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Trial Court Limits Effort By Two Attorneys in Same Firm To Question Multiple Witnesses at Depositions

In the case of Mercado v. UGI Utilities, Inc., No. 2022-CV-5250 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 15, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed the issue of whether multiple, independent interrogations of the same witness at a deposition by separate Plaintiffs’ lawyers in the same firm is permitted.

This appears to be an issue of first impression in terms of any court decision.

According to the Opinion, two lawyers in the same law firm commenced consolidated actions on behalf of three Plaintiffs as a result of a single motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by the eruption of a gas pipeline underneath a roadway. For more than three years, those attorneys in the same law firm jointly represented all three Plaintiffs.

Shortly before the first set of discovery depositions began, as an apparent strategy, those lawyers withdrew their appearances for particular Plaintiffs in certain actions and then proceeded to conduct separate examinations of the deponents, thereby prompting objections by defense counsel. The defense attorneys challenged the propriety of independent interrogations by those attorneys and their redundant questioning that prolonged the depositions.

In anticipation of a next round of depositions, the Defendants filed a Motion for a Protective Order seeking to limit the Plaintiffs “to having only one attorney question each witness that is deposed in the matter.”

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County

In his ruling, Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas undertook a detailed analysis of the issue presented.

Judge Nealon generally noted that the Plaintiffs in this matter had identical interests in the consolidated cases. The court noted that both Pa. R.C.P. 223(2) and Pa. R.E. 611(a)(2)-(3) provide trial judges with the discretion to limit the number of attorneys who may represent the same group of parties.  Those Rules also allow a trial court judge to exercise reasonable control over the mode of examining witnesses in order to protect the witnesses from harassment and to avoid the wasting of time.

In his review of other cases that peripherally addressed the issue presented, the court noted that it has been recognized that it is an abuse of discretion to permit attorneys to effectively “tag team” a witness with duplicative participation and interrogation while those attorneys are representing the same interests.

Judge Nealon noted that, for example, under the deposition protocol requested by the Plaintiffs in this matter, a law firm representing a tortfeasor Defendant and a vicariously liable employer in cases of uncontested agency would be entitled to have a second defense lawyer in their firm represent the employer and then have both attorneys conduct independent and separate examination of witnesses even though the tortfeasor and the employer have identical interests. The court noted that allowing such a practice would protract depositions needlessly and cause recurring objections against the repetitive questioning, as was happening in the case before the court here.

Judge Nealon ultimately held that, in light of the two lawyers’ joint representation of all three Plaintiffs for more than three years, and given the complete commonality of interests among the Plaintiffs in the consolidated cases, the Defendant’s Motion for a Protective Order would be granted. 

Under the Court's Order, the Plaintiffs were directed to designate a single attorney to examine each deponent on behalf of all of the Plaintiffs during future depositions.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image: Photo by Werner Pfennig on www.pexels.com.

Court Upholds Terms of Arbitration Agreement

In the case of Caplinger v. Power Home Solar, LLC, No. CI-24-01474 (C.P. Lanc. Co. Brown, J.), the court sustained a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and held that a valid, enforceable Arbitration Agreement existed between the parties and covered the dispute in controversy.

As such, the court ruled that, under the terms of the agreement, the parties were bound to participate in a binding Arbitration as opposed to this litigation.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a contractual dispute regarding the installation of solar panels on the Plaintiff’s property. During the course of the work, a fire originated in the area where the Defendants had performed the work. The Plaintiffs sued in negligence and breach of contract.

As noted above, based upon the contractual agreement, the court sustained the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and dismissed the case after finding that the contract between the parties contained a valid Arbitration clause.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 9, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Clement Nivessa on www.pexels.com.

Superior Court Applies a Statue of Repose in a Construction Case

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Trepanowski v. Hovnanian Enterprises, Inc., No. 841 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Aug. 28, 2026 Dubow, J., Kunselman, J., and Sullivan, J.) (Mem. Op. By Sullivan, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the law regarding a statute of repose.

In this matter, the Plaintiffs were pursuing a construction defect claim against various construction Defendants.

The trial court entered summary judgment against the Plaintiff’s finding that a statute of repose barred the Plaintiff’s claims. The trial court’s decision was affirmed on appeal.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was raising claims relative to alleged defects in their property that began to allegedly be discovered after the Plaintiff’s moved into the home near the end of 2007. Work was performed on the home in 2011 as well as in 2021. The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in 2023.

The Defendants raised various arguments stating that the construction project statue of repose served as an absolute bar to recovery given that more than twelve (12) years had elapsed between the issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy of the property and the initiation of the lawsuit. The Defendants also asserted other grounds based upon the statue of repose.

The Plaintiffs countered that the statute of repose did not bar their claim because their lawsuit was initiated within ten (10) years of the completion of the work on the home.

As stated, after its review of the matter before it, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled, in a non-precedential decision, that the trial court had properly entered summary judgment in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Kenneth T. Newman of the Pittsburgh office of Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, LLP, for bringing this decision to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Burst on www.pexels.com.

Superior Court Finds That UIM Claim Fails Under Terms of an Umbrella Policy

In the case of Mathews v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 638 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Sept. 4, 2026 Stevens, P.J.E., Stabile, J., Lane, J.) (Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the issue of whether an umbrella policy applied to provide underinsured (UIM) motorist benefits to a Plaintiff.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a result of being hit by a car while crossing the street.  The Opinion noted that the driver involved was underinsured.

According to the Opinion, there was an insurance policy issued to the Plaintiff’s employer that entitled the Plaintiff to UM/UIM benefits.However, the Plaintiff was denied any excess benefits under his employer’s umbrella policy. 

The Plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract and for a declaratory judgment on the issue of UIM coverage under the umbrella policy.

The trial court had entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the umbrella carrier.  On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed.

The Superior Court noted that the plain and express terms of the umbrella policy, including exclusions, limited the umbrella coverage to third-party claims only.

The Superior Court rejected the Plaintiff’s efforts to argue that the policy language was ambiguous. The Plaintiff had attempted to argue that the umbrella policy contained an endorsement indicating that coverage for bodily injury would follow the terms of any underlying insurance.

However, as noted, other language in the umbrella policy specifically limited the umbrella insurance coverage to third party claims.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Pa. Super. Blog (pasuperblog.substack.com) by Attorney Jon Bruno of Bruno Litigation, LLC in Pittsburgh, PA.

Source of image:  Jean-Phillipe Delberghe on www.unsplash.com.
 

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Trial Court Denies Motion for Summary Judgment That Was Based on Traffic Controls Exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act

In the case of Haggerty v. City of Philadelphia, No. 230400850 (C.P. Phila. Co. May 27, 2026 Wright, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1926 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved an accident during which the decedent was operating a motorcycle southbound on Broad Street in Philadelphia when the tortfeasor Defendant exited a parking lot, crossed multiple lanes of traffic and attempted to reach the left-turn lanes on Broad Street and the collision occurred.

The Plaintiff filed suit against the city and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. Those Defendants joined in the tortfeasor driver and other Defendants.

After discovery was completed, the City of Philadelphia moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Plaintiff had failed to prove that it had notice of a dangerous traffic-control condition, failed to identify an appropriate remedial measure, and failed to show that PennDOT would accepted any proposed controls at the intersection.

Reviewing the case before it, the trial court found that the Plaintiff had produced enough evidence to create factual disputes relative to all of the arguments raised by the Defendant. The court also noted that the Plaintiff had produced expert evidence in support of the claims presented.

 The trial court asserted in its Rule 1925 Opinion that it properly denied the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this motor vehicle accident case because the Plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to create triable issues of fact under the traffic-control exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

As such, the trial court was requested the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s denial of the city’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 23, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Trev W. Adams on www.pexels.com.