Superior Court Finds That UIM Claim Fails Under Terms of an Umbrella Policy

In the case of Mathews v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 638 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Sept. 4, 2026 Stevens, P.J.E., Stabile, J., Lane, J.) (Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the issue of whether an umbrella policy applied to provide underinsured (UIM) motorist benefits to a Plaintiff.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a result of being hit by a car while crossing the street.  The Opinion noted that the driver involved was underinsured.

According to the Opinion, there was an insurance policy issued to the Plaintiff’s employer that entitled the Plaintiff to UM/UIM benefits.However, the Plaintiff was denied any excess benefits under his employer’s umbrella policy. 

The Plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract and for a declaratory judgment on the issue of UIM coverage under the umbrella policy.

The trial court had entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the umbrella carrier.  On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed.

The Superior Court noted that the plain and express terms of the umbrella policy, including exclusions, limited the umbrella coverage to third-party claims only.

The Superior Court rejected the Plaintiff’s efforts to argue that the policy language was ambiguous. The Plaintiff had attempted to argue that the umbrella policy contained an endorsement indicating that coverage for bodily injury would follow the terms of any underlying insurance.

However, as noted, other language in the umbrella policy specifically limited the umbrella insurance coverage to third party claims.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Pa. Super. Blog (pasuperblog.substack.com) by Attorney Jon Bruno of Bruno Litigation, LLC in Pittsburgh, PA.

Source of image:  Jean-Phillipe Delberghe on www.unsplash.com.
 

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Trial Court Denies Motion for Summary Judgment That Was Based on Traffic Controls Exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act

In the case of Haggerty v. City of Philadelphia, No. 230400850 (C.P. Phila. Co. May 27, 2026 Wright, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1926 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved an accident during which the decedent was operating a motorcycle southbound on Broad Street in Philadelphia when the tortfeasor Defendant exited a parking lot, crossed multiple lanes of traffic and attempted to reach the left-turn lanes on Broad Street and the collision occurred.

The Plaintiff filed suit against the city and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. Those Defendants joined in the tortfeasor driver and other Defendants.

After discovery was completed, the City of Philadelphia moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Plaintiff had failed to prove that it had notice of a dangerous traffic-control condition, failed to identify an appropriate remedial measure, and failed to show that PennDOT would accepted any proposed controls at the intersection.

Reviewing the case before it, the trial court found that the Plaintiff had produced enough evidence to create factual disputes relative to all of the arguments raised by the Defendant. The court also noted that the Plaintiff had produced expert evidence in support of the claims presented.

 The trial court asserted in its Rule 1925 Opinion that it properly denied the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this motor vehicle accident case because the Plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to create triable issues of fact under the traffic-control exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

As such, the trial court was requested the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s denial of the city’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 23, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Trev W. Adams on www.pexels.com.

Admissibility of Crimen Falsi Evidence

Here is another example of how an appellate court decision in a criminal case may have implications in a civil litigation matter.

In the case of Com. v. Gomery, Nos. 2562 EDA 2025 & 2563 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Aug. 27, 2026 Bowes, J., Olson, J. and McLaughlin, J.) (Op. by Bowes, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court outlined when a criminal conviction qualifies as crimen falsi under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 609.

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 609, evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime involving “dishonesty or false statement” may be admitted for purposes of attacking the witness’s credibility.

In its decision in the Gomery case, the Superior Court noted that a prior conviction qualifies as crimen falsi evidence “only if dishonesty or false statement is either: (1) an essential element of the offense; or (2) facilitated its commission.”

The Superior Court further stated that, in determining whether a prior conviction meets this test, “trial courts must address both the elemental aspects of the offense and the conduct of the individual who committed the crime[.]”

In this case, the criminal defendant was charged with attacking another individual.  The victim had a prior criminal history that the defendant wanted to cross-examine on.

The prior offense at issue was the witness's failure to register as a sex offender in violation of Pennsylvania law. The court ruled that, because such an offense may be committed through omission alone and because the underlying facts in this case confirmed that the witness had only engaged in omissive conduct, the prior conviction was found not to be admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Pa. Super. Blog By Jon Bruno of Bruno Litigation LLC in Pittsburgh, PA (Aug. 31, 2026 blog post).


Source of image:  Photo by Shox Art on www.pexels.com.

Western Federal District Court Holds That E-Commerce Platform (Such as Amazon.com or Wal-Mart.com) Cannot Be Held Liable for Defective Products

In the case of Rimel v. Alabama Janitorial & Paper Supply, LLC, No. 23-CV-2020 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2026 Stickman, J.), the Federal Western District Court of Pennsylvania addressed the novel issue of whether an e-commerce platform like Amazon or Wal-Mart may be held liable for injuries resulting to a plaintiff from the use of products manufactured and sold by third party vendors that use the platforms to sell their products.

In its Opinion the Rimel Court noted that neither the Third Circuit nor the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously ever decided the extent of liability, if any, that an e-commerce platform might have in a products liability action. See Op. at p. 7-8.

In this case, the Court addressed motions for summary judgment filed by various defendants in the matter.

The Plaintiff was a United Postal Service distribution center worker who suffered severe chemical burns when she picked up a bottle of Liquid Fire, which was a drain cleaner, and which was stuck on a conveyor belt.

The bottle of drain cleaner was purchased by a customer in Virigina on Walmart.com from a third-party seller and shipped from a third-party warehouse located in Illinois.

Plaintiff filed suit in product liability and negligence. The Plaintiff's product liability claims were dismissed earlier in the case.

Discovery on the remaining negligence claims confirmed that Walmart, as the e-commerce platform, never had possession of the bottle of Liquid Fire, that it was not the seller, and that Walmart played no role in the shipment of the bottle.

The Western Federal District Court granted summary judgment to various defendants, including Wal-mart.com as the e-commerce platform defendant.

In so ruling the Rimel Court stated that “the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has never directly addressed whether e-commerce platforms, such as Walmart or Amazon, may be liable for a plaintiff's injuries where, as here, a third-party vendor sells the goods on the website, but stores, packages and ships the products itself.” See Op. at p. 6.

After looking to other federal district courts decisions from around the country on this issue, the Court in Rimel held that Walmart had no duty to the plaintiff.

The Court more specifically stated that “[a]s a general matter, the Court holds that e-commerce platforms, like Walmart here (and Amazon [ ]), do not owe any duty of care relating to products sold by third-party vendors on their websites. See Op. at p. 11.

Rather, in this scenario, e-commerce platforms are viewed by the courts as not being a manufacturer, seller, or shipper of the product. Rather, the e-commerce platform is viewed as only being an online marketplace for third parties to conduct their business. See Op. at p. 11.

The Rimel Court otherwise also noted that "[u]nder Pennsylvania law ‘there is no duty to control the conduct of a third party to protect another from harm.’” See Op. at p. 12.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorneys Kenneth T. Newman and G. Richard Murphy of the Pittsburgh office of Thomas, Thomas & Hafer for bringing this case to my attention.


Source of image: Photo by Karola G on www.pexels.com.

Judge Best of Monroe County Allows Claims of Recklessness and Punitive Damages To Proceed in Commercial Vehicle Case

In the case of Maro v. Snook, No. 1805-CV-2025 (C.P. Monroe Co. June 15, 2026 Best, J.), Judge Patrick J. Best of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas overruled a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections challenging a Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages and challenging allegations of gross, wanton, willful, reckless, indifferent and outrageous behavior in a motor vehicle accident matter.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was stopped in his vehicle in a line of traffic in a construction zone when the Defendant rear-ended the Plaintiff’s vehicle. At the time of the accident, the Defendant was operating a commercial vehicle which was a van that was owned by the company Defendants.

In his Opinion, Judge Best began his discussion by confirming that Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state. 

The court noted that its review of the Plaintiff’s Complaint revealed at least twenty-five (25) separate acts and/or incidences of failure to act on the part of the Defendant, all of which allegedly constituted breaches of his duty of care owed to the Plaintiff relative to the rear-end accident. 

The court also noted that the Plaintiff had pled facts in support of allegations that the Defendant had violated various sections of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code including with regards to following too closely, exceeding the speed limit and driving in careless disregard for the safety of others.

Notably, the Plaintiff also alleged in this case that the Defendant was driving and operating a motor vehicle while using an interactive wireless communication device to send, read, or write a text-based communication while the vehicle was in motion in violation of provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code.

The court additionally emphasized the fact that the Plaintiff had alleged that the Defendant was driving a vehicle at an excessive speed within a construction zone. 

The court noted that other courts have ruled that such conduct can be wanton and reckless where a rear-end collision results. Moreover, in this case, the allegation was that the Defendant was traveling at an excessive speed, within a construction zone, while simultaneously texting. 

The court found that such factual allegations supported the claims of recklessness and the claims for punitive damages. 

Judge Patrick J. Best
Monroe County

Judge Best stated that the “conscious action of propelling a vehicle forward, foot on case pedal with eyes down and not on the road, is particularly egregious and extends beyond mere negligence” such that facts alleged in this regard support claims of punitive damages and recklessness.

The court in this case also found the Superior Court decision in the case of Monroe v. CBH2O LP, 286 A.3d 785, 800 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), in which that appellate court ruled that recklessness can be pled with reckless abandon in any case so long as the Complaint alleges a claim of negligence, as supporting the allowance of claims of recklessness in this case. Judge Best followed the trend of finding that, where negligence is alleged, recklessness may also be generally pled as a “condition of mind” under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b).

In the end, the court overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and allowed the claims for punitive damages to proceed against the Defendant driver as well as his Defendant employers.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 23, 2026).

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