PLEASE CONSIDER VOLUNTEERING TO BE A MOCK TRIAL JUROR FOR COMPETITION IN SCRANTON

 

No Right To a New Trial Found After Trial Court Re-Opened Evidence After First Non-Jury Verdict And Then Entered Identical Second Non-Jury Verdict

In the non-precedential decision in the case of Graffia v. Thomas, No. 1497 WDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Dec. 30, 2024 Murray, J, McLaughlin, J., and King, J.) (Op. by King, J.), the court affirmed a trial court’s verdict in a non-jury case following the entry of a default judgment against the Defendant.

In this non-jury trial matter, the trial court issued a verdict prior to rendering a decision on whether the rebuttal testimony of the Plaintiff’s expert was admissible.

The trial court ultimately found that the rebuttal testimony was admissible.  As such, the trial court vacated its original verdict in order to take all of the evidence into consideration.

The trial court then issued a second verdict that was identical to the first verdict.

The Plaintiff appealed and argued that the trial court did not have the authority to vacate the first verdict after forty-three (43) days. The Plaintiff requested a new trial.

The Superior Court found that the trial court committed harmless error. The court noted that, since all of the evidence was taken into consideration prior to the rendering of the second verdict, the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate any prejudice.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Kasey E. Cahill of the Pittsburgh, PA office of Summers, McDonell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Court Finds No Duty Owed By Landowner Where Person Hit By Wayward Target Shooting Shot Coming From the Land

In the case of Folcomer v. Craft, No. 2018-SU-0025278 (C.P. York. Co. Jan. 8, 2025 Menges, J.), the court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by certain Defendants in a tragic shooting accident matter.

According to the Opinion, one of the Defendants in this case lived on the moving Defendant’s property. On the day of the incident, certain Co-Defendants were target shooting on the property.

Nearby, the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff’s decedent left their home and began a drive.

A bullet from the shooting target area of the nearby home traveled through the target, into the nearby woods, ricochet off a roadway and struck the decedent who was a passenger in the Plaintiff’s vehicle.

The Defendants who filed the summary judgment motion in this case were the owners of the property on which the target shooting was taking place.

In this decision, the court ruled that no duty exists to control the acts of third parties unless a “special relationship exists with either the actor the victim."

In this decision, the court also addressed the Nanty-Glo rule and found that this rule did not bar summary judgment in this case as the testimony relied upon by the moving the Defendant was from adversarial Co-Defendants.

The court also referred to §318 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and found that the moving Defendant landowners had no duty to control the conduct of the shooting Defendants as there was no evidence that the moving Defendants were aware of any continuous or dangerous use of the land that would have allowed them an opportunity to intervene. In this case, it appeared that the act of target shooting on the property was not an ordinary event.

In the end, the court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the moving Defendants who were the owners of the land in question.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Stephen M. Hickey of the York, PA law firm of Griffith, Lerman, Lutz & Scheib for bringing this case to my attention.

Federal Court Addresses When Time Begins To Run To Determine if Removal To Federal Court Was Filed Too Late

In the case of Baucom v. Vidal, No. 2:24-CV-01818-JFM (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2024 Murphy, J.), the court addressed a Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand a motor vehicle accident case from federal court back down to state court. 

The court noted that the issue before it was when the Defendant’s thirty (30) day time period to remove a case to federal court begins to run.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs filed this suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia and alleged that the damages claimed were in excess of $50,000.00.

At some point in time after the statutory thirty (30) day removal clock had expired, the Plaintiffs made it known that they were actually seeking more than $350,000.00, that is, an amount more than enough to satisfy the $75,000 amount necessary to support diversity jurisdiction.

At that point in time, the Defendants filed a Notice of Removal to the federal court. The Plaintiff then moved to remand the case back to state court, saying that the removal was too late.

The court noted that the questions before it was whether the original Complaint filed in the state court put the Defendants on notice that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.00.

Judge Murphy noted that the answer to this question is straightforward under the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ bright-line test.  Under the appropriate standard of review, the court noted that, if an initial pleading does not give the Defendant notice of the right to remove the case to federal court, the Defendants shall file a Notice of Removal within thirty (30) days after receipt, by the Defendant, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may be first ascertained that the case is one which is or has indeed become removable. In this regard, the court cited to the Third Circuit’s decision in McLaren v. UPS Store, Inc., 32 F.4th 232 (3d Cir. 2022).

This federal district court noted that the Defendants were not on notice that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.00 until the Plaintiffs made their $350,000.00 settlement demand. As such, the court found that the Defendant’s removal was timely. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.

Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Federal Case Alert.” www.Law.com (Jan. 2025).

Many Volunteer Jurors Needed For First Round Of Mock Trial Competition in Scranton on February 4, 2025

HOPING YOU CAN PLEASE CONSIDER DONATING YOUR TIME AND EXPERTISE AS A MOCK TRIAL JUROR FOR THIS YEAR'S COMPETITION IN SCRANTON, PA.   

Federal Court Judge Wolson Allows Plaintiff to Secure Claims Evaluation Documentation From UIM Carrier in Discovery

In the case of Long v. Progressive Adv. Ins. Co., No. 2:24-CV-01735-JDW (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2024 Wolson, J.), the court addressed a Motion to Compel filed by a Plaintiff against a UIM carrier.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and brought a UIM claim against Progressive.

During the course of the matter, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a demand package to Progressive requesting the tendering of the limits. The court noted that the Defendant had not yet evaluated the Plaintiff’s claim but did so thereafter.

It was noted that, when Progressive produced a claim evaluation documentation in discovery, the carrier had redacted information from the document, including the value it had placed on the Plaintiff’s claim as well as with respect to the analysis with the specific elements of the Plaintiff’s claim. Progressive redacted the documents on work product grounds.

The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel the Defendant carrier to produce an unredacted document.

The court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion after finding that the Defendant carrier had failed to meet its burden of showing that it had created the information, which had been redacted, in anticipation of litigation.

The court noted that the UIM carrier had a duty to investigate and evaluate the Plaintiff’s UIM claim and, based on the court's review of the record before it, the carrier had not yet investigated and evaluated the claims presented by the time it created the claim evaluation document.

Although the court acknowledged that the demand letter from Plaintiff’s counsel could have prompted the Defendant to conduct the evaluation or to complete it quicker, the court found that the Defendant had a separate, business-related (i.e, not litigation-related) obligation to perform the evaluation.

Judge Wolson additionally noted that the demand letter did not demand any more than what Progressive had offered or more than the policy limits. The demand letter also did not threaten a bad faith claim. Accordingly, the court found that there were no circumstances to suggest that the evaluation by the carrier was prepared in anticipation of litigation.

Judge Wolson noted held that there was no per se rule that every document created by an insurance company after receiving a demand letter from an insured qualified as a document protected by the work product doctrine. The court ruled in this fashion after finding that a demand letter did not absolve an insurance company of its obligation to evaluate a claim.

Accordingly, the court rejected the carrier’s assertion of the work product privilege over a claim evaluation document where the carrier had a legal obligation to evaluate an insured’s claim and had not yet evaluated the claim when the insured sent a demand letter. 

In essence, the court in this matter felt that this demonstrated that the evaluation was prepared in the ordinary course of business, rather than in anticipation of litigation.

Accordingly, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel discovery.

It is noted that the court began its Opinion by indicating “[i]insurance companies evaluate claims as part of their business, and their claims evaluations often result in demands from policyholders and then litigation. In discovery, that reality poses a challenge: “litigants (and then judges) must decide when an insurance company created a claim evaluation document in the course of its business and when it did so in anticipation of litigation. The first category of documents is discoverable, but the latter is work product that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) protects.”

Judge Wolson noted that the work product doctrine, which is codified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) protects materials prepared in anticipation of litigation from discovery unless certain exceptions apply. The court noted that the work product immunity shelters an attorney’s mental processes, providing a privileged area for the attorney to analyze and prepare his client’s case.

The court also noted that a party claiming work product protection bears the burden of showing that the materials in question were prepared in the course of preparation for possible litigation.

The court reiterated that, because insurance companies evaluate claims made by their insureds in the ordinary course of their business, and outside of any possible litigation in the future, discovery disputes involving insurance company claims file often present problems for the parties in the court.

As noted, under the circumstances presented in this case, Judge Wolson found that claim evaluation documentation prepared by the carrier did not amount to a document that was prepared in preparation for litigation.  The Judge found, after an in camera review, that the document, in the Judge's eyes, revealed claims handling matters and not litigation analysis.  As such, the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel was granted.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Federal Case Alert.” www.Law.com (Jan. 9, 2025).

Upcoming Rule Change (Effective April 1, 2025) Mandates that Trial Court Judges Sit in on Jury Selection

No More Leaving Jurors Alone with the Attorneys (unless agreed)

On January 7, 2025, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved a change to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure to include a mandate that a trial court judge be present in the courtroom for jury selections in civil cases unless the litigants opt out of the requirement. This rule is set to take effect on April 1, 2025 and can be found under Pa. R.C.P. 220.3.

A copy of the changes to the Rule can be seen at this LINK.

Source: Article – “Phila. Court System Pushed To Adapt As Justices Greenlight Changes to Pa.’s Civil Jury Selection Rules” By: Aleeza Furman of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Jan. 8, 2025).