Superior Court Affirms Philadelphia Trial Court's Decision to Slash $25 Million Punitive Damages Award in Trucking Accident Case

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Clemmons v. Lehr, No. 1426 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Feb. 27, 2026 Olson, J., Dubow, J., and Beck, J.)(Mem. Op. by Olson, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld a Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas decision to slash a $25 million dollar punitive damages award down to just $1 million dollars based on the “interests of justice and constitutional considerations.”

In its decision, the appellate court also found that questions remained regarding how much the Plaintiff should be awarded in this regard. The appellate court provided instructions to the trial court to re-evaluate its decision after finding that the trial court failed to consider all compensatory damages awarded, including for loss of consortium, when reviewing the validity of the punitive damages claim.

On appeal, the court noted that the current status of Pennsylvania law requires that, if a compensatory damages award includes a recovery for a claim of loss of consortium, the trial court must consider the entire compensatory award when assessing the ratio between the compensatory award and the punitive damages award entered by a jury.

In this case, a Philadelphia County jury returned an award of $26.2 million dollars, which included $25 million dollars in punitive damages, in a rear-end trucking accident case in which the Plaintiff claimed that he sustained injuries to his head, neck and back as a result.

On appeal, the Superior Court determined that the entry of punitive damages was warranted by the evidence presented but agreed with the trial court that the ratio between the punitive damages award and the compensatory damages award was unduly excessive. 

Pointing to the United States Supreme Court’s 2003 holding in the case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishment on a tortfeasor,” and that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.” 

Here, the Pennsylvania Superior Court determined that the decision to reduce the punitive damages award to $1 million dollars based upon a 2:1 multiplier was incorrect because the trial court had only considered the $500,000.00 in compensatory damages awarded to the injured party Plaintiff and improperly excluded the $700,000.00 loss of consortium damages that was awarded to the wife from the calculations. The court noted that, in committing this error, the trial court erroneously inflated the ratio of the punitive damages award awarded.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “In Case With Slashed $25M Verdict, Pa. Appeals Court Wades Into Constitutionality Of ‘Excessive” Punitive Awards,” By Riley Brennan The Legal Intelligencer (March 2, 2026).

Factual Issues on Question Presented Compel Superior Court To Quash Appeal Under the Collateral Order Doctrine

In the case of Hailu v. Giorgio Fresh Company, No. 2988 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super Feb. 25, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Panella, P.J.E., and Sullivan, J.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed an appeal under the collateral order doctrine in a third party claim arising out of a work injury.

More specifically, the Superior Court quashed an appeal from a trial court’s denial of summary judgment under which a Defendant had asserted worker’s compensation immunity under the borrowed employee doctrine.

The Defendant employer was arguing that, with respect to the Plaintiff’s work place accident, the Plaintiff, who had been hired as a temporary employee from a staffing company should be considered to be a “borrowed employee” and that, therefore, the Defendant employer was immune from suit under the provisions of the Worker’s Compensation Act, which provided for the exclusive remedies to injured parties for work place injuries.

After the trial court denied the Defendant’s Motion without an Opinion, the Defendant filed an appeal and asserted that the Order was a collateral order capable of being appealed under Pa. R.A.P. 313. The Defendant asserted that the issue of whether the Plaintiff was a borrowed employee was separable from the main cause of action and was too important to be denied immediate review given that the issues involved immunities afforded under the Worker’s Compensation Act.

The Superior Court disagreed. The Superior Court found that the Defendant’s appeal did not present a purely legal question, but rather a factual one regarding whether the Defendant employer had sufficient control over the Plaintiff employee’s work, which was central to the determination of whether the borrowed employee doctrine applied.

The Superior Court noted that the trial court had ruled that the evidence was insufficient to establish the borrowed employee doctrine such that there was an indication that further factual development was necessary at the lower court level.

The Superior Court ultimately concluded that the issue of whether the Plaintiff was a borrowed employee required a fact-based inquiry, which was not a suitable topic for collateral review of a matter on appeal. Accordingly, the Superior Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order of the trial court.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed with the Superior Court emphasizing that the collateral order doctrine must be narrowly applied in order to prevent the erosion of the final order rule regarding appeals.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 17, 2026).

Source of image: Photo by Jim Wilson on www.unsplash.com.

Plaintiffs Secure Split Decision on Statute of Limitations Issues in a Professional Negligence Case

In the case of Boyanowski v. Carl J. Babushko, CPA, P.C., No. 2021-CV-1975 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 12, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed a statute of limitation issue in a professional negligence claim filed by taxpayers against their former accountant and his employer for allegedly failing to timely prepare and file their individual and business tax returns.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs asserted causes of action for “professional negligence,” “negligence,” and “breach of contract.”

The court noted that, even when viewing the case in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs as required by the standard of review, the record shows that, for more than two (2) years prior to the commencement of the action, the Plaintiffs had actual or constructive knowledge that the accountant had failed to timely file their tax returns due to alleged accountant malpractice. Accordingly, the court dismissed the claims in professional negligence and negligence.

However, relative to the breach of contract claims, the court found that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the parties’ words and course of conduct created an enforceable contract under which the accountant and his employer allegedly agreed to timely file the Plaintiffs’ federal and state tax returns. As such, the Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the breach of contract claim was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Recha Oktaviani on www.unsplash.com.

U.S. Supreme Court Weighs In On a Pennsylvania Civil Litigation Matter

In the case of Galette v. NJ Transit, Nos. 24-1021, 24-1113 (U.S. March 4, 2026) (Op. by Sotomayor, J.), the United States Supreme Court ruled that New Jersey Transit is not entitled to interstate sovereign immunity. With this decision, the United States Supreme Court overruled the decision entered in the case by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The United States Supreme Court held that the New Jersey Transit Corp. was not an arm of the state. In so ruling, the United States Supreme Court recognized a state’s choice to create a legally separate entity from itself via a corporate form.

Given the finding that New Jersey Transit was not an arm of the state, the court ruled that interstate sovereign immunity did not apply.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “US Supreme Court Rules NJ Transit Is Not Entitled To Interstate Sovereign Immunity,” By Tristin Hoffman of The Legal Intelligencer (March 4, 2026).

Article: The Rise and Fall of The Gist of The Action Doctrine

Here is a LINK to the latest edition of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly which contains an article written by my son, Daniel E. Cummins, Jr. and myself entitled "The Rise and Fall of the Gist of the Action Doctrine." The article can be found on p. 118 of this edition.

My son, Daniel, is currently finishing up his second year at Virginia Law School where he is currently serving as one of the Articles Editors for the Virginia Law Review. He is set to work as a Summer Associate this summer with Cozen & O'Connor in their Philadelphia office. He is also looking forward to his clerkship with Federal Middle District Court Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr. after he graduates from law school next year.

As noted in the article, the gist of the action doctrine prevents plaintiffs from bringing both a breach of contract claim and a negligence claim based on an alleged breach of the same duty.

The article reviews the centuries of jurisprudence behind the gist of the action doctrine as compared to the recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions that call into question the continuing validity of the doctrine. The article also predicts further anticipated developments in the law going forward.

Daniel and I send thanks to Professor Emeritus Robert E. Rains of the Dickinson School of Law, who is the Editor of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly, for selecting this article for publication and for editing it into a better article.  We also thank Tina R. Schreiber for her editorial assistance on the article.



I also proudly note that I am referenced the first article listed in this edition. That article, written by Joel Fishman, Ph.D., M.L.S. and entitled "The Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly: A 10-Year History Volumes 87-96 (2016-2025)," references two past PBA Quarterly articles of mine on pages 80-81 as part of the history of this periodical. I thank Professor Rains for selecting those articles for publication as well.

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Court Rules Plaintiff Cannot Insert Into Written Settlement Agreement a Term That Was Not Contemplated in Previous Oral Settlement Agreement

In the case of Liberty Prop. Ltd. P’ship v. Kendall Heaton Assocs., Inc., No. 2947 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Feb. 27, 2026 Olson, J., Dubow, J. and Beck, J.) (Op. by Olson, J.), the Superior Court upheld and affirmed a trial court’s enforcement of a oral settlement agreement reached by the parties in a civil litigation matter.  

In this case, the Plaintiff sought to insert an additional term in an effort to restrict the scope of the written release after the oral settlement contemplated releasing all known and unknown claims.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of construction litigation.

The Plaintiff was a developer that had contracted with several parties, including the Defendant, for construction services.  During construction, the Plaintiff discovered design defects that lead to additional costs. After attempts to resolve these issues through a Mediation failed, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit for breach of contract and professional negligence.

During the course of the litigation, the parties reached a settlement during negotiations participated in by the Plaintiff’s in-house representatives, including an attorney, as well as outside counsel for the Plaintiff. Once that oral agreement to settlement was reached, the Defendant’s attorney confirmed the terms of that settlement via an email.  Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged the email as representing the Plaintiff's understanding of the agreement as well.

However, the Plaintiff later sought to exclude latent defects from the final written settlement agreement, which was a term that was not part of the original oral settlement agreement.

Thereafter, when the parties could not resolve their dispute over the terms of the settlement agreement, the Defendant filed a Motion to Enforce the original settlement agreement. The Plaintiff filed a cross-Motion requesting the court’s enforcement of the different version of the settlement that the Plaintiff desired. 

The trial court granted the Defendant’s Motion relative to the original oral settlement agreement and denied the Plaintiff’s Motion to seeking to change that agreement under a written settlement agreement.

The Superior Court found that the trial court had properly ruled that the parties had reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement, which was not contingent upon the confirmation of the terms in a written document. The court additionally found that the agreement included a mutual release of all known and unknown claims related to the construction project in exchange for the monetary settlement payment.

The appellate court otherwise determined that the Plaintiff’s attempt to alter the agreement in the written settlement agreement to exclude latent defects was an additional term that was not part of the original settlement agreement.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority decision may click this LINK.  The dissenting Opinion by Judge Dubow can be viewed HERE.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 17, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Radisson US on www.unsplash.com.