Considered For Life Expectancy Costs, Judge Finds.” By Riley Brennan. Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Oct. 18, 2024).

Source of image:  Photo by Clam Lo from www.pexels.com.

Federal Court Finds that Lyft Driver Able to Pursue Claim That Driver Was Owed Uninsured Motorist Coverage From Lyft

In the case of Ahtasham v. Lyft, Inc., No. 2:24-CV-01673-GJP (E.D. Pa. Pappert, J.), the Eastern District Federal Court ruled in favor with a Lyft driver in that driver’s contractual dispute with Lyft over the availability of $1million dollars in uninsured motorist coverage.

According to the Opinion, Lyft filed a Motion to Dismiss a lawsuit brought by a Lyft driver who claimed that he was entitled to uninsured motorist coverage following a motor vehicle accident.

The court determined that the terms of service agreement and a promise in a driver guidebook was a binding contract between Lyft and one of its drivers who was the Plaintiff at issue in this case.

According to the Opinion, the guidebook promised Lyft drivers that “‘we’ve got you with our $1million insurance policy,’” and that “‘there are four coverages included in our insurance policy.’” including underinsured/uninsured (UM/UIM motorist coverage).

In the Opinion, it was indicated that the Plaintiff claimed he was denied coverage by the UM carrier after he was in an accident with an uninsured driver. Coverage was denied even though Lyft previously allegedly informed the Plaintiff that he and his car would be insured.

According to the Opinion, prior to the accident, Lyft had waived the UM/UIM coverage for its Pennsylvania drivers, without informing them.

The Plaintiff filed suit against Lyst seeking entitlement to uninsured motorist benefits, as well as claims of breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, violations of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, and negligent misrepresentation.

In his Complaint, the Plaintiff additionally sought a declaratory judgment that Lyft had a duty to provide him with up to $1 million dollars in uninsured motorist coverage.

The breach of contract claim revolved around the parties’ alleged agreement and the driver guidebook, which Lyft argued was not part of its contract with the Plaintiff.

The court concluded that the agreement’s interpretation, including whether it incorporated references to the guidebook’s UM/UIM coverage promise, was governed by California law as that was were Lyft maintained its principle place of business.

The Plaintiff claimed that the driver’s agreement and the guidebook, when considered together, constituted his contract with Lyft that he relied upon. The Plaintiff more specifically asserted that he relied upon the provision and the guidebook that “in the event of an accident…our UM/UIM coverage will apply up to $1million per accident.”

Lyft attempted to argue that this representation was barred as a matter of law by the parol evidence rule. 

The court found that the parol evidence rule did not serve to exclude evidence that is offered to explain any ambiguity or to otherwise assist in the interpretation of the terms of an alleged agreement. 

The court noted that, where it is decided by the court that the language of a contract is ambiguous or fairly susceptible of more than one interpretation, extrinsic evidence relevant to prove any of the possible meanings is admissible to assist in the determination of the term of the contract. 

The court noted that, in this matter, the agreement contained to provisions that indicated that the guidebooks promised to provide Lyft drivers with uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage was part of the contractual relationship between the drivers and the company.

Overall, the court found that the Plaintiff’s allegations that Lyft breached the guidebook’s clear promise of UM/UIM coverage was sufficient to plausibly state a claim for breach of contract.

The court also rejected arguments by Lyft that a disclaimer in the guidebook prevented the guidebook from being interpreted as it was being interpreted by the court.

In the end, the federal court judge from the Eastern District denied Lyft’s Motion to Dismiss the lawsuit brought by this Lyft driver who claims that he is entitled to uninsured motorist coverage under a Lyft Insurance policy.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney Jimmy Kunnell of the Feasterville-Trevose, PA law firm of Kunnell Law for bringing this case to my attention.


See also: Article “Federal Judge Sized With Lyft Driver In Contractual Dispute Over $1M Uninsured Motorist Coverage” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Sept. 13, 2024).

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Trial Court Bucks Trend and Strikes Allegations of Recklessness and Punitive Damages

In the case of Almonte v. Roaring Creek Egg Farms, LLC, No. 2019-CV-03731 (C.P. Luz. Co. Oct. 16, 2024 Pierantoni, J.), the court sustained various Defendants’ Preliminary Objections to a Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint against allegations of recklessness and claims for punitive damages.

This matter involved a personal injury claim arising out of a fall down event.

The court ruled that all allegations of recklessness and claims for punitive damages in the Second Amended Complaint were stricken without prejudice.  The Plaintiff was permitted to file an Amended Complaint.

No details were provided in the Order as to the rationale of the court in granting these Preliminary Objections.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Order may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Ryan McBride of the Scranton, PA office of the Weber Gallagher law firm for bringing this case to my attention.