Plaintiff Found To Have Made Good Faith Efforts To Complete Service of Process in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Francis v. Xu, No. 2025-CV-3745 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 16, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed Preliminary Objections filed by a Defendant-physician in a medical malpractice matter seeking to dismiss the claims asserted against the physician on the grounds that the Plaintiffs failed to effectuate service of original process in a timely fashion or with good faith upon the Defendant-physician prior to the expiration of the two (2) year statute of limitations. 

Judge Terrence R. Nealon, writing for the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, agreed that, in order to toll the statute of limitations, a plaintiff must indeed make a good faith effort to timely serve initial process on a Defendant. The court also agreed that, if a plaintiff fails to do so, the lawsuit is subject to dismissal where either (a) the plaintiff has demonstrated an intent to stall the judicial machinery, or (b) the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Rules regarding service of original process has prejudiced the defendant.

After reviewing the record before him, Judge Nealon found that the Plaintiff in this matter made repeated attempts to serve the Defendant at issue at multiple locations while expeditiously and repeatedly reinstating the Complaint along the way.

Accordingly, the court found that service of process upon the Defendant physician resulted from the Plaintiff’s repeated efforts to diligently and timely serve the doctor. The court also found that the Defendant doctor did not identify any prejudice that she allegedly suffered due to any delay in serving initial process.

As such, the doctor’s Preliminary Objections asserting untimely service of original process were overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

AI Hallucinations Appear in a Third Circuit Matter

In the case of McCarthy v. US Drug Enforcement Admin., No. 24-2704 (3d Cir. March 27, 2026 Phipps, J., Chung, J., and Roth, J.) (Op. by Chung, J.), in a matter of first impression, a divided US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a decision in which it reprimanded a Pennsylvania attorney whose work featured fabricated case law and various inaccuracies through artificial intelligence tools.

The court reprimanded the attorney involved for filing a brief that contained AI hallucinations. More specifically, the attorney filed a brief that included summaries of eight Drug Enforcement Administration adjudications that were generated by AI and supplied to him by a non-attorney. According to the Opinion, the attorney failed to verify the cases and the summaries, seven of which were filed with factual and legal errors, and one of which involved a case that did not even exist.

The court emphasized that the attorney involved not only failed to verify the erroneous citations generated by AI, but also failed to alert the court in this regard for months, even after the opposing attorney involved in the case identified the potential errors.

In a 2 to 1 ruling, the majority concluded that sanctions were warranted. The court found that the attorney violated Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 and Third Circuit Disciplinary Rule 2.1(d) by failing to provide competent representation.

The Third Circuit panel noted that, because it was this court’s “first opportunity to address the use of AI."  The Third Circuit panel noted that since it had not notified the attorney in question that the court would consider whether his conduct violated Pa. R.P.C. 1.1, the court was electing not to issue monetary sanctions.

However, the majority noted that, going forward, attorneys could face any of the sanctions available under the Circuit Court Disciplinary Rules 4.1-4.2, including suspension and even disbarment.

Judge Roth concurred in part and dissented in part, opining that the attorney in question also violated Pa. R.P.C. 3.3(a)(1), by making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal on at least two occasions. Judge Roth felt that more severe sanctions were warranted.

Judge Roth went on to note that the Majority did not need to warn attorneys to use artificial intelligence responsibly. She stated that “[n]o forewarning is necessary when it is clear what standard the attorney was required to follow.” 

Judge Roth felt that the court could instead take notice of the numerous court decisions from across the country that have already addressed an attorney’s obligation to take ownership over their work product.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “ ‘No Forewarning Necessary’: Divided 3rd Circuit Weighs Discipline For Attorney’s Use of AI Hallucinations,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (March 30, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Igor Omilaev from www.unsplash.com.

Trial Court Finds That Defendant Waived Arbitration Clause in Nursing Home Case by Litigating Case in Court

 

In the case of the Estate of Smalling v. 2990 Holm Operating, LLC, Jan. Term 2024, No. 240102492 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 9, 2025 Cohen, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the appellate court to uphold the trial court’s decision to deny a Defendant’s Motion to Compel an Arbitration in a nursing home case.

In this matter, the Plaintiffs allege that their family member decedent had passed away due to alleged negligence treatment received at the Defendant’s facility.

After the Plaintiffs had filed suit, the case proceeded with pleadings and discovery. Fourteen months after the lawsuit was filed, the Defendants filed a Petition to Compel Arbitration.

The court denied the Petition under the primary rationale that the Defendants had waived its right to compel arbitration by availing itself of the judicial process. The court noted that, here, there was a significant delay of over one year before the Defendant sought to compel arbitration. Given the delay and the active litigation in the lawsuit, including the filing of earlier Preliminary Objections by the Defendant, the trial court found a waiver of the right of the Defendant to request arbitration.

In so ruling, the trial court did not reach the Plaintiffs’ other arguments that the arbitration clause in the nursing home agreement was unenforceable under the doctrines of procedural and substantive unconscionability, and/or the argument that the person who had signed the arbitration agreement did not have the power to bind the decedent to the arbitration agreement.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Matthius Zomer on www.pexels.com.

Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 12, 2026).

Trial Court Addresses Duty of Counsel To Act Reasonably in Moving Forward With Discovery and Depositions

In the case of Knick v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, No. 2024-CV-3016 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan,. 30, 2026, Nealon, J.), the court addressed a second Motion filed by a Plaintiff to extend the deadlines for the completion of discovery and expert discovery, and to postpone the scheduled trial date, in a medical malpractice case.

In this Opinion, the court noted earlier admonitions from the court directing the parties to promptly initiate and complete their pre-trial preparations.

In their filings on this Motion, each party claimed that the opposing party was the reason for the delay. 

The court noted, however, that defense counsel produced emails and other communications between counsel reflecting that the Plaintiff made no attempt to schedule a single deposition for the first fourteen (14) months that the case was pending and that defense counsel had made many attempts to schedule depositions only to have Plaintiff’s counsel claim that they were unavailable and, on another occasion, to cancel the depositions that had been scheduled for mutually convenient dates.

The court noted that litigants and their counsel have an obligation to act reasonably in scheduling and conducting discovery depositions, and when attorneys are unavailable to complete pending legal matters in a timely fashion, the Rules of Professional Conduct require them to either (a) decline additional work, (b) seek assistance or (c) withdraw and allow another attorney to complete the work.

Ultimately, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend partially by allowing for deadlines to be modified in a limited fashion. However, the request to postpone the July of 2026 trial date was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

LACKAWANNA PRO BONO GOLF TOURNAMENT SET FOR JUNE 8, 2026

 

Summary Judgment Granted in Supermarket Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Jordan v. Brown’s Superstores, Inc., Aug. Term 2023, No. 02262 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 5, 2025 Yu, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in a slip and fall case involving a Plaintiff who allegedly slipped and fell on pieces of watermelon on a supermarket floor.

The trial court noted that the Plaintiff did not present any evidence that the Defendant had created the hazard. The Plaintiff also did not produce any evidence that the store had any actual knowledge of the pieces of watermelon being on the floor prior to the Plaintiff’s fall.

Moreover, no evidence was produced that would enable the Plaintiff to prove constructive notice on the part of the store. More specifically, there is no evidence presented as to how the pieces of watermelon came to be on the floor, or how long they had been present.

In addition to entering summary judgment for these reasons, the court also noted that the Plaintiff did not file any response to the Motion.

The court noted that the Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment provided an independent procedural basis to support the granting of the summary judgment motion under Pa. R.C.P. 1035.3(d).

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image: Photo by Shamblen Studios on www.unsplash.com.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 12, 2026).

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Court Rules that Placement of Wet Floor Signs Constitute Adequate Warning

In the case of Pitts v. Sonesta Intern. Hotel, Corp., No. 231002600 (C.P. Phila. Co. Nov. 24, 2025 Moore, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of a hotel in a case where a Plaintiff slipped and fell on a wet floor in the hotel’s foyer area.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff slipped and fell in an area where a maintenance worker for the hotel had recently mopped the floor but had also put out yellow caution signs. Videos surveillance footage confirmed that the maintenance worker had put the signs out.

According to the Opinion, during her testimony, the Plaintiff acknowledged the presence of the signs inside the foyer. However, the Plaintiff claimed that she did not see the signs before she slipped and fell.

At trial, the court granted the defense Motion for a Non Suit on the basis that there was no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by the jury once the Plaintiff rested and given that the Plaintiff had failed to establish a right to relief.

The court emphasized that, in Pennsylvania, a business owner had a duty to maintain a reasonably safe property and must either fix dangerous conditions or warn invitees about them.

The court additionally noted that invitees are expected to be aware of their surroundings in order to appreciate possible dangers and also to appreciate warnings of any hazards.

Here in this case, the court found that, by clearly placing the yellow “Wet Floor” signs on the floor in the hotel foyer, the Defendant had adequately warned the Plaintiff about the possibility of the foyer floor being slippery.

The court emphasized that the Plaintiff acknowledged the presence of the wet floor signs inside the foyer before she walked into the area. On cross-examination at trial, the Plaintiff agreed that she had seen at least one (1) of the yellow signs before she entered the foyer and prior to falling down. The trial court noted that, even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, it was the trial court’s opinion that the Plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of proving that the Defendant was liable for her fall.

Notably, the court noted in its Opinion that the placement of yellow warning signs in and around the foyer was conduct that established that the Defendant had adequately warned the Plaintiff of the dangers of the wet floor.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s suggestion that the hotel should have also have had someone standing near the foyer to tell customers inside the hotel that the floor was wet. The court found that this was not a reasonable requirement and that the law does not require a business owner to undertake such unreasonable measures to warn of hazards on the property.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 5, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Sandiyu Nuryono on www.pexels.com.